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What conceptual and methodological resources would it take for political theory to be able to 
more deeply analyze the emotional and affective dimensions of political life? In this dissertation, 
I articulate interdisciplinary work on affect and emotion into political theory in order to realize 
four linked objectives: first, to develop a method of reading and interpreting political theory 
capable of tracing the theoretical work done by affect and emotion in works of political thought; 
second, to reassess the boundaries of the political theory canon in terms of the thinkers that 
‘count’ as part of that canon as well as the conceptual concerns that ‘count’; third, to provide 
specific re-readings and re-imaginings of four particular theorists or theoretical movements: 
Thomas Hobbes, Karl Marx, Marxist feminism, and Simone de Beauvoir; and fourth, to 
contribute to theories of embodied political ethics emerging from this kind of reading by 
centering the interactive, material body in ways attuned to emotion and affect. Ultimately, this 
dissertation argues that ‘the political’ is always emotional and affective. 
 Building on contemporary work in political theory on materialism and embodiment (e.g. 
Connolly 1999; Bennett 2001; Connolly 2002; Tambornino 2002; Frost 2008; Protevi 2009; 
Bennett 2010; Coole and Frost 2010; Washick et al. 2015), I construct and practice a method for 




between political theory and the transdisciplinary project of affect theory (e.g. Deleuze 1988; 
Massumi 2002; Ahmed 2004; Clough 2007; Clough 2010). My approach becomes a method of 
reading, theorizing, affecting, and being affected by political theoretical texts and concepts, one 
potentially useful for thinkers and issues beyond those of this project. 
 The main chapters of the dissertation explore what this looks like for each member of my 
constellation. The first chapter reads Thomas Hobbes as a precursor to affect theory in his 
attention to the politics of the body; an encounter between affect and Hobbes’s materialism 
enables a reinterpretation of the state of nature. Chapter two reinterprets Karl Marx to argue that 
a critique of capitalist affect is central to his account of capital: on the one hand, capitalism 
amplifies the potential affective capacity of bodies through its development and organization of 
productive forces; on the other, it captures this increase in affective capacity to enrich the 
bourgeoisie, immiserate the proletariat, and reproduce capitalist relations. The third chapter 
engages in an affective reading of Marxist feminists to construct a theory of social reproduction 
that focuses on the reproduction of affective capacity within patriarchal and capitalist forces, and 
to analyze four specific Marxist feminist thinkers and concepts, exploring how affect theory can 
productively extend and rearticulate the project of Marxist feminism. Chapter 4, in which I read 
Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex alongside Sara Ahmed’s The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 
investigates the emotional valences of phenomenology, subjectivity, gender oppression, power, 
and social transformation. The conclusion assembles the work of the main chapters to contribute 
to accounts of embodied political ethics, arguing that ethical considerations emanate from the 
center of ‘the political’ and that my method can theorize resources for affectively analyzing this 
intersection of ethics and politics. The conclusion also explores the limitations of affective 




violences, the potential emptiness of affective ethical categories, the status of collectivity and 
democratic practice, among others.   
 This project develops the conceptual and methodological resources necessary to think 
through the ways politics is materially felt and experienced by embodied subjects. Ultimately, it 
analyzes the political forces that shape, channel, assemble, appropriate, redirect, dampen, and 
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Feeling as Method in Political Theory 
 
“There is a double reading … [the systematic reading and] on the other hand and 
at the same time, the affective reading, without an idea of the whole, where one is 
carried along or set down, put in motion or at rest, shaken or calmed according 
to the velocity of this or that part” (Deleuze 1988, 129). 
 
 
Prologue: Three Scenes of Political Bodies 
 
At an August 2015 Bernie Sanders rally in Seattle, Washington, #BlackLivesMatter activists 
took the stage and disrupted Sanders’s speech, calling out “white supremacist liberalism”, 
criticizing Seattle’s plan to build a new prison, and attempting to start a moment of silence for 
Michael Brown on the one-year anniversary of his death. As two black women took over the 
microphone, members of the predominantly white crowd booed, yelled that the protestors should 
be arrested, and shouted profanities during the attempted moment of silence (Brunner 2015).1 In 
a later interview, Mara Willaford – one of the two protestors to take over the microphone and 
podium – narrated the experience, including its particularly emotional and embodied dimensions: 
We did so much mental, emotional, spiritual prep before the action, because we knew it 
was going to be controversial. We knew it was going to be a really hostile environment. 
But there's nothing that can prepare you for what it actually feels like to have thousands 
of white people yelling at you. … I put my fist up, and I close my eyes. And I tell 
Marissa [Johnson, the other protestor with Willaford], ‘Hold my hand.’ We stand there. I 
can hear her breath caught in her body. I can feel her shaking and crying (StoryCorps 
2016). 
 
In the moment of this particular rally, demands for and policy proposals to curb police violence, 
start to dismantle the carceral state, and call for other forms of racial and economic justice are 
channeled into a politics that works at a visceral level. There is a material politics to the 
movement, dually legible in the Willaford and Johnson’s embodied presence disrupting the rally 
and in the discomfort and anger of the (liberal and likely to identify as anti-racist) crowd. 




together on the streets of cities, staging “die-ins” in symbolically loaded spaces, and insisting 
upon social and political attention to the disposability of black bodies. This visceral politics 
exceeds customary political theoretical vocabularies of representation, rights, democratic 
practice, and deliberation. 
At content moderation sites – both within the US and outsourced abroad (especially to the 
Philippines) – over 100,000 laborers spend their workdays viewing violent and disturbing images 
as they attempt to keep pictures and videos of gruesome car crashes, sexual violence, beheadings, 
pornography, animal abuse, and other banned material off of social-networking sites and mobile 
applications (Chen 2014). Visiting one content moderation company in the Philippines working 
for the mobile app Whisper, Chen (2014) recounts the scene:  
A list of categories, scrawled on a whiteboard, reminds the workers of what they’re 
hunting for: pornography, gore, minors, sexual solicitation, sexual body parts/images, 
racism. When Baybayan sees a potential violation, he drills in on it to confirm, then sends 
it away—erasing it from the user’s account and the service altogether—and moves back 
to the grid [of posts]. Within 25 minutes, Baybayan has eliminated an impressive variety 
of dick pics, thong shots, exotic objects inserted into bodies, hateful taunts, and requests 
for oral sex.  
 
As Sarah T. Roberts writes (2016, 8), the “hidden labor” of these workers – where they “view 
and deal with material that is racist, homophobic, sexist, and disturbing as a regular part of their 
daily work” – is essential to the “curation and creation of social media sites and the content they 
disseminate.” One can imagine the embodied experience of these workers. Like many workers 
today, they face the everyday stresses and pressures of entry-level and/or globalized labor in 
networks of global neoliberal capital (cf. Ong 2006) as well as the bodily discomfort and eye 
strain from sitting at a desk staring at a computer screen for long periods. But they also 
experience a constant assault on their senses all workday, every workday. They are continuously 




interviewed describes the everyday experience of these workers as “like PTSD” as the images 
leave “a memory trace in their [the worker’s] mind” (Chen 2014). Political decisions about labor 
regulations and globalization, flows of global capital and digital media, and virulent visual-
auditory expressions of gendered, racialized, sexualized, and homophobic violence converge on 
and assault the body of the content moderator, with long-lasting effects. 
 In the year 2015 alone, almost two million migrants – many of them refugees fleeing 
conflict and repression – entered Europe; most of them attempted a dangerous journey across the 
Mediterranean Sea to migrate, and almost 4,000 people died trying to complete this crossing 
(BBC 2016; UNHCR 2016). There were over 1.3 million asylum claims in European countries in 
2015, yet the number of approved asylum claims or migrants accepted by various countries is far 
less than this number (BBC 2016). Striking images and narrated experiences of migrant bodies 
have proliferated: camps in Calais, France where migrants wait to attempt to get into Great 
Britain; crowds of refugees at train stations in Hungary; groups of Europeans welcoming 
migrants and protesting their arrival; a dead Syrian toddler on a beach in Turkey. In the so-called 
“refugee crisis” or “migrant crisis,” bodies in motion confront a panoply of political forces, 
including but not limited to the state, war, securitizing discourses, capital flows, militarization, 
international organizations, the fear and hate of xenophobic individuals, bio- and necropolitical 
regimes, and more.   
 All of these sketches are narratives about the affective, emotional, and embodied 
dimensions of political life. These and many other contemporary political phenomena – those 
who live under constant threat of American drone attacks as well as the situation of drone 
operators/pilots (Wilcox 2015), emotional appeals in the War on Terror and other international 




Mossner 2014), the active biopolitical debilitation of populations (Puar forthcoming), 
neoliberalism’s reliance on emotional and affective labor (Lazzarato 1996; Weeks 2007a; 
Hochschild 2012; Lordon 2014), and so on – demand that political theory embark upon a deeper 
engagement with current interdisciplinary work on affect and emotion so as to be able to think 




What would it take for political theory to be able to think through political and ethical responses 
to the especially embodied dimensions of systemic racism and police violence, the brutal 
sensorium of globalized, digital labor such as content moderation, or large flows of refugees and 
migrants? What frameworks and modes of reading and theorizing are necessary for political 
theory to grasp the range of and potential connections between these scenes? How must we 
rethink the political theory canon to fully engage these phenomena, especially their particularly 
material and embodied qualities?  
More broadly, what conceptual and methodological resources would it take for political 
theory to be able to more deeply analyze the emotional and affective dimensions of political life? 
What are the political forces that comprise, shape, channel, redirect, amplify, dampen, 
appropriate, reassemble, connect, and disconnect affect and emotion? In this dissertation, I 
articulate interdisciplinary work on affect and emotion into political theory in order to realize 
four linked objectives: first, to develop a method of reading and interpreting political theory 
capable of tracing the theoretical work done by affect and emotion in works of political thought, 
especially where thinkers are superficially not working on the level of affect and emotion; 
second, to reassess the boundaries of the political theory canon in terms of the thinkers that 




specific re-readings and re-imaginings of four particular theorists or theoretical movements: 
Thomas Hobbes, Karl Marx, Marxist feminism, and Simone de Beauvoir; and fourth, to 
contribute to theories of embodied political ethics emerging from this reading by centering the 
dynamic, interactive, material body in ways attuned to emotion and affect. Ultimately, this 
dissertation argues that ‘the political’ has always already been emotional and affective.  
I mobilize affect and emotion as a reading-writing-theorizing-feeling practice, one which 
investigates Pheng Cheah’s question “what is the matter of the political and what is the matter of 
politics?” (2010, 90). Feeling2 as a method engages the materiality of affect and emotion to offer 
one standpoint – or perhaps a Deleuzean line of flight – for answering this prompt and enlivening 
the study of political theory. Given that affect itself has not generally been part of political theory 
or of the ways the political theory canon is interpreted (with some exceptions, of course), such a 
practice and method are necessarily experimental and unsure in advance of what emerges from 
affective-emotional readings of political theory.3 Indeed, as I will discuss later, one of my 
motivations for such an approach is to remain open to where reading the history of political 
theory beside affect theory can take us. Spinoza claims that we do not yet know what a body can 
do, and that this fact should impel inquiry into the affects, capacities, powers, and knowledges of 
the body (Spinoza 2005, pt. III prop. II scholia; Deleuze 1990, 226). In terms of this dissertation, 
not only do we not yet know what a body is capable of, but we also do not yet know what certain 
modes of theorizing embodied affect and emotion in political theory can do. I thus mark out one 
possible elaboration of what affective political theory might be capable of. To do so, I make an 
interdisciplinary move, setting up a relay and constructive engagement between on the one hand 
political theory, and on the other work on affect and emotion from cultural studies and cultural 




literary criticism, and American studies, among others. As a reading and theorizing practice, the 
intention is to intensify connections of various kinds between political theory and affect theory.   
This dissertation builds on contemporary work in political theory on materialism and 
embodiment (Connolly 1999; Bennett 2001; Connolly 2002; Tambornino 2002; Frost 2008; 
Protevi 2009; Bennett 2010; D. H. Coole and Frost 2010; Washick et al. 2015), but specifically 
pursues affect and emotion as means of engaging matter and the body. I argue my approach 
becomes one way of doing “positive ontopolitical interpretation,” a “strategy of attachment” 
where “the idea is to interpret actively, specifically, and comparatively” (Connolly 1995, 36–37). 
Here one “project[s] ontopolitical assumptions explicitly into detailed interpretations” in order to 
“offer affirmative interpretations and positive ideals” while also “acknowledging that your 
implicit projections surely exceed your explicit formulation of them” and “challeng[ing] closure 
in the [ontopolitical] matrix by affirming the contestable character of your own projections” (36-
37). In terms of my project, I inject ontological and ontopolitical assumptions of affect and the 
body into political theoretical texts as a way to actively interpret specific theorists as well as to 
compare and read across theorists, while recognizing that affect, emotion, and the dynamism of 
the body will resist closure and exceed our accounts of them. The “affirmative interpretations” 
this project hypothesizes would include specific readings of particular theorists as well as 
surprising and fruitful connections between them, while the “positive ideal” involves the 
contribution to theories of embodied political ethics I outline in the conclusion. That Connolly 
describes this method of interpretation as a “strategy of attachment” is also noteworthy, 
considering the importance of the idea of attachment to some strands of affect theory. As Sara 
Ahmed argues, emotions work to produce movement and attachment at the same time, or more 




(2004, 11). While Connolly does not pursue the emotional valences of “attachment” as an 
interpretive method, I would contend that bringing political theory and affect theory into 
proximity with one another opens up new possibilities for tracking movements within political 
theoretical texts and to forging new attachments between concepts, traditions, texts, and thinkers 
previously detached from one another.  
I argue that my approach is not just a projection of ontological assumptions, but more so 
a method of reading, theorizing, and affecting/being affected by political theoretical texts and 
concepts, one potentially useful for thinkers and issues beyond those of this project. The main 
chapters of the dissertation explore what this looks like for each member of my constellation. 
The rest of this introduction concerns itself most of all with how an affective turn in political 
theory might unfold, laying out the modes of encountering and interpreting the history of 
Western political theory that are at stake in such a project. In the remainder of this section, I 
provide an overview of the main threads of affect theory that I work with, as well as why I 
deploy them and navigate the tensions within affect theory in the specific way I do. The 
subsequent section explicitly conceptualizes the method of reading for affect and emotion that I 
will use in the dissertation, drawing primarily on the work of Eve Kosofky Sedgwick and Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari. I then discuss the multiple ways I understand the relationship 
between political theory and affect theory in this project. The final section of the introduction 
briefly outlines my interpretations of Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminism, and Beauvoir. 
Theories of Affect and Emotion 
 In this project, I work with two trajectories of contemporary inter-/trans-disciplinary 
work on affect and emotion. The first develops a concept of emotion that works to problematize 




subjectivity, exemplified in the work of Sara Ahmed or Ann Cvetkovich. The second – working 
with a trajectory from Baruch Spinoza to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari – elaborates an 
account of affect as an autonomic and asubjective intensity or force, as exemplified by Patricia T. 
Clough or Brian Massumi, among others. Although a multiplicity of approaches to affect exist 
beyond the two I describe here, I find these two particular strands especially useful for engaging 
the thinkers of this study and for highlighting tensions within affect theory.4 I will explore the 
differences between the approaches below. Here I want to mark their important shared 
commitments to thinking through embodiment, materiality, and sensation in a way that rejects 
dominant tropes in Western theory. Such tropes include: Cartesian dualism; a conception of the 
subject as atomistic or bounded; a rigid dichotomy between the individual and the social or the 
biological and the cultural; and purely cognitive conceptualizations of emotion or feeling. 
Ahmed insists on the connection between emotion and sensation, and argues that it is 
through the emotional interpretation of sensations – themselves “responses to the impressions of 
objects and others” – that “bodily surfaces take shape” (2004, 25). Against both colloquial 
models of emotion that presume the interiority of emotions – for example ‘I have a feeling, that 
moves outward from myself’ – as well as “outside-in” social or psychological models in which 
emotions are assumed to come from outside of an individual and move into them, Ahmed details 
the way that emotions “produce the very surfaces and boundaries” of the individual and the 
social and that “objects of emotion take shape as effects of circulation” (10). Emotions move; 
they are not things we can have or possess. Instead of “positively inhabit[ing]” somebody or 
something, emotions are part of what Ahmed calls an “affective economy” of circulation, with 
the subject as only “one nodal point in the economy” (45-46). The crucial question to ask is that 




and others “sticky,” or “saturated with affect”, for example the way that white fear and hate have 
become stuck to black bodies (chap. 2-3). Cvetkovich offers an account of affect and emotion 
similar to Ahmed’s. In her early work, she uses emotion, affect, and feeling more or less 
interchangeably, for example in the way she discusses “cultural texts as repositories of feelings 
and emotions”, an “archive of feelings” related to trauma that acts as “a point of entry” to “many 
forms of love, rage, intimacy, grief, shame, and more” and “represent[s] examples of how 
affective experience can provide the basis for new cultures” (2003, 7). In her more recent work, 
she deploys “affect” to describe a collection of “impulses, desires, and feelings that get 
historically constructed in a range of ways” (2012, 4). In general, for both Ahmed and 
Cvetkovich, emotion and affect are more or less interchangeable and usually refer back to 
subjects in some way. 
An alternative approach focuses on affect as an autonomic and asubjective force or 
intensity. This trajectory flows from Spinoza (2005) to Deleuze – including the latter’s texts on 
Spinoza (1988; 1990) and work with Guattari (1987; 1994) – to more contemporary theory. In 
Deleuze’s rendering, Spinoza theorizes bodies in terms of capacity to affect and to be affected 
(Spinoza’s affectus), such that bodies interact in encounters that can increase or decrease this 
capacity (this change in capacity is Spinoza’s affectio) (Deleuze 1988). For Deleuze and Guattari, 
these Spinozan concepts give rise to a definition of the body as “the sum total of the material 
elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness” and 
“the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential” 
(1987, 260). This mode of individuation – “haecceity” – “consist[s] entirely of relations of 




Recent scholarship has expanded this concept and study of affect, in what we may 
broadly understand as an “affective turn” in critical and cultural theory (Clough 2007). Affect 
can be conceptualized as “pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body’s 
capacity to act” that point to a “dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter generally” 
(Clough 2010, 207). Massumi links affect to intensity and sensation and contends that it is 
“autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, 
or potential for interaction, it is” (2002, 35). Along similar lines, Kathleen Stewart explains the 
world of affect as “transpersonal or prepersonal,” with “bodies literally affecting one another and 
generating intensities” through affects as moving things; as such, the self is what “enfolds the 
intensities it finds itself in,” understanding the individual (such as it is) as a “collection of 
trajectories and circuits” (2007, 128; 58–59). 
In many ways, these two strands of affect theory stand in marked contrast to one another. 
Distinguishing her work from Massumi’s, Ahmed contends that sharply distinguishing affect 
from emotion “can under-describe the work of emotions, which involve forms of intensity, 
bodily orientation, and direction that are not simply about ‘subjective content’ or qualification of 
intensity” (2010, 230n1; her emphasis). Moreover, “intensities” themselves may be more 
directed and qualified, such that even if we could distinguish affective bodily sensation from an 
attributed subjective emotion, the two “are contiguous; they slide into each other; they stick, and 
cohere, even when they are separated” (230-231n1). For her, the clear demarcation of affect from 
emotion occludes far more than it reveals. Conversely, Massumi (2002, 27–28; 35–36) and 
Clough (2010, 207; 224n1) both emphasize that affect theory in their understanding explicitly 
does not refer back to a subjective emotion or feeling. Massumi for instance claims that affect 




trajectories of affect theory I work with in this project are thus to some extent incommensurable, 
one emphasizing the relationship between affect and subjective emotion and the other arguing 
for the autonomy of affect.  
 Nonetheless, questions about the potential collapsing, relation, and/or distinction of 
emotion and affect have been the topic of much debate. Massumi himself acknowledges the 
difficulty of upholding a rigid contrast “in any final way” even though that distinction remains 
analytically and ontologically important (2002, 293n17). While maintaining a substantive 
distinction between affect and emotion, Sianne Ngai argues we should understand this as a 
“modal difference of intensity or degree” rather than “a formal difference of quality or kind” so 
that we can pay attention to transitions between the two (2005, 27). Carolyn Pedwell (2014, 20) 
contends “that it is sometimes useful to make contingent analytical distinctions between these 
categories” of affect and emotion “without suggesting that they are wholly discrete.” For her, “if 
affect pertains to emerging and shifting intensities rather than named or recognised entities, we 
could consider it be less discursively and socially constructed than emotion” (20), yet Pedwell 
nonetheless chooses to “often use the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ interchangeably ‘to highlight 
the fluidity of conceptual [and disciplinary] boundaries’ [Koivunen 2010, 10]” (21). Several 
thinkers turn to “feeling” as a term encompassing an overlap and/or undecidability between 
different theories and understandings of affect and emotion. For Cvetkovich, “feeling” functions 
as a “generic term” that is useful for “spanning the distinctions between emotion and affect 
central to some theories” and for “acknowledging the somatic or sensory nature of feelings as 
experiences that aren’t just cognitive concepts or constructions”; she favors the term for its 
“intentionally imprecise” usage, as it retains the “ambiguity between feelings as embodied 




understanding feeling as an overarching concept encompassing embodied, physiological 
experiences as well as more subjective, cognitive processes (2001, 4–6), while Ngai claims that 
we should characterize feeling as a category both social and material (2005, 25). Teresa Brennan, 
conversely, contends that affects, understood as material and energetic, are “the physiological 
shift accompanying a judgment” and “basically synonymous with” emotions. Although affects 
are more “physiological” while emotions are more psychological and “longer-lasting” for her, 
feeling is quite distinct, referring to “sensations that have found the right match in words” (2004, 
5–6).  
In general, I think we ought to avoid any conclusive decision about whether to maintain a 
firm distinction between affect as an asubjective force or a subjective emotion, whether to 
traverse the “circuit from affect to subjectively felt emotional states” (Clough 2010, 207), 
whether to collapse affect and emotion (and possibly feeling) into each other, or whether to take 
any other kind of final position. Instead, I suggest that political theory’s encounter with affect 
theory should pursue a more ecumenical approach, with the adoption of any one kind of affect 
theory remaining contingent and refusing closure or exclusivity. The strand of theorizing on 
affect and emotion guiding political theoretical inquiry should always be responsive to the texts, 
thinkers, and questions at hand; those interrogating what are ultimately asubjective forces in 
politics require a different conceptual and methodological repertoire than those analyzing the 
politics of subjectively felt emotional states. At times, a sharp focus on affect as an intensity 
distinct from emotion may be useful, for example in my reading of Marx and Marxist feminists 
on the quasi-structural direction of bodily capacities to affect and be affected. At others, the 
travel between and potential collapse of affect and emotion might become most important, such 




asubjective sensation to more subjectivized emotion. And in different circumstances, more 
exclusively tracing subjective, embodied emotion will be most generative, as is the case for my 
reading of Beauvoir and her language of subjectivity and conscious experience. In each of these 
instances, the texts and my reading of them govern the kind of thinking about emotion and affect 
which I engage, as I work with the way that the texts themselves move. This is one place where 
my situation as the person thinking and feeling the resonance between   
The two kinds of affect theory I work with in this project are in opposition to one another 
in notable ways, but in my view this does not preclude them from being used together in the 
same project. They each will resonate more with some thinkers than with others, and rather than 
decide a priori the singular kind that is correct or that will be used exclusive of the alternative, I 
emphasize the need to respond to which one will be most generative in relation to a given 
theorist. That is, one ought to be flexible rather than rigid with their use of ‘affect,’ ‘emotion,’ 
‘feeling,’ and related terminology. In this dissertation, I will uphold a (never final) distinction 
between emotion and affect along the lines sketched above, using “feeling” as an umbrella term 
that encompasses both concepts/bodily processes, as well as their relation, crossover, and 
indistinction.  
 
Feeling as Method 
 
This project functions as a relay and constructive engagement between political theory and affect 
theory, producing an explicit practice of opening the political theory canon to conversation and 
connection with critical theoretical work from political theory’s elsewheres. Thus, I mobilize 
conceptual underpinnings for an approach to political theory that are themselves located outside 
of the field.  That is, I explore what other disciplines and theories can do, methodologically, to 




level of the project’s general orientation, but also in terms of the specific conceptual resources I 
find in developing my methodology. This section surveys these resources and constructs the 
approach to feeling as a method that I practice in the subsequent chapters.5 
How does one carry out political theoretical readings and interpretations – especially in 
the history of political thought – incited by affect and emotion? What kinds of practices are 
involved, and what sorts of concepts can guide the effort? The most important methodological 
impulse of this sort of project asks what work affect and emotion do and what effects they 
generate when one stages an encounter between feeling and political theoretical texts. 
Rearticulating Sara Ahmed’s motivating gesture – asking ‘what do emotions do?’ (2004, 4) – is 
helpful here. My claim is that asking, ‘what do affective reading practices do in interpreting X?,’ 
‘what do affect and emotion uniquely enable us to discover and construct in X?,’ or ‘how do 
affect theory and political theory resonate with one another?’ promises generative answers. This 
set of questions enables us to explore how affect and emotion might be at work in a way 
unacknowledged or unanticipated by the thinker yet matter for our ongoing work with and 
understanding of that thinker. One of the reasons for this is that, instead of thinking of “emotion 
as being ‘in’ texts” that we can go find or not find in some way, the “emotionality of texts” 
consists in “how texts are ‘moving’, or how they generate effects” (Ahmed 2004, 14). Affective 
and emotional reading practices track a variety of movements in political theoretical texts in 
order to open them up anew, accessing important dimensions of their projects, the richest points 
that an affective method can disclose.  
Crucial to such a commitment and to these kinds of reading and theoretical practices is 
that we cannot know in advance what an affective and/or emotional reading of X can or will 




theoretical moments and movements that result from following feeling as a method. This 
involves putting affect and canonical theory on the same theoretical plane, tracing resonances 
between affect theory and political theory, following theoretical developments and 
reinterpretations spurred by affect and emotion, and so on. Such a method resists limiting the 
possibilities of its interpretative practices in advance, such that they can solely ever discover one 
and only one form or mode of relation between feeling and theory. For example, it is possible 
(and likely, I believe) that the relation between affect theory and political theorist X could 
simultaneously take many of these forms: ‘affect theory adds to X’; ‘affect theory and X resonate 
with one another’; ‘affect theory fosters a critique of X’; ‘there is a disjuncture between affect 
theory and X in this way’; ‘X anticipates affect theory in certain ways’; and ‘affective reading 
can re-describe and re-interpret concepts A and B from X,’ among other possibilities. Even in 
their tensions with one another, these are some of the kinds of relations one might articulate 
through intensifying the connections between affect theory and political theory.  
Queer theorist and literary scholar Eve Kosofky Sedgwick’s elaboration of “reparative” 
reading – juxtaposed with “paranoid” reading6 – provides a guide for this method. Reparative 
reading, she contends, enables one to take up old questions and texts in novel and fruitful ways. 
For the “reparatively positioned reader, it can seem realistic and necessary to experience surprise” 
(Sedgwick 2003b, 146), as opposed to the oft-default mode in critical theory which “requires that 
bad news already be known” in advance, places “extraordinary stress” on “knowledge in the 
form of exposure”, and engages a “knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror … 
shall ever come to the reader as new” (130; 138; 146, her emphasis). In other words, the 
reparative reading’s sensibility is open to and expectant of surprise, while the paranoid reading’s 




expense of other orientations to texts and ideas (Sedgwick 2003b, 139–40; also see Bennett 2010, 
xiii–xiv). Sedgwick offers a related framing of reading practices in the introduction to her essay 
collection, where she argues for reading “beside” as a way of doing theoretically informed 
interpretive work. Reading beside facilitates the interaction of a multiplicity of elements in a way 
that eschews both “linear logics that enforce dualistic thinking” such as “cause versus effect, 
subject versus object” as well as the “fantasy of metonymically egalitarian or even pacific 
relations” between texts and concepts (Sedgwick 2003a, 8).7  
 In my affective-emotional reading of political theory, reparative reading and reading 
beside become an important orienting impulse. Above all else, they insist that feeling as method 
not attempt to know in advance the emotions and affects circulating through a text, the effects 
that an affective reading might generate, or what political theoretical moments can be disclosed. 
A “paranoid” reading position might seek to expose the problems and insufficiencies of X’s 
theory of emotion and/or affect (or their lack of such a theory). Focusing primarily on this mode 
might lead us to too quickly dismiss thinkers as possibilities for this kind of reading and 
theorizing. Hypothetically, if this was our concern, we might prejudge a thinker as “obviously” 
not affective or emotional – perhaps they have a very strong split between mind and body, and/or 
an exclusively cognitive and rationalistic view of politics – and reject on face the possibility that 
affective reading might open them up with surprising and theoretically enriching effects.8   
What Sedgwick productively suggests for my project is that the reparative queries 
promote both affective and theoretical openness and generativity. What becomes important is 
reading X beside affect and emotion in order to track resonances between them and to 
experiment to see what that reading can generate for political theory. Such reading beside, 




theoretical interaction between a given theorist/text on the one hand and affect and emotion as a 
conceptual movement on the other; indeed, it seeks to twist those pressures in productive 
directions. This enables reading and theorizing to examine complex relations between (political 
theoretical) text and (affective) concepts – a “wide range of desiring, identifying, representing, 
repelling, paralleling, differentiating, rivaling, leaning, twisting, mimicking, withdrawing, 
attracting, aggressing, warping, and other relations” (Sedgwick 2003a, 8) – instead of 
reductionist relations that would exclusively attempt to render final judgment on whether X is 
affective. Throughout this dissertation, I work to cultivate a reparative reading practice that puts 
Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminists, and Beauvoir beside another, and that puts them individually 
and collectively beside emotion and affect. Keeping open the kinds of relations one might 
theorize between affect and political theory as well as the political theoretical effects of such 
relations ultimately harbors the most critical potential.  
I further elaborate conceptual-methodological resources for affective political theory with 
concepts from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus. One of my objectives in this project 
is to construct a “smooth” rather than “striated” methodological and theoretical space. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, striated space is a space of homogeneity “which intertwines fixed and 
variable elements, produces an order and succession of distinct forms,” is filled by properties, 
and contains rigidly “formed and perceived things.” Smooth space is populated by multiplicities, 
comprises a “continuous” and “directional” space that is “filled by events and haecceities”,9 and 
is an “intensive” “space of affects” (1987, 477–79). A related set of concepts from Deleuze and 
Guattari is the notion of molar and molecular segmentarity. For them, texts (chap. 8), individuals, 
and societies (chap. 9) are “plied” by two “segmentarities” – molar and molecular – that do not 




They are distinguished by the “nature of the system of reference” between them: the molar refers 
to large-scale aggregates and collective signifiers and representations, while the molecular refers 
to flows of desire that conjugate and connect with one another (217-219).  
 Affective and emotional reading of political theory strives to engage texts and thinkers in 
smooth (theoretical and methodological) space in a way that attends to their molecular flows. As 
Deleuze and Guattari claim, smooth space is a “space of affects” (479), so my overall project 
orients itself to that kind of space. I am interested in the ways that we can become more creative 
in our interpretation of political theorists, both individually and in their connections to one 
another, and I think that asking what it would mean to have smooth political theoretical space 
pushes in that direction. What would it mean for the histories of political theory to be 
multiplicitous events in continuous variation, as Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize the entities 
populating smooth space? An affective approach can open up canonical theorists and theories as 
multiplicities and haecceities by exploring the different kinds of affective and emotional 
processes that constitute and escape from the more formal entity and its properties.  
I situate Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminism, and Beauvoir in smooth space: following 
emotional and affective circulations in these thinkers’ works means changing the directions, 
relations, and compositions of our receptivity to them. Thinking about smooth space and the 
molecular enables a re-engagement with Beauvoir on the relationship between power, emotion, 
and phenomenology, or a return to Marxist feminism in order to draw out the affective 
dimensions of concepts like social reproduction, materialism, and patriarchy. A more striated 
reading would subsume the less obvious emotional and affective qualities of this theoretical 
work under more homogenizing signs. Deleuze and Guattari help articulate the background 




can provide an entry into the molecular flows of desire, energy, intensity, and so on coursing 
through any given text or theorist, which are likely not captured by interpretive engagements and 
reading practices that take on theoretical concepts and texts as more molar (collective, 
representational) entities – as important as such readings are. Affect and emotion can access the 
microtextures and flows that constitute as well as deconstruct and escape from the molar 
aggregate.  
For instance, Hobbes’s Leviathan is ostensibly one of the most molar entities in the 
history of Western political theory, the paradigm of undivided authoritarian sovereignty and 
absolute political power. But, what are the material affects, emotions, desires, flows and 
intensities that operate to compose the Leviathan, and may work against it? What can an 
approach emphasizing feeling uniquely help us read out of the fear and other affective and 
emotional circuits of the state of nature, or of Hobbes’s account of power? To think about this 
visually, a molar approach to Hobbes focuses on the giant sovereign depicted in the famous 
frontispiece to Leviathan, while a molecular approach examines the multitude of bodies that 
compose the larger whole. ‘Capitalism’ can also be a massive striated and molar entity. It is often 
represented in left/Marxist and in non-Marxist discourses as unitary, singular, and totalizing (J. 
Gibson-Graham 2006, chap. 1; chap. 11). But upon what operations on and with the affective 
capacities of bodies does it depend? How can feeling as a method operating at the molecular 
level pay attention to the processes and bodies that make up capitalism? Can attention to affect 
open up new components to Marx’s critique of capital, especially in a contemporary moment 
when affective labor is a central concern of critical scholarship and radical praxis (Negri 1999; 
Hardt 1999; Hardt and Negri 2000; Weeks 2007a; Berg 2014)? What are the material, feeling-




deployment as a critique of capitalist patriarchy and of Marxism? These are (some of) the 
questions the approach I sketch in this introduction asks and the rest of the dissertation seeks to 
answer. Affective and emotional reading-theorizing practices can elaborate these thinkers into 
the smooth theoretical space and molecularity that such inquiry requires. They enable us to 
rearticulate these thinkers in order to generate different political theoretical resources in response 
to recurrent problems and questions in Western political theory. 
This project’s methodology, by paying attention to the circulation of affect and emotion, 
may provide “lines of flight” from these thinkers. If we take seriously the insistence of Deleuze 
and Guattari that every process is constantly generating lines of flight from its overcoded molar 
stratifications,10 then what are the lines of flight from, for instance, Hobbes’s account of the state 
nature or Beauvoir’s feminist appropriation of Hegel, existentialism, and phenomenology? Lines 
of flight are active, real, and immanent, “escaping” and “causing runoffs” from large-scale 
aggregates and entities (1987, 204–205). For me, feeling as a method lets loose lines of flight 
from political theoretical texts, enabling creative reinterpretations, surprising connections, and 
new concepts to emerge.  
One way to tie all of these methodological concerns and motivations together is think 
about what Sedgwick – noting her connection here to Deleuze and Guattari – describes as 
“planar relations” (2003a, 8) in our reading and theorizing. Various philosophers, philosophies, 
philosophical becomings and problematics construct the plane their affiliated concepts populate 
and move around; the plane is the “indivisible milieu in which concepts are distributed” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 36).11 My approach to doing political theory in this project lays out a single 
plane traversed by affect theory and a particular constellation of thinkers. When an encounter is 




collective projects? What features of these projects are made uniquely legible? What distinctive 
concepts, assemblages, and critical articulations emerge from feeling as method? These are the 
kinds of questions this project makes possible – and starts to answer.  
Ultimately, feeling as a method emphasizes experimentation in reading, interpreting, and 
theorizing. We do not yet know what a body of affective political theorizing can do; the 
methodological imperative becomes to reflect on what processes, practices, and experimentations 
one might engage in when bringing together affect and political theory, and on the kinds of 
conceptual resources that might guide this effort.12 Grounded in an intensive and affective view 
of the subject, Rosi Braidotti insists that it “is urgent to explore and experiment with more 
adequate forms of non-unitary, nomadic, and yet accountable modes of envisaging both 
subjectivity” and sociopolitical “interaction” (2009, 144). The method I have sketched is, I posit, 
one mode of this exploration and experimentation, reparatively attuned to the molecular flows 
surging through the canon in its reading of affect and emotion beside political theory. Each of the 
chapters of this dissertation practices feeling as a method with different texts and thinkers.  
 
Affect Theory and Political Theory 
 
As articulated by Nicholas Tampio (2015, 147n13), Deleuze engaged the history of philosophy 
by “citing accurately but arranging elements to say something new” (cf. Deleuze 1995, 6). Such 
a theoretical practice, Tampio suggests, enables this history to become a “keyboard that may play 
many songs depending on how the notes are arranged” (131). Taking a cue from this, I argue that 
my turn to affect theory presents a particularly generative modality for arranging notes 
differently to play original songs with the keyboard of political theory, offering a vector for re-




The method I develop could, potentially, be used to read any text of political theory, and I 
find this to be one of its most important features: my hope is that this project motivates affective 
readings of thinkers beyond those that I study here. This is one of the reasons that I engage four 
thinkers who do not, on face, ‘fit’ with one another. As a method, affect and emotion can open 
up surprising – and surprisingly productive – connections. Engaging with thinkers at the 
molecular level through reading practices focused on feeling shifts the emphasis to bodies, forces, 
and materialities rather than more molar concerns and significations. This fosters connections 
across different time periods and theoretical traditions. If one practices an affective method for 
reading, for instance, how Hobbes and Beauvoir interact in the way they theorize materiality and 
emotion, then the fact that Hobbes is a sixteenth century contract theorist while Beauvoir is a 
twentieth century feminist philosopher poses less of an obstacle for reading them alongside each 
other. If we focused only on those larger categorizations, we might dismiss the possibility of 
Hobbes and Beauvoir converging to be read alongside one another in the same project, yet this 
dissertation works to connect them through my overall method, and more specifically through 
Ahmed’s work on affective economies.13 Indeed, this dissertation reads across time periods and 
theoretical traditions: Hobbes is a contract theorist writing in the sixteenth century in the context 
of the English Civil War and early modernity; Marx appropriates and transforms a Hegelian 
framework in the midst of nineteenth century Europe, capitalist industrialization, revolutions, 
and labor organizing; Beauvoir writes at the intersection of phenomenology and existentialism 
during and after World War II; and Marxist feminism re-evaluates the Marxist tradition in the 
context of women’s organizing in the middle- to late-twentieth century, with this chapter also 
touching on Black and postcolonial feminist critiques of Marx and Marxist feminism from the 




affect theory most resonant for each – in order to demonstrate the wide-ranging capability of my 
method, and to generate affective and emotional connections across these contexts.  
This is one of the merits, I would argue, of thinking through political theory in the terms 
of reading beside (from Sedgwick) and of the molecular and smooth space (from Deleuze and 
Guattari). Reading X beside Y entails focusing on twisting, tense, complicated, resonant 
interactions between texts, rather than the “fantasy of metonymically egalitarian or even pacific 
relations” between texts (Sedgwick 2003a, 8). Affect and emotion provide a particularly 
generative way to engage this kind of reading, for theorists may interact and relate to one another 
on the molecular level and/or in smooth space in ways that more traditional readings might 
foreclose. Moreover, this project enables the elaboration of varied thinkers together as a 
multiplicity related through emotion and affect. My theorists might be engaged in different 
theoretical projects in different historical contexts – and thus seemingly incommensurable – yet 
they might also be productively read alongside one another in the ways they resonate with affect 
theory.14 In his survey of corporeality in Arendt, Taylor, Nietzsche, and Hampshire, John C. 
Tambornino argues that by focusing on the body in bringing together thinkers who are often read 
separately, we can “weaken familiar groupings” in a way that “attempt[s] to modify materialism” 
and “understand[s] thinking and politics to occur on multiple, related, nonidentical levels” (2002, 
135–36).15 Something similar is the case, as I demonstrate throughout this book, when we focus 
on affect and emotion.   
 This project also reassesses the importance of the affect and emotion that have so 
regularly been excluded from the status of ‘the political’ in Western political theory. In this way 
my project takes up a feminist lineage, extending critiques of Western philosophy and political 




white men – and often just propertied white men – with the mind and reason while women, 
people of color, slaves, colonial subjects, and people with disabilities have been associated with 
the body and emotion. Politically, these schemas have mapped white men, mind, and reason onto 
the public political sphere while relegating subjects ascribed to be less human with the body and 
emotion in the supposedly pre- or non-political private sphere (Okin 1979; W. Brown 1987; W. 
Brown 1988; Elshtain 1993; Lloyd 1993; Mills 1997, chap. 3; Ahmed 2004, chap. 8; Simplican 
2015). None of the thinkers of this current project juxtapose mind and body or reason and 
emotion in such a hierarchal way, and I will argue in several places that affect theory accentuates 
their critiques of mind/body dualism.16 Nevertheless, my project works to further undermine 
these binary and exclusionary schemas by locating emotion, affect, and the body at the center of 
political theorizing and political life.  
 I also make an explicit interdisciplinary move, laying out a set of reading practices and 
concepts that could open up even the most traditional questions, concepts, and texts in political 
theory to creative original work. As a relay between affect theory and political theory, this 
method offers an explicit interdisciplinary alternative to – not a replacement for – methods for 
engaging canonical thinkers that are more internal to the field (Straussian reading, the methods 
of Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School, and so on). This is a method that experiments 
with what other disciplines and theories can do to the traditional questions and objects of study in 
political theory. Feeling as a method provides a direct practice of opening political theory to 
conversation and connection with critical theoretical work ongoing in cultural studies, gender 
and sexuality studies, queer theory, feminist science studies, literary criticism, and others. As 
Teresa Brennan contends, “extending attention into the flesh” is an “exploration of the affects” 




has too often been “excluded from [the] consciousness” of studies of philosophy and political 
theory (2004, 161). My project embarks upon this path by bringing recent theorizing on emotion 
and affect to bear on political theory.  
 My overall approach is, finally, shaped by one way Sheldon Wolin understands 
innovation in Western political theory. At times, he writes, innovation in this tradition:  
has taken an existing idea and severed it from the connective thread that makes an 
aggregate of ideas an organic complex. A connective thread or unifying principle not 
only integrates particular ideas into a general theory, but also apportions emphasis among 
them. If the unifying principle should be displaced, propositions within the complex 
which theretofore were commonplace or innocuous suddenly become radical in their 
implications (2004, 23–24).17 
 
My own interpretive project displaces my thinkers from their traditional connective threads and 
unifying principles. In doing so, I work to make propositions about embodiment, affect, and 
emotion potentially radically in their implications for our understanding of the particular 
theorists under consideration and for the fields of political theory and affect theory.  
 
What Can An Affective Political Theory Do?  
 
Chapter 1 takes up Thomas Hobbes, primarily Leviathan but also some of his works of natural 
philosophy. I begin by re-evaluating Hobbes’s proclamation of his materialist ontology that 
“every part of the Universe is Body” (1996, 463) in relation to affect theory, initially situating 
Hobbes on a plane with Spinoza, Deleuze, and Massumi. From there, I move through his account 
of interacting bodily processes of motion, sense, imagination, and thought in the first seven 
chapters of Leviathan to further these connections. The chapter then turns to Hobbes’s theory of 
passion/emotion and to the work of Sara Ahmed. Reading Hobbes and Ahmed alongside one 
another re-envisions Hobbes as a theorist of affective economies and a critic of mind-body and 




theory of emotion through a sustained reading of the state of nature as an affective economy, 
highlighting the ways in which Hobbes is more focused on the conditions and production of 
circulating emotions rather than on the emotions of particular subjects or on human nature in 
general. Noting that emotions not only circulate in the state of nature to create a state of war but 
also work to move individuals to leave behind the state of nature, I conclude by sketching the 
implications of my reading of Hobbes for his account of the social contract and for the possibility 
of a subdued Hobbesian ethics of the body.  
 Chapter 2 presents a sustained reading of Karl Marx in relation to a Spinozan-Deleuzean 
notion of “affective capacity,” the capacity of bodies to act and be acted upon. From different 
texts and concepts of the ‘early’ Marx, I draw out this figure of the body as I explore his (and 
Engels’s) concepts of essential powers, historical materialism, the production of life, and 
consciousness. This opens up onto a reading of Marx’s category of nature, where I evaluate 
Marx’s anthropocentrism and argue that affect provides a line of flight for a less-dominating 
understanding of nature in his thought. I then turn to the main section of the chapter, where I 
affectively read Marx’s critique of capital, especially as presented in the Grundrisse. My main 
argument here is that a critique of the tension of capitalist affect is central to Marx’s account of 
capital: on the one hand, capitalism amplifies the potential affective capacity of bodies through 
its development and organization of productive forces; on the other, it captures this increase in 
affective capacity to enrich the bourgeoisie, immiserate the proletariat, and reproduce capitalist 
relations. As part of this section, I argue that Marx’s critique is in part ethical, a reading made 
possible once we approach Marx from the standpoint of affect and affective capacity. The 
chapter concludes with a speculative theory of communist affect, re-envisioning Marx’s 




The third chapter engages in an affective reading of Marxist feminism in order to extend 
and supplement important Marxist feminist concepts and to problematize the universalizing 
framework of Marx and my reading of him in the preceding chapter. I begin by outlining the 
Marxist feminist account of social reproduction and reproductive labor as well as providing an 
overview of their critique of Marx. I use this as a basis to construct an affective Marxist feminist 
theory of social reproduction that focuses on the reproduction of affective capacity within 
patriarchal and capitalist forces. From here, I engage in a reading of four important Marxist 
feminist thinkers and concepts in order to explore how affect theory can productively extend and 
rearticulate the project of Marxist feminism: the sex/gender system (Gayle Rubin); social 
reproduction (Lise Vogel); sex/affective production (Ann Ferguson); and above all the human 
need for sensation and affect (Rosemary Hennessy). The final main section engages Black and 
postcolonial feminist critiques of Marx and Marxist feminism in a challenge to the work of this 
and the preceding chapter, while also pointing out the potential for an affectively-attuned re-
reading of thinkers such as Angela Davis and bell hooks.  
Chapter 4, in which I read Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, thinks through the 
emotional valences of questions about subjectivity, gender oppression, power, and social 
transformation. Since Beauvoir works at the intersection of feminism, phenomenology, and 
existentialism, I am able to further demonstrate the potential of feeling as a method across a 
range of traditions. I read Beauvoir alongside Ahmed to throw her engagement with emotion – 
especially in its connection to phenomenological orientation – into relief. I start by examining 
Beauvoir’s general theory of subjectivity from the perspective of Ahmed’s work on emotion and 
phenomenology, outlining a concept of “emotional orientation.” The chapter goes on to examine 




The Second Sex. Here, I focus first on the ways men’s emotions (particularly disgust) and 
phenomenological orientation toward and around women work to reproduce their power. The 
section then examines the emotional-phenomenological confinement of women. The rest of this 
chapter goes on to analyze the way that emotions and phenomenological concerns are also part 
of the process of liberation in Beauvoir’s work, exploring the emotion of critical wonder and the 
emotional-phenomenological process of disorientation. Throughout this chapter, I illustrate my 
Ahmedian reading of Beauvoir with reference to the problematic of “the woman in 
[heterosexual] love,” underscoring what bringing together Beauvoir and Ahmed can disclose 
about this situation. Ultimately, the chapter works to move the project in a more explicitly 
feminist direction – and in so doing claim Beauvoir as a political theorist – and to continue to 
demonstrate the wide-ranging application of feeling as a method.  
The conclusion threads these readings together to contribute to theories of embodied 
ethics, connecting the work of this dissertation with the Deleuzean ethics of Rosi Braidotti 
(2006; 2009) and Erinn C. Gilson’s feminist ethics of vulnerability (2011; 2014). With attention 
to feeling as a method, it becomes possible to articulate an account of the ways that ethical 
encounters are always politically organized. Once the body is understood in the full range of its 
dynamism, intensity, affectivity, emotionality, and vulnerability, ethical considerations emanate 
at the center of ‘the political,’ contra contemporary theorists who claim that attention to ethics in 
radical political thought may constitute a depoliticizing move (e.g. Rancière 2010a; Rancière 
2010b; Mouffe 2013, 15–18). With affect, emotion, and the body as central concerns, when one 
asks a question such as ‘what legitimates a mode of governance’ or ‘how should a body politic 
organize its economy’, one is always also asking about the kinds of ethical encounters between 




An embodied political ethics can place its emphasis on how to regularize and organize joyful 
encounters, the transformation of negative affects, sustainable experimentation toward becoming, 
cultivation of and responsiveness to vulnerability, and openness to ethical transformation. My 
contention is that feeling as a method can creatively read and theorize resources for such a 
project in the thinkers I engage in this dissertation.  
These are some of the potential answers to the question of what an affective political 
theory can do. There are, doubtlessly, other compositions to be created with the new songs that 
affect and emotion enable us to play with the political theory keyboard. As a method, a turn to 
affect and emotion ultimately performs a movement of opening and unfolding, creating a 
provocation to experiment in our political reading, feeling, interpreting, and theorizing. It is also 
a provocation to develop the conceptual and methodological resources necessary to think through 
the ways that politics is materially felt and experienced by embodied political subjects in general, 
or in the specific instance of the #BlackLivesMatter protestor, content moderator, or refugee. 
What follows analyzes the political forces that shape, channel, assemble, appropriate, redirect, 






Affect Theory and the Dynamic Hobbesian Body 
 
 
“…every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of 
the Universe” (Hobbes, Leviathan, XLVI: 463) 
 
“The end or scope of philosophy is, that we may make use to our benefit of 
effects formerly seen; or that, by application of bodies to one another, we may 
produce the like effects of those we conceive in our mind, as far forth as matter, 
strength, and industry will permit, for the commodity of human life.” (Hobbes, De 
Corpore, I: 7) 
 
Introduction: The Body of Philosophy 
 
“The World,” the “whole masse of all things that are,” Hobbes writes in the most wide-ranging 
articulation of his materialism, is:  
Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, 
Bredth, and Depth: also every part of Body, is likewise Body, and hath the like 
dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not 
Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of 
it, is Nothing; and consequently No Where (Leviathan [hereafter L], XLVI: 463).1 
 
For Hobbes, the entirety of that which exists is body, and this body is, as we will see, dynamic, 
generative, and as I seek to argue in this essay, affective and emotional. In investigating any 
phenomenon, whether natural, political, individual, group, etc., one must proceed from the body 
and its motions. Hobbes’s persistent materialism, I argue, ought to direct us toward reading 
Hobbes besides recent theorizing on affect and emotion. This chapter deploys feeling as a 
method in order to explore a number of resonances between Hobbes and affect theory in order to 
elucidate this connection in his materialism and open up the possibilities for re-interpreting 
central problematics in Hobbes’s explicitly political thinking, above all the state of nature. I take 
up Hobbes as a central concern to political theory as such, but do so through an emotional 
reading that seeks to reanimate his work. Sensing, moving, dynamic, and ultimately affective 




and if Hobbes and affect theory have the connections I argue for, then the entirety of his thought 
has to be investigated from the perspective I develop.  
For Hobbes, methodologically and ontologically it is only “after physics” that we can 
arrive at moral and civic philosophy (De Corpore [hereafter DC], VI: 72).2 His physics entails 
the study of motion, bodies, sense, and imagination, all of which are in his conceptualization 
material, embodied processes. These physical processes form the causes of Hobbes’s later 
objects of inquiry – such as “appetite, aversion, love, benevolence, hope, fear, anger, emulation, 
envy, etc.,”artificial bodies, bodies politic, and commonwealths – which are “the subject of 
physical contemplation” and thus can only be understood by investigating “sense and 
imagination,” that is, physics (DC, VI: 72-73, emphasis Hobbes’s; also see DC, I: 10-11 and 
Gaskin 2008, xvii-xviii, xx). The subject of philosophy is “every body of which we can conceive 
any generation” or chain of creation, and can compare with other bodies (DC, I: 10). Philosophy 
consists in the elements necessary to explain “Conceptions concerning the Nature and 
Generation of Bodies” (L, XLVI: 463). Moreover, he understands the objective of philosophy to 
be the study of effects of bodies on one another, in order to organize those encounters in ways 
we conceive of for the “commodity of human life” (DC, I: 7).  
So, philosophy consists in the explanation of bodies and their effects on one another. This 
chapter explores Hobbes’s account of the body and its corporeal processes, arguing that we can 
read multiple points at which Hobbes’s articulations open onto connections with contemporary 
thinking on affect and emotion. I illustrate this mode of interpreting these connections through a 
close reading of Hobbes’s account of the state of nature. As I read Hobbes, I theorize these 
resonances between affect theory and Hobbes, focusing on Hobbes’s conceptualization of 




embodied processes of motion, sensation, and thought, and his theory of the passions/emotions. 
In engaging these connections, I construct a basis for a more general reading practice, where an 
affective reading of the Hobbesian body and Hobbesian philosophical project could also create 
generative (re-)readings that implicate emotion and affect more fully into classical Hobbesian 
problematics.  
In engaging Hobbes vis-à-vis affect theory, I build most directly upon the work of 
Samantha Frost (2008) in her superb reading of Hobbes’s materialism. She hints at theoretical 
space for an affective reading of Hobbes, I would argue, through her close attention to the 
“matter in motion” and “thinking bodies” at work in Hobbes’s thought. Other commentators 
have taken up his materialism, account of the body and its relation to politics, and relation to 
scientific epistemologies emerging contemporaneously with his own writing (e.g. Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985; Petchesky 1987; Latour 1993, chap. 1; Dungey 2008). This literature informs the 
way in which I engage his work, but my focus on emotion and affect enables me to build upon 
these kinds of accounts, which can overlook the force of emotion and affect in Hobbes. In 
general, analyses of Hobbes’s materialism and engagement in scientific debates situate him in a 
way that opens up an affective reading, but do not pursue detailed inquiry into the work that 
emotion or affect do in Hobbes’s philosophy or connections to affect theory. Analyses that focus 
on a specific feeling or emotion in Hobbes’s work, such as fear and/or anxiety (e.g. Blits 1989; 
Sokoloff 2001; Robin 2004; McClure 2011), do not engage with the status of emotion, feeling, or 
affect as such, much less with recent interdisciplinary theorizing on emotion and affect. My 
reading of Hobbes thus generates new and productive readings of this thinker by specifically 




Furthermore, by practicing feeling as a method I position Hobbes as a thinker of living, 
acting, moving, interacting bodies, not a thinker of crude mechanism or proto-game theory.3 
Frost seeks to recast Hobbes’s materialism against these perspectives through, as she writes “a 
thoroughgoing concession, a giving-over in which Hobbes’s materialism is articulated in all its 
depth and breadth, and in which its implications for our conception of ourselves and our world 
are elaborated as fully and as trustfully as a generous imagination can accommodate” (2008, 3). 
She also argues that these interpretations lay a Cartesian framework back over Hobbes even as 
Hobbes’s own thought works against Descartes’s mind-body dualism (chap. 1). My own 
approach is not only to grant Hobbes his materialism, but to do so and then project current work 
on emotion and affect into Hobbes’s persistent materialism.     
This chapter opens with a reading of Hobbes in relation to Deleuze and Spinoza vis-à-vis 
embodiment and affect, arguing that they share some philosophical commitments and objectives 
that connect them to contemporary affect theory and that this connection generates some 
affinities in their respective ethical projects. From there, I engage Hobbes’s materialist account 
of motion, sensation, and thought from the perspective of affect theory. I contend that not only 
does Hobbes’s philosophy of the body in motion resonate with affect theory at multiple points, 
but that they share the project of upsetting Cartesian dualism. The subsequent section directly 
takes up Hobbesian emotion, which I theorize in terms of Sara Ahmed’s work on emotion, 
particularly her concept of an affective economy. After this, I mobilize my interpretation of 
Hobbes to provide an affective reading of Hobbes’s state of nature that uses the preceding 
sections to trace the material, affective processes – motions, sensations, thoughts, etc. – at work 
there; this section argues that the state of nature should itself be read as an affective economy. 




overall project, I conclude the chapter first by briefly speculating what an affective reading might 
do to another important concept from Hobbes – the social contract – and second by questioning 
whether my approach might be able to draw out an ethics latent in Hobbes’s thought.  
 
A Spinozan Hobbes?: Affect and the Hobbesian Body 
 
Even before directly reading Hobbes’s texts for emotion and affect, it is possible to think 
of the affectivity of his conceptualization of philosophy itself, particularly when situated in 
conversation with Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. The methodological imperative here is not to 
attempt to compare Spinoza and Hobbes.4 Instead, I seek to connect Hobbes to Spinoza through 
their shared insistence on philosophizing the body to see what generative readings of Hobbes this 
connection can stimulate; this is one example of the broader reading practice I try to cultivate 
throughout this project. I am not seeking to provide a ‘representative’ account of Hobbes (or 
Spinoza), but to follow feeling as a method and see what lines of flight, planes, and problems we 
can generate from these kinds of reading practices. In doing so, I seek to pick up on Connolly’s 
speculation that there is potential “productive dialogue” to be had between Hobbes and Spinoza 
when it comes to “diversity, ethics, and generosity” if we admit a “generous reading” of the two 
together (2001, 593n8). This approach is one of the reasons why I am specifically interested in 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza: Deleuze performs, I think, a similar kind of theoretical-
methodological initiative, and it is this sort of endeavor that I seek to connect to and carry out 
with Hobbes and the other thinkers of this dissertation.   
In Deleuze’s rendering, Spinoza theorizes bodies in terms of capacity to affect and to be 
affected – Spinoza’s affectus – such that bodies interact in encounters that can increase or 
decrease this capacity, where this change in capacity is affect – Spinoza’s affectio (Deleuze 




constructing a “single substance of being having an infinity of attributes or modifications of this 
substance” and laying out a “common plane of immanence on which all bodies, all minds, and all 
individuals are situated” (Deleuze 1988, 17; 122). Hobbes’s articulation of all that exists in the 
universe as body and consequent conceptualization of philosophy as the study of bodies and their 
effects on other bodies resonates with Spinoza’s (or at least the Deleuzean Spinoza’s) 
construction of this common plane populated by bodies defined affectively. This leads one to 
Spinoza’s famous provocations, that “we do not even know what a body is capable of” and “we 
do not even know of what affections we are capable, nor the extent of our power,” in Deleuze’s 
rendering (1990, 226). As Deleuze contends, not only does this argue against a Cartesian 
primacy of mind over body, but it also works to incite us to acquire knowledge of the affects, 
capacities, and powers of the body in order to “discover, in a parallel fashion, the powers of the 
mind that elude consciousness” (Deleuze 1988, 18; his emphasis). The study of bodies and their 
interaction holds the promise of provoking understanding of the world. Hobbes offers a similar, 
albeit less direct, prompting to explore the body, and from there the rest of the phenomena of life. 
As discussed above, he claims that we cannot engage philosophy until we do physics, but he also 
asserts that we cannot study physics until we know “first what motions are in the smallest parts 
of bodies; nor such motion of parts, till we know what it is that makes another body move; nor 
this, till we know what simple motion will effect” (DC, VI: 71). Both Spinoza and Hobbes 
intimate that their proposed investigations that start with bodies and their potentials and 
movements are necessary for any further inquiry, and that insufficient attention has been given to 
investigating the material, generative body. Hobbes intends for his comprehensive material 
philosophical project that segues into a bodily political-philosophical project to address the 




challenge attempts to overstate the certainty that reason can ever achieve, especially when reason 
is disembodied.  
Hobbes and Spinoza further share – albeit in different ways – a commitment to thinking 
about these bodies that comprise the world in terms of change, relationality, and, ultimately, 
affect. Hobbes, after defining the universe in terms of Body, describes these bodies as “subject to 
change,” to “various accidents, as sometimes to be Moved, sometimes to stand Still,” a 
description which “we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate” (L, XXIV: 270). 
Philosophy includes the study of bodies involved in “composition and resolution” (DC, I: 10), 
the way we “distinguish” and “conceive one body to be equal or unequal, like or unlike to 
another body” is through the way that the motion of various bodies has “effects” on the sense of 
other bodies (DC, I: 5-6), and part of the philosophical method he sketches involves 
“consideration of what effects one body moved worketh upon another” (DC, VI: 71). In this 
sense, Hobbes resonates with Kathleen Stewart’s account of ordinary affects, the “varied, 
surging capacities to affect and be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual 
motion or relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences” and are “literally moving things – 
things that are in motion and that are defined by their capacity to affect and to be affected” (2007, 
1; 3).5 Hobbes’s emphasis on motion, and particularly motions that effect further motions and 
changes in other bodies, ought to be read in terms of affect. As Stewart demonstrates, concerns 
about this kind of motion as a force that works on, between, and with bodies situates us in the 
realm of affect. They generate questions about “where they might go and what potential modes 
of knowing, relating, and attending to things are already somehow present in them in a state of 




forms of knowledge, philosophy, and ultimately politics these moving bodies beget as they 
interact with one another.  
The study of bodies serves as Hobbes’s fundamental intellectual project, and it must be 
the study of the way that bodies affect other bodies, and of the effects flowing from that 
interaction. Bodies are not conceived in terms of bounded units that mechanistically act with one 
another. Instead, an expansive study of bodies must trace the ways that relations between them 
affect all the bodies in an interaction. I read this beside Deleuze’s rendering of Spinoza, where 
Spinoza defines bodies not as static essences but as modes and relations characterized by their 
affective capacities: “a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity 
for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its individuality” (Deleuze 1988, 123). 
Deleuze’s Spinoza defines the world as populated not just by bodies, but by bodies that are 
definitionally affective through their interaction with other bodies. Hobbes does not use the term 
affect explicitly in his multiple articulations of the body. However, his attention to the body 
induces an affinity with Spinoza’s precise elaboration of the affective body, an affinity that ought 
to provoke us to think Hobbes together with affect theory more broadly. Both insist on the need 
to think through the world in the terms of bodies that interact and, in that bodily interface, 
modify one another. Hobbes’s philosophical project proceeds from the body, and quickly moves 
to the terrain of the way that bodies interact with and generate effects on and for other bodies as 
an ineluctable component of inquiry. Through Spinoza, we can (and as this chapter progresses 
this ‘can’ will slide into ‘ought’) read this concentration on bodies’ capacities for modifying and 
modifiability in affective terms: when Hobbes writes that the philosophical method entails 
“consideration of what effects one body moved worketh upon another” (DC, VI: 71), I contend 




The ethical project emerging from a Spinozan, affective account of bodies as affecting 
and being affected by other bodies also bears resemblance to the way that Hobbes thinks about 
the purpose of philosophy and the study of bodies. For Deleuze, Spinoza’s move to thinking 
about bodies in terms of affective capacity points us to an ethics that considers “the compositions 
of relations or capacities between different things”; more specifically, the way we might organize 
compositions of individuals in “sociabilities or communities” where “capacities can compound 
directly to constitutes a more ‘intense’ capacity of power … while preserving or respecting the 
other’s own relations and world” (1988, 126). The Deleuzean-Spinozan ethical question is 
something like ‘how do we organize society so as to maximize the affective capacity of the 
bodies that populate it?’ Let us then return to the purpose Hobbes ascribes to philosophy: its “end 
or scope” consists in “mak[ing] use to our benefit of effects” of bodies on one another, “as far 
forth as matter, strength, and industry, will permit, for the commodity of human life” (DC, I: 7).   
Philosophy ought to provoke us, on Hobbes’s account, to use this knowledge generated 
from studying bodies to organize human life to be more commodious to living bodies – indeed, 
one might say vis-à-vis the above discussion of Hobbes and Spinoza, to raise the (affective) 
capacity of bodies to change and be changed. Moreover, both Spinoza and Hobbes recognize 
some boundaries to this effort, in the above form of Spinoza’s respect for the individual’s “own 
relations and world” and in Hobbes’s qualifier accounting for the bounds of “matter, strength, 
and industry.” Philosophy generates, for both, an ethical project to maximize the potential of the 
active, dynamic body in its relations with other such bodies.6 While Hobbes does not phrase it in 
explicitly affective terms, putting Hobbes and Spinoza in conversation with one another helps to 
elucidate the affectivity of the Hobbesian body and also illuminates the affective quality with 




universe, so inquiry must proceed from body; any reading of Hobbes that deviates from or 
ignores the body obscures the foundational efforts of his entire project.  
 
Hobbesian Physics, Affect Theory, and Mind-Body Dualism 
 
In Hobbes’s texts we find another node to connect to affect theory: his detailed investigation of 
the various component movements of the body that work together to shape the human: motion, 
sense, imagination, conception, deliberation, will, appetite, aversion, and passion. All of these 
processes are material, bodily, and interactive, working in Hobbes’s physics to contravene any 
attempt to split mind and body or sensation, cognition, and emotion. In this section, I use feeling 
as a method to trace the interacting bodily processes that Hobbes theorizes, and in so doing 
assemble another set of connections between his work and that of recent theorizing on affect and 
emotion. These connections and resonances from Hobbes’s foundational physics – which, as 
noted above, are for him an absolute prerequisite for studying later compositions of bodies such 
as a commonwealth – form an underlying relay point for later parts of this chapter. When I 
theorize the state of nature as an affective economy, it is in relation to this section’s reading of 
Hobbes’s physics vis-à-vis affect theory.  
 Hobbes begins with motion, which works as the phenomenon from which all other bodily 
phenomena proceed, and as the very source of life. “Life itselfe” is, for Hobbes, “but Motion” (L, 
VI: 46); more specifically, it “is but a motion of Limbs” (L, Introduction: 9). All that we perceive 
by sense, and later all that we imagine, think about, endeavor to do, and feel begin with motion, 
the “one universal cause” for “the variety of all figures” and “universal things” (DC, VI: 69). 
From the beginning of Hobbes’s physics, motion opens up the Hobbesian body to affect theory. 
What does a body do, Massumi asks to open his Parables of the Virtual: “It moves. It feels. In 




cannot think the body – especially affectively – without thinking of the connection between 
movement, affect, and sensation. He challenges critical and cultural theory as well as the 
humanities more broadly to think through movement and sensation instead of assuming that 
change in the body is “unmediated,” simple, or as not itself needing to be theorized (2002, 1). 
We should extend this insight into political theory and connect it to affect theory in doing so. My 
reading enables us to carry out this task through an affective reading of Hobbes and his emphasis 
on the moving, changing, sensing body.7 In Massumi’s reading, Spinoza’s emphasis on 
movement and sensation comprises a crucial component of his account of body and affect: the 
capacity, potential, or “power to affect or be affected” involves the “body’s capacity to enter into 
relations of movement and rest”; thus, affect as something to be inquired into arises in relation to 
the interplay of movement, sensation, perception, and memory (15). That Hobbes engages these 
same linked processes directs us, I argue, to an affective reading of his work.  
 Motion produces sense and sensation. For Hobbes, the motion of some external object 
(which is itself a body, in the sense of it being a material thing) contacts and thus moves the 
“organs of sense,” which themselves undergo motion: this “first organ of sense is touched or 
pressed” by the object-body, causing the “next part” to be pressed, such that “the pressure or 
motion is propagated through all the parts of the organ to the innermost” part of sensation, which 
he understands to be the heart (DC, XXV: 390). Thus the “immediate cause of sense of 
perception consists in” motion provoking a cascading effect throughout the human body, the 
“internal motion in the sentient” being (DC, XXV: 390-391).8 The sensing subject is the living 
creature itself, not an isolated organ of the living body itself (DC, XXV: 391-2), involving the 
complicated connection and networking of sense organ, brain, heart, nerves, arteries, and 




account of motion actually implicates a complex concatenation of bodily processes working 
together. One registers or experiences this somatic assemblage of motions in terms of a 
“phantasm” that “remain[s] for some time more or less” in and with the body – something 
Hobbes refers to at one point as “sense itself,” a memory of registering sensation (DC, XXV: 
389) – as it generates a “reaction and endeavor” to the cascading motion (DC, XXV: 391). 
 Hobbes’s account of sensation can itself be read affectively. Massumi describes sensation 
as “mesoperception,” a “corporeal transformer” that registers the movement of the body and 
especially its constant displacement through movement, which is itself an affective passage 
(2002, 62). Importantly, mesoperception or sensation involves the translation of sensation into 
affect and into further movement (62). That is, sensation is not a phenomenon of merely ‘dumb’ 
matter passively registering action coming from elsewhere but is actively involved in the 
experience and translation of that which is being sensed, including the movement of affect. We 
cannot think affect or the body, he contends, without the “intrinsic connection between 
movement and sensation” (1). Hobbes thinks this very connection. Sensation is a sort of active 
network of forces for Hobbes as well: it registers external and internal motions, registering and 
translating motion into further motion (the “reaction and endeavor”), experience of motion (the 
“phantasm”), and affect. Indeed, upon an affective reading Hobbes seems to describe sensation 
as itself the sensation of affect. If we theorize affect as an autonomic and asubjective force or 
intensity,9 we can read Hobbes on sensation as articulating something like the sensing of some 
force that strikes the body, generating a cascading concatenation of bodily effects that tie 
together sensation, bodily motion, and as we shall soon see, cognition and passion. In Massumi’s 
reading, the “Spinozist problematic of affect offers a way of weaving together concepts of” 




15). Spinoza, though, does not have to be our only reference for thinking affect in these terms. 
Hobbes continuously theorizes an active, dynamic body that can be understood only by tracing 
its continuous change produced by motion, sensation, and, I would argue, affect.  
Sensation is not an endpoint for Hobbes: it immediately generates imagination and 
cognition. Sense, a product of motion, necessarily weakens when the motion slows or stops, or 
when the moving body-object is no longer present. However, as this motion and the sense it 
generates leave an impression on us, they continue to effect and affect us. This is “sense 
decaying or weakened” by the absence of the object, which constitutes Imagination and Memory 
(DC, XXV: 396).10 After an object passes us by or is removed, or after a period of time, our 
senses continue to receive and be affected by other objects, making our impression of the earlier 
object/sensation weaker (L, II: 16). Moreover, because of the constant succession of motion and 
sensation, a corresponding series of imaginations or memories is produced in the individual 
sensing body. The “succession of conceptions in the mind are caused … by the succession they 
had one to another when they were produced by the senses” (EL V: 34; also see L, III: 20). This 
is what Hobbes variably calls a discourse of the mind (EL, IV; DC XXV: 399), train of 
imaginations (L, III), conception (L, III) and thought (DC, XXV: 398). Conception is always first 
sensation, and we have no thoughts that are “not subject to sense” (L, III: 23-24). Sensation is 
never severed from thought, thought is always embodied, and the mind cannot be separated from 
and set in opposition to the body.  
Sensation and thought as well as body and mind operate not in an oppositional or 
hierarchical model, but in a relation of feedback. Another facet of Hobbes that resonates with 
affect theory is, thus a commitment to upsetting these kinds of dualisms that have been essential 




tending to embodiment is, I contend, particularly illustrative in his account of emotion.11 In one 
especially suggestive passage, Hobbes writes: 
And I believe there is a reciprocation of motion from the brain to the vital parts, and back 
from the vital parts to the brain; whereby not only imagination begetteth motion in those 
parts; but also motion in those parts begetteth imagination like to that by which it was 
begotten (EL, III: 27-28).  
 
Here, it is not an elaboration where the mind is primary and works or enlivens the dull, inert 
body. For Hobbes, body and mind work in conjunction with one another. He gives us, again, a 
model of the movement of the active, dynamic body in constant reciprocal motion with the mind. 
This theorization of the body is consistent with Hobbes’s interest in the animate body-machine 
metaphor (cf. L, Introduction: 9), leading him to understand the body as a set of interlocking, 
mutually dependent processes. Hobbes presents the reader with a number of illustrations of the 
mind-body-sensation-thought interplay: “pleasure in the sense” also produces “pleasure in the 
imagination” (L, XI: 71); dreams connect body, organs, and brain through sensations such as 
heat and coldness (L, II: 17-18); the brain, heart, and bodily membranes produce and conduct 
motion to and from one another (DC, XXV: 401). His account of passion evinces a similar 
understanding of the body, as I discuss below. 
This challenge to Cartesian dualism proves to be one of the central concerns of 
contemporary theorizing on emotion and affect (e.g. Cvetkovich 2012, 4; Brennan 2004, 18–19; 
157; Ahmed 2004, 170–172; Deleuze 1988, 17–18; 86–88). Once we shift from thinking about 
cognition as separate from and superior to bodily processes such as sensation to thinking of 
thought as always already embodied and working together, as affect theory does,12 we can no 
longer separate mind from body, or presume that thought is disembodied. Hobbes, when we pay 




from which alternative, embodied accounts of thought, cognition, and ultimately emotion 
emanate; we can in this way figure him as a sort of proto-affect theorist.  
We take notice of sense by “sense itself,” which turns out to be “the memory which for 
some time remains in us of things sensible” (DC, XXV: 389). So, our registering of sensation 
automatically implicates memory: it is not necessarily that sensation (something like affect) 
happens first, with a meaningful duration between its motion pressing on the body, followed by 
its registering through memory, and then imagination and cognition. Instead, sensation itself 
instantaneously activates these processes that work alongside sense. Later, Hobbes writes that 
“sense … hath necessarily some memory adhering to it,” especially in the way phantasms of 
sense-thought are “distinguished from one another” (DC XXV: 393). There is a striking affinity 
between Hobbes’s insistence on the implication of memory and bodily history in the receptivity 
to sensation and Ahmed’s delineation of her position that sensation, cognition and emotion 
cannot be “separated at the level of lived experience” (Ahmed 2004, 24). Arguing against a 
separation of “sensation or affect and emotion,” she contends that  
this model creates a distinction between conscious recognition and ‘direct’ feeling, which 
itself negates how that which is not consciously experienced may itself be mediated by 
past experiences. I am suggesting here that even seemingly direct responses actually 
evoke past histories, and that this bypasses consciousness, through bodily memories 
(Ahmed 2004, 40n4).13 
 
Hobbes and Ahmed both invoke, albeit in different registers, the inseparability of sensation and 
embodied memory. For both, sensation from the perspective of lived experience of sensation can 




This, then, brings us to Hobbes’s conception of the passions, or what we would likely call 




to emotion: for him, passions arise from a complex transmission of the motion that strikes the 
body and is rendered in thought, continuing to affect other parts of the body (and being altered in 
this transmission), especially in the heart. These “motions of the heart” are generally called 
endeavors, and take the more specific form of appetites and aversions (DC, XXV. 401; also see L, 
VI: 37-40). The endeavor towards something is appetite (specific) or desire (general), while an 
endeavor away from something is aversion. They are, Hobbes writes, commonly called love 
(appetite toward) and hate (aversion away from) (L, VI: 38; EL VII: 43-44; DC XXV: 406-
408).15 Because these phenomena are bodily motions, bodies sense these changes. Sensing 
appetite or desire is delight, while sensing aversion is displeasure or offence, such that all 
appetite and aversion is “accompanied with some” feeling (L, VI: 40). So, there is a sort of 
feeling that emerges before (so to speak) the emotion itself. These delights or pleasures – for 
Hobbes switches between the two, at least in Leviathan – can “arise from the sense of an object 
Present,” “from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight” of consequences, from 
displeasure in sense, or from displeasure in “Expectation of consequences”; respectively, these 
are called Pleasures of Sense, Joy, Pain, and Grief (L, VI: 40-1).  
These bodily processes and movements comprise the constitutive components of 
emotion: all “divers” emotions arise from the “simple Passions” of appetite, desire, love, 
aversion, hate, joy and grief (L, VI: 41; see also DC, XXV: 409-410). The way that these forces 
interact with and succeed one another, the effect of that “Alteration or succession it selfe,” the 
likelihood (or not) of realizing or attaining the object of endeavor, and the nature of that object 
interact to create the diversity of passions (L, VI: 41). In Leviathan, Hobbes proceeds to 
catalogue several dozen possible emotions as varied configurations of these forces. For example, 




constitutes fear, but this passion succeeded by the hope of resisting that hurt is courage (L, VI: 
41); joy in imagining one’s own power and ability is glory, and buttressing it with likelihood of 
efficacy and the experience of previous success is confidence while glory with a low likelihood 
of attainment and/or low actual capacity is vain-glory (L, VI: 42). In the former set of examples, 
the nature of the object (it will cause harm) interacts with the endeavor (aversion), producing 
different emotions depending on whether this is succeeded by hope (itself an “Appetite with an 
opinion of attaining”) or not. In the latter set, the basic component of the passion (joy) interacts 
with the object of joy (one’s own power) to produce the passion (glory), which is then refined 
into different passions (confidence and vainglory) based on the likelihood of attaining the object. 
Hobbesian emotions are a complex of interlocking and interacting corporeal phenomena which 
themselves connect to past histories, the particular constitution of the given body, the social 
environment in which that body is embedded, the other passions that circulate, and innumerable 
other phenomena. 
Passion is a kind of swirling concatenation of bodily motions, processes, feedbacks, and 
effects that, from a broader perspective, comprises just one node in an entire network of bodies 
generating diverse emotions and interacting with one another, which will in turn effect and affect 
the other emotion-concatenations, and so on. Hobbesian emotion is densely textured, saturated 
with bodily processes, pasts, and interactivities. I thus argue we should read Hobbes through 
Ahmed’s concept of an “affective economy,” where emotion is produced “as an effect of” the 
“circulation” of bodies, objects, and signs such that the subject or the individual body is only 
“one nodal point” in the “affective economy” of circulation and where this “movement of 
emotions” is “not contained within contours of a subject” (2004, 45–46). Beyond the simple – 




Ahmed share the commitment that emotion depends on motion and does not exclusively reside 
within an individual body/subject. For Hobbes, only motion from outside the body can, through a 
chain of bodily forces, generate emotion. Furthermore, the fact that any emotion depends not 
only on these individual bodily forces but also on exterior factors such as the possible objects 
emotions can seek, the likelihood of attaining those objects, and the multiplicitous succession of 
emotions, any given emotion receives its contour not only from the motion that begets it but also 
the social environment in which the body is embedded. As such, an individual body experiencing 
any particular emotion is necessarily caught up in a network of bodies and objects that all 
mutually shape one another, even if Hobbes does not explicitly theorize it in these terms. He is 
indeed very interested in the workings of the individual body, but in his account of the diversity 
of passions, he makes recourse to factors that necessarily tether the formation of emotion in the 
individual body to a wider context. He occasionally gives more direct examples of this kind of 
implication of the broader social context, for instance his assertion that “the difference of 
Passions [in different people] proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the body, and 
partly from different education” (L, VIII: 53), where this differential education includes a 
broader social context.16 Particularly because of Hobbes’s emphasis on motion – which we could 
read as Ahmed’s circulation – in theorizing emotion, I contend we can read a general resonance 
between Hobbes and Ahmed when it comes to affective economy.  
The connection between Hobbes and Ahmed goes further. Emotions, for Ahmed, impress 
upon bodies and shape individuals and collectives, but they do not reside within bodies. They are 
“relational” as they “involve (re)actions or relations of ‘towardness’ or ‘awayness’” (2004, 8). 
Ahmed notes, as a crucial effect of the work of emotions, the way they are not only bodily but 




aversions that form the basis for Hobbes’s passions are endeavors toward or away from the 
object. Hobbes insists that he does not mean this metaphorically, but that it is literal motion (L, 
VI: 38). Here, his theorization of emotion – or at least one essential component of it – describes 
the corporeal work they do in very similar terms as Ahmed: both want to describe the way that 
emotions move the body in relation to something outside of it. For Ahmed, when we attribute 
feelings to an object or an other, it is “an effect of the encounter, which moves the subject” in 
relation to the other or to the object as an “affective reorientation” (2004, 8). We cannot, she 
argues, locate emotions exclusively in an object; they receive their shape only as a result of the 
encounter. Hobbes, at least in his account of the passions, suggests that there is little to no 
meaning or identity for an emotion outside of the interaction between circulation and a particular 
body. Emotion only becomes legible after the motion of some outside body-object puts pressure 
on sense organs, this motion gets transmitted through sensation and experience, and is conducted 
into appetite and endeavor, interacting with other factors to become emotion. Emotion is indeed 
not an inherent property of a thing or subject, but only an effect of an encounter.  
Hobbes also resonates with Ahmed in his articulation of the direction or regulation of 
thought by “desire:” that which we “desire, or feare” as well as the objective or “End” of our 
train of thoughts produce an “impression” that is regularly “strong, and permanent” and is 
characterized by “greatnesse” (L, III: 21).17 Ahmed, reflecting on Hume, insists that, when 
thinking through emotion and affect, especially vis-à-vis sensation and cognition, we “remember 
the ‘press’ in an impression,” the way that feeling an emotion is associated with “the very affect 
of one surface upon another, an affect that leaves its mark or trace” (2004, 6). Emotional, 
somatic interactions with objects and others “leave me with an impression; they impress me and 




Hobbes the object of desire and fear produces an “impression” that I argue we should read as 
bodily.18 
Hobbes’s account of passion extends his undermining of distinctions between mind and 
body or thought and emotion. The series of bodily responses leading to emotion begins with 
Imagination as “first internall beginning” of all “Voluntary Motion,” and it is these “small 
beginnings of Motion, within the body” that are endeavors (L, VI: 38). More specifically, 
“appetites and aversions are generated by phantasms, so reciprocally phantasms are generated by 
appetites and aversions” (DC, XXV: 401). Considering that emotions eventually emerge from 
interacting endeavors in the form of appetites and aversions, here Hobbes sets up an interactive, 
multi-layered set of bodily motions that preempt the hierarchal primacy of thought, for thought 
instantaneously catalyzes a process involved in generating emotions. Even internal to these 
interrelating processes, there are instances of mind-body feedback, with the reciprocal 
production of phantasms – which, from above, are thoughts generated by sense – and endeavors. 
Thought and emotion are thus intimately connected, and both material, corporeal processes. 
What Hobbes calls deliberation is an alternating of appetite, aversion, hope, and fear concerning 
some issue, along with the good and evil consequences of the issue coming into thought; 
deliberation describes “the whole summe” of these processes until an action is done or deemed 
impossible (L, VI: 44). Because appetite, aversion, hope, and fear are all embodied processes, the 
form of thought and deliberation involves body and emotion alike.  
Furthermore, when specifically writing about the passions, Hobbes retains these 
connection between mind-body and thought-emotion, arguing that we can pursue the motions 
that produce conceptions to the heart, where they are transmitted through other bodily forces into 




X: 60). Hobbes demonstrates these mind-body and thought-emotion interactions in an elaborate 
taxonomy of specific emotions. Pity or compassion, for instance, proceeds from Grief for the 
harm that occurs to another and is combined with “the imagination that the like calamity may 
befall” one’s self (L, VI: 43). Admiration consists in joy from the “apprehension of novelty” 
interacting with “appetite of knowing the cause” of some thing (L, VI: 42). In both examples, 
emotion is inseparable from thought (imagination of harm, knowing a cause) and both of these 
are embodied processes. Taken broadly, Hobbes’s theory of emotions intensifies the connection I 
am constructing between his work and affect theory (or at least certain threads of affect theory). 
He shares a commitment to thinking about emotion in terms of motion/circulation and as a force 
that does not reside exclusively within a body or external to one. Intimately connected to 
sensation, emotion upsets mind/body and thought/emotion dualisms, producing a model of the 
body caught up in networks of relations with objects and others that shape the body itself.  
From Hobbesian Physics, Towards Hobbesian Politics 
Hobbes asserts that “man’s nature is the sum of his natural faculties and powers, as the 
faculties of nutrition, motion, generation, sense, reason, etc. For these powers we do 
unanimously call natural, and are contained in the definition of man” (EL, I: 21). We should 
emphasize that all of these faculties and powers that he describes, as well as the appetite, 
aversion and passions that fill out the et cetera in the quote above, are embodied and material 
processes. Hobbes’s project proceeds from the body, and ultimately this body ought to be read 
affectively and emotionally. My reading of his physics – which for him comprises the foundation 
of all further inquiry – demonstrates the resonance and connection between Hobbes and 
contemporary theorizing on affect and emotion. His elaboration of philosophy’s method and 




theory of emotion, and challenge to mind-body and thought-emotion dualisms all render Hobbes 
as a potential early voice of something like affect theory, and enables us to connect Hobbes to 
contemporary affect theory. My reading elaborates the numerous linkage points between these 
two sets of theory that have not been joined in either Hobbes scholarship or affect theory. As I 
show in the following section, this connection between Hobbes and affect theory enables us to 
provide original, generative readings of one of the most commonly analyzed aspects of Hobbes’s 
more explicitly political theorizing, the state of nature. Engaging this kind of reading is possible 
only by following Hobbes’s own imperative to proceed from and follow the dynamic body in its 
motions and interactions. Following this path requires an immersion in the resonances between 
Hobbes and affect theory.    
 
The State of Nature and Hobbesian Affective Economy 
 
If everything existing in the world is body insofar as all phenomena and actions are at bottom an 
issue of complex, interactive webs of moving matter, sensation, thought, endeavor and passion, 
and if these are affective and emotional processes as I have claimed, then Hobbes provides the 
potential to trace any component of his theorizing back to its material, affective processes. My 
reading-theorizing process of connecting Hobbes to affect theory – a practice that operates as a 
particular kind of pursuit of Hobbes’s own materialism in a contemporary setting – ought to then 
open up theoretical space for affectively reading any of these components, no matter how 
disconnected from his initial physical account they may appear to be. The Hobbesian universe is 
body, and we are able to – indeed, we should – engage with the moving bodies composing it no 
matter what part of his universe we explore. We can do this by tracing motions, sensations, and 
passions, and the effects they generate, in the theoretical composition of these phenomena. That 




the rest of his theory in terms of emotion and affect. The rest of this chapter engages in this kind 
of theoretical effort in terms of particularly salient, (in)famous, and frequently-discussed aspects 
of Hobbes’s political theory, focusing on Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, which I read in 
terms of Ahmed’s concept of affective economy.  
 As Hobbes’s state of nature is an environment of whirling emotions – a network of 
saturated material processes and contacts full of embodied subjects that move and interact 
through it – I argue it should not be read independent of the Hobbesian-affective physics that 
underlie his project. The state of nature is above all a condition that is viscerally and actively felt 
through embodied, emotional encounters with the material conditions and the other bodies that 
circulate through it. Thus, the unit of analysis, so to speak, of the state of nature cannot be a sole 
autonomous individual, a liberal subject, a disembodied agent, or any model of the person-
subject that either pays insufficient attention to or manifestly ignores the nature of bodies as 
feeling material bodies caught up in the specific affective conditions of the state of nature. As 
Frost argues regarding Hobbes’s materialism generally, “in many respects, the very concept of 
the individual is displaced as a central unit of his political analysis … thoughts and desires are 
constituted and reconstituted intersubjectively and in relation to the material environment” (2008, 
7). While Frost addresses Hobbes’s materialism mostly without engaging affect, she in this 
instance opens up a path to my particular project to engage Hobbesian affect and emotion. We 
have to shift our framework for interpreting Hobbes from an individualistic one to one that 
explores the material atmosphere(s) of Hobbes’s theory, of which the (always embodied) 
individual is only one aspect. I claimed above in account of Hobbesian physics and passions that 




material, social environment in which they are embedded; no element of Hobbes’s theorizing 
elucidates this as demonstratively as his account of the state of nature.  
Hobbes states that his account of the state of nature is primarily “an Inference, made from 
the Passions,” which is also “confirmed by Experience” (L, XIII: 89). Recall from above that for 
Hobbes, one of the chief modes of Hobbesian philosophical inquiry involves examining the 
effects that moving bodies have on other moving bodies (DC, I). In this sense, it is relatively 
clear that if we are to engage his theorization of the state of nature, it must be through the 
emotions at work in it, as well as the bodily motions, contacts, and effects that underpin them. 
The focus is not on the individual as such, but the affective conditions in which individuals 
interact. This resonates with Ahmed’s imperative when it comes to thinking about emotions in 
terms of economy, as they are the effects of circulations of bodies, objects, and signs instead of 
statically existing as inherent, contained properties of things or subjects (2004, 46–47).19 Much 
like I argued in the previous section that Hobbesian emotions are themselves sorts of affective 
economies, I contend that the particularly emotionally saturated situation of the state of nature is 
an affective economy as well. 
For Hobbes, individuals are relatively equal “in the faculties of body and mind” (L, XIII: 
86),20 in a way that shifts the emphasis away from any individual body and to the environment in 
which there is no common power. While the individual human body is an especially salient node 
in the affective economy of Hobbes’s state of nature, any analysis must engage and follow the 
circulations that: generate fear and other emotions; construct an overall environment of 
inclination to war; and are composed of on certain motions and sensations. In terms of the 
reading that I develop in this section, individuals are relatively equally constituted for sensing, 




common characteristics of bodies organized as human persons, and will react more or less 
similarly to the material, emotional conditions of the environment. Hobbes himself immediately 
turns from the discussion of relative equality of persons that occupies the first two paragraphs of 
his notorious chapter on the state of nature to an examination of the relational, material, and 
ultimately affective conditions of the state of nature itself.  
What, then, circulates in the affective economy of the state of nature, and what motions 
and sensations are at work? Hobbes understands the individuals populating the state of nature as 
having two primary “Ends,” “principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their 
delectation [happiness or pleasure]” (L, XIII: 87). Here, there is need to think in terms of 
affective materiality, as understanding these as the specific human ends draws on Hobbes’s 
concept of the vital motion that animates living human bodies. Frost argues that Hobbesian “vital 
motion tends toward its own perpetuation,” the “response of a living organism” to the “stimuli” 
of its environment (2008, 23).21 A crucial component of the affective economy of the state of 
nature is thus dynamic matter, organized in the forms of a human, seeking to realize that which is 
necessary for their continued existence. That is, the particular kind of material embodied subject 
in the state of nature matters, since the nature of that materiality constitutes the intentionalities of 
those that act there, and consequently the kinds of relations and interactions that follow. 
Moreover, there’s a certain kind of emotional relationship between these embodied subjects and 
these ends, an “equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends” (L, XIII: 87). The emotion of hope, 
for Hobbes a passion defined by “Appetite with an opinion of attaining” (L, VI: 41), connects the 
body and the object being sought after. So, the individual – read: an active materiality seeking its 
own conservation and pleasure – in the state of nature exists in emotional relation to those 




expectation of realizing that end. Already the state of nature is affectively multifaceted, with 
material bodies, their nature, their ends, and emotional connections between of all of these. Of 
course, the situation is much more complex than this lone body connected to these objects, 
because there is more than one body, and thus more than one set of hopes and emotional 
relations. In the state of nature, multiple bodies come into conflict with one another when the 
“desire” that would fulfill their particular ends is the same among multiple individuals; in this 
event, the bodies “endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another.” (L, XIII: 87).  
Let us heed Hobbes’s methodological-ontological commitments, reckon with affect 
theory in (embodied!) mind, and think through the kinds of motions and sensations at play in 
encounters in the state of nature. An embodied, sensing, thinking, feeling individual sees some 
object which will enable the persistence of their vital forces, or they think of it (thought itself 
being produced by and producing corporeal effects for Hobbes), all generating a panoply of 
sensations. The interactions of these vital motions, thoughts, and sensations induces an embodied 
appetite towards that object, which then connects to some embodied thought that one can attain 
that object, a thought itself bound up with the residue of past sensation-thought-experiences of 
attaining the object. So, the individual resolves to attain the object, moves toward it, which in 
turn produces more motions, sensations, and so on in response to the motion and corresponding 
changes in the body. They approach the object that is conducive to the persistence of the vital 
motion, but encounter another body, one also with a hopeful appetite of attaining that same end 
and perpetuating their own vital motion, and with a similar network of motion, sensation, and 
thought generating that desire. One can imagine the material effects of these bodies interacting 
with one another: bodies move into defensive postures, muscles tense, bodies sense a tightness, a 




and insults and warnings exchanged. They feel the tension in the air, so to speak.22 This 
embodied state of “Anticipation” (L, XIII: 87) is part of an affective economy: the circulation of 
these bodies, the sensations, motions, and words exchanged between them, and the object(s) at 
play generate the emotional flows that traverse the environment.  
These circulations produce the passions that emerge: diffidence, grief, glory-seeking, and 
fear. For Hobbes, the passion of diffidence is “Constant Despayre,” where despair is “Appetite” 
without “an opinion of attaining” (L, VI: 41). This diffidence does not preexist the encounter in 
the state of nature, as the bodies entering the state of nature had hope of attaining their ends upon 
entering the scenario. When these appetitive embodied individuals interact in the conditions of 
the state of nature, the affective economy of sensation, motion, and objects transforms this into 
diffidence, and necessitates “Anticipation” and readiness “by force, or wiles, to master the 
persons” of all in order to guarantee one’s own “conservation” (L, XIII: 87-88). Again, one can 
imagine the motions, sensations, and thoughts that accompany this embodied, yet social, passion. 
This is a situation of “griefe” when there is no common power (88). Grief, “the Expectation of 
consequences” that are displeasing is a “simple passion” that, in my reading of the statue of 
nature, must be accounted for as an embodied product of this affective economy (L, VI: 40-41). 
This condition of diffidence, anticipation, and grief is compounded by glory, the fact that some 
individuals take “pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they 
pursue farther than their security requires” (L, XIII: 88). Glory, more specifically “Joy, arising 
from the imagination of a man’s own power and ability” (L, VI: 42) is a result of some previous 
affective economy – in the sense that all Hobbesian passions are, as I argued above – and enters 
into the affective economy of the state of nature. It amplifies the emotions already being 




intensifying the motions and sensations at play. Moreover, with the competition, diffidence and 
war of the state of nature, the conditions are arguably uniquely prevalent for feeling and enacting 
glory since there are numerous opportunities to demonstrate one’s power and ability. At the same 
time, people seeking glory have no common power to prevent them from making “signes of 
contempt” of one another, leading individuals in Hobbes’s account to exert effort “to extort a 
greater value from [one’s] contemners,” through damage or example (L, XIII: 88). This is why 
glory not only augments the emotions being generated in the affective economy, but is itself 
strengthened.  
“[W]orst of all” in the state of nature, Hobbes declares, is the “continuall feare, and 
danger of violent death” (89). Before this passage – in the ninth paragraph of the chapter on the 
state of nature – Hobbes mentions fear only once, in a passage mentioning a lack of fear when 
invading another without a common power.23 It comes after everything I have discussed so far, at 
least in the order of Hobbes’s text. Hobbes’s declaration - that the creation of this fear is the 
worst outcome of the state of nature – is especially noteworthy compared to the specific things it 
is worse than, including the inability to sustain industry, culture, knowledge of the earth, arts, 
letters, and society. Fear is the most significant “consequent” to the conditions of the state of 
nature is fear, a consequence that is also the most directly emotional. Fear, like all these other 
emotions, are products of the Hobbesian affective economy and its circulations, motions, 
sensations, other passions, and so on.  
All of these material conditions and contacts generate a state of war, and I contend that 
the state of war is itself another kind of affective economy. Individuals in the state of nature are, 
for Hobbes 
in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against 




tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known … So the 
nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, 
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary (88-89). 
 
The state of war is an atmospheric inclination to war tethered to certain kinds of passions, not 
warfare itself. It is an affective economy. We could speculate as to the motion and sensations and 
passions here as well. The individual living in this perpetual inclination or orientation to war 
trains their bodies for potential fighting, will likely experience a greater sense of anxiety, fear, or 
anticipation, may sleep less well as a consequence, and their actions will affect any person 
around them in a cascading network of emotional orientations in this state of becoming-war. 
Whether war breaks out at any given moment proves less important in Hobbes’s account than 
this embodied, relational disposition with a temporal, atmospheric character. It shapes the body 
in particular ways, is constituted by certain emotional circulations, and produces more emotional 
circulations, including the ones that will eventually provoke people to get out of the state of 
nature.    
More broadly, the concept of affective economy – and attention to emotion and affect 
more generally – is necessary for fully tracing the complexities of Hobbes’s state of nature, 
especially in terms of Hobbes’s own materialist ontology and philosophical method. We must 
insist on all these passions in the embodied sense I outlined above, in order to engage the 
intricacy and density of Hobbes’s project. It is important that Hobbes expends so much effort 
providing a detailed material ontology in the opening of all his major works. When we read his 
account of the state of nature, we will never be able to fully apprehend it in its dense corporeal 
complexity without the sort of exegesis I offer here, informed as it is by contemporary theorizing 
on emotion and affect. When he portrays some particular passion or competition over some 




but a motion of limbs” (L, Introduction: 9), we must trace the motions – and consequently, the 
sensation, thoughts, further motions, passions, and so on – throughout his theory. Overall, the 
affective encounter in the state of nature produces emotional effects in the interacting bodies. 
Bodies move and bodies affect one another in relation to objects and the material conditions, 
producing particular kinds of sensations, thoughts, and ultimately changes in passions. 
Examining these corporeal interactivities as I have done is one mode of attending to Hobbes’s 
own philosophical method of examining the effects that bodies have on one another, something 
his theorizing of the state of nature clearly does. The “three principall causes of quarrel” in the 
state of nature – competition, diffidence, and glory (L, XIII: 88) – are all caught up in and 
traverse a dense affective economy of bodies and objects interacting with one another. They are 
not ‘inputs’ to these kinds of embodied relationalities but are produced by them.  
The body of another is not in and of itself fearful, or threatening, or provoking: fear is not 
an inherent characteristic of a body, but only an effect of the material and affective conditions of 
the encounter between bodies. Human bodies in Hobbes’s theory are not necessarily naturally 
conflictual, but enter into relations of conflict in certain affective economies. If the above 
encounter took place where there was civil law determining possession, or if something about the 
affective economy was producing a passion like benevolence, or if there were more than one 
object to satisfy the ends such that competition was itself unnecessary, then it is unlikely that war, 
fear, and so on would be produced. There is no preexisting emotion behind the encounter and its 
motions, sensations, thoughts, circulations, and so on; the encounter is everything. Indeed, 
Hobbes insists that in his account of the state of nature, he very much does not “accuse mans 
nature in it”; moreover, the “Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin” (L, 




existence, but that the affective economy in which these passions takes part in and are 
conditioned by certain modes of movements, emotions, and relationalities, while foreclosing 
others.  
Fear emerges from the conditions of the state of nature. As such, the state of nature may 
indeed prove effective (and affective) in regards to one of the “ends” of Hobbesian philosophy, 
“mak[ing] use to our benefit of effects” of bodies on one another, “for the commodity of human 
life” (DC, I: 7). Hobbes articulates with the state of nature a situation where destructive passions 
emerge from a delimited set of conditions, thus amplifying the need to theorize alternatives. 
From this perspective we see another aspect of the significance of reading Hobbes beside affect 
theory. Once we see that the state of nature – the device through which Hobbes theorizes and 
justifies the move to civil society – is an affective economy, the project of organizing bodies for 
the commodity of life, and more specifically the effort to build a theory that gets us out of the 
deplorable – but not inevitable – situation of the state of war, takes on an added emotional 
component. It is not just that we need a common power to create and enforce law (although that 
is most certainly necessary for Hobbes), it is that we also need to organize the material 
conditions to construct an affective economy radically different than that of the state of nature.24  
Interestingly, it is the passions themselves – connected to reason and natural law – that 
compel people to quit the state of nature. Hobbes concludes his chapter on the state of nature by 
noting “a possibility to come out of it, consisting Partly in the Passions, partly in [an 
individual’s] reason”; these “passions that encline men to Peace” are “Feare of Death, Desire of 
such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a Hope by their industry to obtain them” 
(L, XIII: 90). Some of the same emotions that circulate in the state of nature thus also move 




embodiment and circulation in an affective economy, as I have outlined in this chapter. Desire 
for things commodious to living and hope to attain them take part in constituting a state of war, 
but those emotions persist in altered form to come out of that state. Fear is produced by the 
affective economy of the state of nature – indeed, it is the worst product of it – but in addition 
motivates efforts to leave those conditions. Emotions generated within an affective economy 
continue to move and continue to generate effects on, in, and through bodies. Moreover, the 
specific phrasing of Hobbes regarding the Desire that aids in quitting the state of nature – that it 
is a desire of that which is “necessary to commodious living” – is very similar to his description 
of the objective of philosophy in De Corpore which I have noted before: the organizing of bodies 
in their effects on one another “for the commodity of human life” insofar as material conditions 
permit. In his closing statements on the state of nature, Hobbes thus provides us with a particular 
instantiation of this end and connects it to desire, linking the specific aim of individuals in the 
conditions of the state of nature and the overall objective of philosophy itself through the sensing, 
feeling, emotive body.  
Passions/emotions are not the only dimension of the move from the state of nature to civil 
society, as Hobbes names Reason – more specifically, the “convenient Articles of Peace” that are 
“suggest[ed]” by Reason as the other part of this transition (L, XIII: 90). These articles are the 
Laws of Nature, which Hobbes defines in the subsequent chapter as “Precept[s], or generall 
Rule[s], found out by Reason, by which” people are “forbidden” to do something “destructive” 
of their lives or to not do that which would preserve life (L, XIV: 91). This presents a potential 
contradiction with my account, as Hobbes states earlier in Leviathan that Reason contrasts with 
Sense and Memory in that Reason “is not…borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely,” but 




affective account of Hobbes, I would suggest that it also provides an opportunity to rethink the 
ways that cognitive processes in Hobbes are embodied and connected to emotions. Reason 
involves a form of calculation or “reckoning” of “the Consequences of generall names”, 
conceiving of connections between them “for the marking and signifying of our thoughts” as well 
as for beginning at consequences close at hand to “proceed from one consequence to another” (L, 
V: 32-33; his emphasis).  
Even as Hobbes distinguishes this process from Sense and Memory, it should still be 
considered an embodied process, as everything ultimately is for him. Earlier in this chapter I 
discussed how Hobbes’s conception of Imagination, itself linked with Thought, works against a 
Cartesian framework of disembodied mind and reason. When Hobbes explicitly describes a 
process of reasoning in defining the laws of nature, he does so partly in the language of thought, 
since one dimension of a law of nature is a “Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is 
forbidden to … omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved” (L, XIV: 91). If Reason 
consists partly in thought, and if thought is part of the “trayne” of embodied processes analyzed 
earlier in the chapter, then Reason is also embodied.25 Furthermore, in the passage on moving out 
of the state of nature quoted above, Hobbes more explicitly pairs emotion and reason as both 
working to motivate action. I would thus argue that Hobbes’s understanding of the place of 
reasoning in the transition from the state of nature to civil society provides an opportunity to 
reassess the way that cognitive process are always tied to other bodily processes at work in 
Hobbes’s thought.  
Ultimately, the state of nature details the way that the fear, anticipation, anxiety, desire, 
and hope swirling around the state of nature move bodies to change how they relate to one 




particular set of material conditions, amplifying the need to construct alternatives. The purpose 
of the state of nature thus has to with the connection between feeling and politics: it is not just 
that a sovereign power is needed to create and enforce law, but something is needed to organize a 
different, less harmful affective economy than that of the state of nature. 
Theorizing the state of nature necessarily implicates motion, sensation, and passion in 
Hobbes’s philosophical project and in the components of his theorization of the state of nature. 
This affective reading, pursuing as it does a variation of the philosophical method that Hobbes 
himself insists upon, traces the train of motions, sensations, thoughts, and passions that construct 
an environment in which the social contract surfaces as the most propitious means for following 
those passions that seek peace and thereby quitting the state of nature. Attending to feeling, 
emotive materiality is what enables this sort of reading, and thus is one mode of interpretive 
practice that helps us to track the kind of method Hobbes lays out in a way that generates a more 
vivid and more materially vital reading of the state of nature, while also preparing an affective 
reading of other elements of Hobbes’s political theory as well as intensifying the resonance 
between Hobbes and contemporary theorizing on affect and emotion. 
 
Conclusion: Hobbesian Lines of Flight 
 
In this conclusion, I speculate what further reanimations of Hobbes are made possible by my 
practicing feeling as a method with his thought, in addition to reading the state of nature as an 
affective economy. While the possibilities are vast – one could reread political power, 
sovereignty, authority, law, religion, and so on from the standpoint of emotion and affect, here I 
will first outline what an affective reading of the social contract in Hobbes might entail, and 
second sketch how my mode of reading Hobbes could draw out a potential embodied ethical 




 Hobbes writes that the commonwealth and the sovereign are generated by the compact in 
which all the soon-to-be subjects “conferre all their power and strength” upon the sovereign, 
“reduc[ing]” all their Wills “unto one Will,” appointing one sovereign “to beare their Person” 
and, ultimately, exceeding mere “Consent, or Concord” in order to forge “a reall Unitie of them 
all, in one and the same Person” (L, XVII: 120).26 The frontispiece for Leviathan by Abraham 
Bosse visualizes this striking alchemical formulation. The image portrays the sovereign, a man 
that Hobbes emphasizes is artificial yet still natural (L, Introduction: 9). He looks over his 
kingdom (and towards the reader), sword and crosier in hand. The dozens and dozens of bodies 
that make up the Leviathan are both individuated and an incoherent agglomeration. Their 
characteristic features are nondescript. They are almost all turned toward the giant head of the 
sovereign, the only face given detailed characterization. Some are looking up at this machinic, 
humanized embodiment of political power itself; a few – especially those in the Leviathan’s right 
arm – are gesturing up to this sovereign head. Bosse’s image really does transfigure and unite all 
the individual subjects into one body, one person bearing all their persons.  
An affective reading of Hobbes could draw out this specifically embodied dimension of 
the social contract. Perhaps the subjects conferring all their power and strength on the sovereign 
can be understood to be bringing together their affective capacities, or maybe the appointment of 
a sovereign to bear the person of the subject is a matter of bearing their affective capacities and 
channeling certain emotional circulations. This speculative reading would push Hobbes further 
than he himself went, at least in his earlier work. In Elements of Law Natural and Politic, 
discussing the constitution of the “body politic,” he notes that “it is impossible for any man 
really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that other to receive it,” and thus the 




107). However, I think that drawing out the affectivity of Hobbes’s overall project enables one to 
conceive of the transfer of power and strength as an actual physical redirection and interaction of 
affective capacities. I would observe here that Duncan (2005) argues that Hobbes’s materialism 
became stronger in Leviathan and De Corpore than in his earlier Elements of Law. This, 
combined with the fact that no such proviso is found in Leviathan, opens a path for pursuing 
Hobbes’s materialism further than he himself did in this regard. Hobbes’s description of the 
Leviathan as an “Artificiall Man” – whereby sovereignty is the artificial soul “giving life and 
motion to the whole body”, the magistrates are the joints, wealth is the strength, counsellors are 
the memory, concord is health, sedition is sickness, civil war is death, and so on (L, Introduction; 
XXI; XXIX) – is suggestive of this line of inquiry, given the general framework I have 
constructed for reading Hobbes. For Hobbes, this is an artificial body, but as Deleuze notes in his 
reading of Spinoza, conceptualizing Nature as a plane of immanence distributing 
affects/affective capacities works against sharp divisions between natural and artificial (1988, 
124). Consequently, one consequence of an affective reading of Hobbes could be to mitigate the 
salient differences between what Hobbes calls natural and artificial bodies.  
If all universe is body, if the point of philosophy is to organize bodies for commodious 
living, and if Hobbes and affect theory resonate with one another, we should explore the 
emotional and affective processes that make the sovereign Leviathan a body. From this 
standpoint the social contract is not just a narrative about a transfer of rights and formation of a 
sovereign government, but it can also be read to explore the channeling of embodied power. It is 
an attempt to bring bodies together to construct a different kind of affective economy than the 
one in the state of nature. It sets up a relationship between subjects and the sovereign that could 




we might read the power of the sovereign – “the Greatest of humane Powers,” the “compounded 
Powers” of those who unite and confer their power on the sovereign (L, X: 62) – as also an 
emotional and affective power. It uses this power – and in doing so relies on the affective 
economy of “bodily fear” (L, XXVIII: 206-207) – in order to move and affect bodies. In general, 
then, one can say that for Hobbes the social contract quite clearly fulfills the challenge he laid 
down for philosophical inquiry: to study the effects of bodies on one another in order to organize 
them for commodious living.  
 This overall project that Hobbes articulates, interpreted in the way I have in this chapter, 
might also hint at an alternative Hobbesian ethics as a line of flight from the more molar, striated 
Leviathan that is received as part of the political theory tradition. Samantha Frost argues that a 
materialist reading of Hobbes makes legible a reading where Hobbes has an ethics that “enjoins 
people to attend to their relations with others through time” such that “the pursuit of peace is, or 
at least should be, our primary ethical concern” (2008, 10). At the same time, James Martel 
emphasizes Hobbes’s method of reading and account of rhetorical representation in order to read 
him as a radical democratic thinker (2007). Taking a cue from these two interpreters of Hobbes, I 
want to end this chapter by very briefly sketching the possibility that an affective reading of 
Hobbes draws out a latent embodied ethics.  
 Compare, for instance, Hobbes’s objective for philosophy (at least as articulated in De 
Corpore) to the ethical imperative Deleuze assembles from Spinoza:  
The end or scope of philosophy is, that we may make use to our benefit of effects 
formerly seen; or that, by application of bodies to one another, we may produce the like 
effects of those we conceive in our mind, as far forth as matter, strength, and industry 
will permit, for the commodity of human life” (Hobbes, De Corpore, I: 7). 
 
But now it is a question of knowing whether relations (and which ones?) can compound 
directly to form a new, more ‘extensive’ relation, or whether capacities can compound 




utilizations or captures, but of sociabilities and communities. How do individuals enter 
into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad infinitum? 
How can a being take another being into its world, but while preserving or respecting the 
other’s own relations and world? (Deleuze 1988, 126). 
 
This passage from Hobbes – one that helped open this chapter – at the very least creates the 
possibilities to envisage an embodied ethics as a line of flight from the Hobbesian text. By 
formulating Hobbes as a thinker concerned with the sensing, dynamic, interactive, emotional, 
affective body, I situate him and this Deleuzean Spinoza on the same ethical plane. In my 
reading Hobbes and Spinoza comparably turn our attention to studying how bodies affect one 
another so that we can reimagine the ways they relate to one another and ultimately shape these 
interactions for a reciprocal collective and individual affective capacity. Both are interested in 
what the body can do and in thinking through how bodies might act and be acted upon in 
different ways. From this perspective, Hobbes’s state of nature could become what Deleuze calls 
“utilizations or captures,” while an ethics from Hobbes might involve the “sociabilities and 
communities” of Deleuze’s Spinoza. Furthermore, Hobbes’s “application of bodies to one 
another” might become a matter of the Deleuzean Spinoza’s “whether capacities can compound 
directly to constitute a more ‘intense’ capacity or power.” If such an alternative reading of 
Hobbes is to be articulated, it comes from re-centering the material body – its interactivity, 
potentiality, and equality inherent in embodiment – in his thought.  
 This is, admittedly, only a tentative suggestion that merits further exploration.27 However, 
it is a promising example of what an affective reading might be capable of, counterpoising to the 
authoritarian sovereign Leviathan an embodied ethical line of flight that becomes possible when 
we pursue Hobbes’s materialism from the standpoint of emotion and affect. My methodological 
framework from the introduction helps think through the character of this suggestive line of 




one, willing to be surprised when we no longer know in advance the outcome of our reading of 
Hobbes (pervasive authoritarianism). In terms of Deleuze and Guattari, one might speculate that 
the authoritarian Leviathan is an attempt to reterritorialize, overcode, striate, and make molar the 
deterritorialized, decoded, molecular flows of bodies, emotions, and affects that could be said to 
comprise Hobbes’s thought. Affective reading-theorizing practices in general can work to let 
loose the molecular flows, and in the case of Hobbes, affectively and emotionally following 
through on his materialism opens up alternative ethical formations from Hobbes’s account.   
 Reading Hobbes beside affect theory generates possibilities to reimagine any dimension 
of his thought in affective and emotional terms. The chapter has worked on multiple levels: first, 
laying out the general resonance between Hobbes and affect theory; second, reevaluating 
Hobbes’s general project from the standpoint of embodiment, emotion, and affect; third, tracing 
the circuits of affect and emotion in Hobbes’s physics and understanding of fundamental bodily 
processes (sense, imagination, and thought); fourth, reimagining Hobbes’s theory of 
passion/emotion as a theory of affective economies; fifth, envisioning the state of nature as an 
affective economy and thus reinterpreting one of the classic political problematics in his thought; 
and sixth, letting loose other potential lines of flight from his theorizing. If all universe is body, 
and if Hobbes and affect theory have the connections I have argued for, then the entirety of his 





Vital Forces: Marx, the Tension of Capitalist Affect, and the Communal Body 
 
 
“What experience generally shows to the capitalist is a constant excess of 
population, i.e. an excess in relation to capital’s need for valorization at a given 
moment, although this throng of people is made up of generations of stunted, 
short-lived and rapidly replaced human beings, plucked, so to speak, before they 
were ripe. And indeed, experience shows to the intelligent observer how rapidly 
and firmly capitalist production has seized the vital forces of the people at their 
very roots” (Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 380).  
 
Introduction: An Affective Marx?  
 
What happens to Marx’s philosophical project and critique of capitalism when we read him and 
affect theory on a singular theoretical plane? If we theorize central Marxian concepts – such as  
historical materialism, labour power, living labour capacity – in relation to affect theory, what 
features of Marx’s project are made uniquely legible? What distinctive concepts and critical 
articulations emerge from an affective reading of Marx’s critique? What is capitalist affect? 
What is communist affect? This chapter explores these questions and more by theorizing, from 
different points and concepts in the ‘early’ Marx, a Deleuzean-Spinozan figure of the body in 
terms of affective capacity – the capacity to affect and be affected. Proceeding from this 
conception of the Marxist-Spinoza body illustrates the affective stakes of Marx’s critique of 
capital and vision for communist society. I contend that when it comes to Marx, feeling as 
method uniquely draws out three dimensions of Marx’s thought: bodily material as dynamically 
affective in its constant interaction with other bodies, objects, nature, social formations, and so 
on; affect as an essential component of Marx’s critique of capitalism alongside his account of 
alienation, the appropriation of surplus value, factory conditions, and other oppressive elements 
of capital; and communism as an affective project whereby bodies affect and are affected by 




 Kathi Weeks, in her generative book on the work ethic, post- and anti-work imaginaries, 
and utopian demands, insists that we pay attention to the capitalist domination of the worker in 
terms of more than just a “quantitative” logic of exploitation; instead, domination must also “be 
grasped in qualitative terms, as attitude, affect, feeling, and symbolic exchange” (2011, 236n11). 
This chapter takes on this task through a return to Marx himself, deploying affect theory to think 
through Marx’s philosophical project in general and to focus on affective relations of domination 
and – in communism – freedom. Lyotard enthusiastically declares that “we must come to take 
Marx as if he were a writer, an author full of full of affects” (1993, 95), charging readers to 
“show what intensities are lodged in theoretical signs, what affects within serious discourse” 
since there are “intensities that haunt Marx’s thought” (103-104). Staging an encounter between 
Marx and affect theory – specifically, in this chapter, Spinoza and Deleuze – I trace the 
affectivities, forces, powers, capacities, and intensities that traverse Marx’s works. Such a 
reading indicates that Marx is indeed a thinker full of affects, enabling both a re-articulation of 
Marx in affective terms and awareness of the import of this reading for our concepts of affect 
theory.    
In doing so, this chapter also has the effect of mapping the potential to more directly 
orient affect theory toward Marx. That is, building upon other projects taking up Marx and affect 
in some way (cf. Lordon 2014; Clough et al. 2007; Hardt and Negri 2000; Negri 1999), I suggest 
that Marx himself can and should be a resource in affect theory’s critical repertoire, given the 
incisiveness of his attunement to affect that I elucidate throughout the chapter. More specifically, 
while this chapter emphasizes the lines of flight affect opens for Marx, a related theoretical move 
is to think through the deployment of (Deleuze’s) Spinoza into the realm of Marxist analysis of 




Spinoza, Yovel argues that while often working in a broadly Spinozan framework, Marx’s “more 
penetrating view of social reality” – such as adding economic dimensions to the Spinozan 
concept of freedom – enriches Spinoza and expands his scope. The “scholastic bulk of” the 
volumes of Capital can be articulated as “Marx’s own way, following Spinoza, of discussing 
ethical vision and powerful human aspirations as if they were points, lines, and bodies,”1 
replacing Spinoza’s “mos geometricus” with “economic analysis” (98).  
Marx read Spinoza in 1841, specifically the Theologico-Political Treatise and some of 
Spinoza’s correspondence (Yovel 1989, 78; Bowring 2014, 24–26). Yovel makes the argument 
that most readers have systematically underappreciated the Spinozism of Marx, contending that 
Spinoza is “almost as deeply rooted” in Marx’s thinking as Hegel and that Marx “used Spinoza’s 
thought far more than he admitted” (1989, 78). Marx sparsely makes direct reference to Spinoza. 
The most prominent citation occurs in the Introduction to the Grundrisse, where he contends that 
the “identity of production and consumption amounts to Spinoza’s thesis: determinatio est 
negatio” (G, 90).2 Even with the scattered direct reference, Yovel argues “Spinoza is almost 
always present in Marx’s thought” in a way that “surpasses his direct mention by name” (1989, 
79), such that “Spinoza underlies the texture of Marx’s thought, whatever his express judgment 
of Spinoza” (200n4). He sees Marx as reorienting a Spinozan philosophy of immanence3 in a 
more economic and dialectical way, writing that Spinoza’s muted presence is most striking in 
Marx’s critique of religion, theorization of the relationship between humans and nature, and in 
the connection between Marx’s ethical vision and his understanding of the scientific quality of 
his critique of capital (1989, chap. 4). Althusser makes several scattered references to Spinoza 
vis-à-vis Marx in his contributions to Reading Capital (Althusser and Balibar 1979),4 and 




Marxists have turned to Spinoza in times of “crisis within Marxism.” The most prominent of 
contemporary “Spinozist Marxists” are Hardt and Negri5 in their Empire trilogy (2000; 2004a; 
2009), emphasizing Spinozan power and the joyful affects in their theorizing of the revolutionary 
multitude. Frédéric Lordon seeks to use Spinoza to answer a question that constitutes for him a 
‘gap’ in Marx: especially in contemporary capitalism, how do “a few – we call them bosses – 
have the ‘power’ to convince the many to adopt their employers’ desires as if they were their 
own and to occupy themselves in their service” (2014, x)? A reading of money and the 
employment relation in terms of Spinozan conatus, affect, and desire provides the mechanism 
that the “structures” of the “capitalist mobilisation of employees … ‘run on’” (x-xi), the way that 
“master-desires engage the power of acting of enlistees” in the master’s “enterprise” (3).  
 Given this genealogy, it should not be surprising that I too turn to Spinoza to think with 
Marx. In doing so, though, I seek to work with a particular rendering of Spinoza, a Spinoza 
present in contemporary affect theory transmitted through Deleuze (1988; 1990). The shared 
move that so-called Spinozan Marxists make is to read Spinoza as a materialist, and perhaps the 
exemplary materialist (Boros et al. 2009). The particular materialities I find most generative for 
thinking through Marx’s project in an encounter with affect theory involve Deleuzean-Spinozan 
concepts of affect, conatus, and power.6 Ultimately, in response to those who restrict Marx 
somewhat exclusively to a dialectical, “organismic” ontology derived from Hegel (cf. Cheah 
2003, chap. 4), In deploying feeling as a method, I use affect and Deleuze to twist Marx closer to 
Spinoza and Deleuze.7  
 I first explore the materialism of the early Marx, using my reading practice to analyze his 
(and often his and Engels’s) notions of essential powers, the production of life, and the body in 




anthropocentrism while contending that an affective reading of Marx provides a line of flight 
with less nature-dominating potentials. From here, I turn to Marx’s critique of capital, especially 
as he articulates it in the Grundrisse. My central argument is that a critique of the tension of 
capitalist affect is fundamental to a Marxian account of capital: on the one hand, capitalism 
amplifies the potential affective capacity of bodies through its development and organization of 
productive forces; on the other, it captures this increase in affective capacity to enrich the 
bourgeoisie, immiserate the proletariat, and reproduce capitalism. The final main section of the 
chapter theorizes Marx’s sketches of communism as a reciprocal, amplifying set of affective 
relations, with what I call “communist affect” producing consequences for his concepts of class 
consciousness, the social individual, nature, machines, and most of all freedom.  
 
Essential Powers: The Affective Material of Historical Materialism 
 
Marx opens his “Theses on Feuerbach” by critiquing “all previous materialism” – Feuerbach 
included – for conceptualizing “things, reality, sensuousness … only in the form of the object or 
of contemplation”; Feuerbach’s problem, in Marx’s view, is not conceiving sensuousness 
“subjectively,” “as sensuous human activity, practice” (“Theses on Feuerbach” [hereafter TF], I; 
emphasis Marx’s).8 But what is this alternate materialism advocated by Marx? How does Marx 
take real sensuous activity into account, and how does his and Engels’s historical materialism 
avoid the deficiency of Feuerbach’s attempted materialism, which in their view appealed to 
“abstract thinking” and “sensuous contemplation” without “conceiv[ing] sensuousness as 
practical, human-sensuous activity” (TF, V; emphasis Marx’s)? More pointedly, how does affect 
theory enable a re-envisioning and an enlivening of Marx’s materialism and attention to practical 
sensuous activity? What is the affectivity of historical materialism? This section focuses mostly 




1844 (EPM), “Theses on Feuerbach” (TF), and The German Ideology (GI) – in order to generate 
an affective theorization of Marx’s early historical materialism.  
Essential Powers and Affective Capacity 
 This sub-section briefly engages Marx’s account of the “essential powers” of the body in 
a particularly dynamic passage from “Private Property and Communism” in the third of the 1844 
Manuscripts as a way of beginning to unspool the important concepts from Spinoza that will 
resonate with Marx throughout this chapter. Here, the materialism I take up is that of the sensing, 
relational, and I would argue affective Marxian body. In a discussion of the changing 
relationality of the body through different socioeconomic formations, Marx conceptualizes the 
body in a way that productively networks with Spinoza’s conception of power, the body, conatus, 
and affective capacity; these become throughout this chapter the most vital nodes of Spinoza’s 
thought in elaborating an affective Marx.  
In the process of self-objectification, where “man himself becomes the object,”9 the 
“objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man’s essential powers” 
(107-8; Marx’s emphasis). It is the introduction here of the concept of “essential powers”10 that 
evokes a connection to Spinoza. In Deleuze’s affirmation of Spinoza, he describes how for 
Spinoza an 
individual is first of all a singular essence, which is to say, a degree of power. A 
characteristic relation corresponds to this essence, and a certain capacity for being 
affected corresponds to this degree of power. … Thus, animals are defined less by the 
abstract notions of genus and species than by a capacity for being affected, by the 
affections for which they are ‘capable,’ by the excitations to which they react within the 
limits of their capacity (Deleuze 1988, 27).11  
 
That is, for Spinoza, we must define individuals by their characteristic relations and essential 
power, where “all power [potentia] is inseparable from a capacity for being affected” (97). 




others becomes affective. In Marx’s consideration of this body in these relations through the 
register of “essential power,” we can work with Spinoza to think in terms of capacity to affect 
and be affected. Indeed, Marx’s interest in this part of the text lies in the interactivity of bodies 
and objects, in the effects they generate on another and the relations they construct. Marx’s 
“essential power” is itself relational, in a way that furthers the resonance with Spinoza.12 The 
product of an interaction between body and object “depends on the nature of the objects and on 
the nature of the essential power corresponding to it” (108; emphasis Marx’s). Not only do 
human bodies have particular essential powers in the form of affective capacity, but objects do as 
well. The effects of any composition of individual(s) and object(s) are constituted by the 
affective capacities of those individuals and objects. A Deleuzean-Spinozan affect theory 
approaches these kinds of interactions similarly: things “act differently according to the objects 
encountered” and respond by way of “the affections that come from the objects” (Deleuze 1988, 
21). For both Marx and Spinoza, essential powers – as the capacity to affect and be affected – 
interact, causing transformations in the things encountering one another, and being transformed 
in the process.  
The affectivity of the Spinozan-Marxian body extends to the play of essential powers in 
the affirmation of life. Deleuze’s Spinoza argues that from “the moment the mode exists,” an 
“essence as a degree of power is determined as a conatus,13 that is, an effort or tendency … to 
maintain and affirm existence” (99). Deleuze celebrates Spinoza for constructing a philosophy of 
affirmation of life and the powers of life, one where the imperative becomes to “arrive at a 
maximum of joyful passions” in a sociability of interacting bodies forming compounding 
relations and amplifying affective capacity (27-28).14 Marx also connects the interaction of 




“nature of the essential powers” of the interacting objects and bodies that “shapes the particular, 
real mode of affirmation,” in this case in the form of the objectification of the human self (EPM, 
108; emphasis Marx’s). Co-acting essential powers – capacities to affect and be affected – 
constitute the particular mode that affirmation will take. Moreover, Marx portrays this 
affirmation as particularly embodied. Not only is this affirmation determined through the 
essential powers – which I have argued we should read through Spinoza’s account of bodies and 
affects – but this affirmation takes place not abstractly, but “in the act of thinking” and “with all 
[the individual’s] senses” (108). Marx and the Deleuzean Spinoza share, I would contend, an 
extension of the prominence of essential powers in their orientations to an affirmation of life.  
For Marx, subjectively, “my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential 
powers and can therefore only be so for me as my essential power is present for itself as a 
subjective capacity” (EPM, 108). The process through which an individual perceives and 
interacts with an object is shaped by the particularity of their essential powers. Or, in more 
Spinozan terms, one’s own capacity to affect and be affected and the affectations one is capable 
of delimit the potential kinds of compositions that may be possible. Marx explains this through 
recourse to the senses, wherein “the sense of an object for me goes only so far as my senses go 
(has only sense for a sense corresponding to that object)” (108; emphasis Marx’s). Essential 
power in general, and the senses in particular, correspond to the characteristic relation of any 
given body. Individuals, for Spinoza, “designate the complex organization of the existing mode 
in any attribute,” the composition of “extensive parts … pertain[ing] to a singular essence of 
mode under a characteristic relation” constituted by “the degrees of power” (Deleuze 1988, 76–
77). The singularity of the organization of the modes compose an individual and form its 




one’s subjective senses and essential powers shape their relation to objects, I argue we should 
read this in terms of Spinoza’s theorization of the individual and its defining affective capacities.  
My reading of Marx on essential power helps begin to develop the affectivity of this 
thought, of interacting bodies generating effects and affects in encountering other bodies. In this 
affective register, we can understand the Marxian-Spinozan body as one determined by its 
characteristic affective capacity to affect and be affected, and as constantly interacting with 
bodies and objects; the outcome of these interactions is constituted by the respective affective 
capacities. As I continue throughout this chapter – both in my account of Marx’s historical 
materialism as well in my particular readings of the affectivity of capitalism and then 
communism, it is with this dynamic figure of the body in mind. This discussion of essential 
powers – and thus, I’ve argued, of a kind Spinozan affect – occupies only a few pages in the 
Manuscripts; however, the rest of this chapter demonstrates that something like this conception 
of the body is at work throughout Marx, from his earlier writings to his more developed critique 
of capital and sketches of a future communist society. 
Historical Materialism, Activity, and Consciousness 
 Marx and Engels’s articulation of their historical materialism, especially in relation to 
their discussions of consciousness, activity, and matter, provides us another set of resonances 
between the Marxian project and affect theory. In many ways, their materialism as elaborated in 
the early sections of The German Ideology begins with the body, and particularly its practices, 
productive capacity, and relations. It extends, as I will demonstrate, the connections I am 
creating between Marx and strands of affect theory. Marx and Engels insist that, contra 
Feuerbach’s ultimately idealistic materialism, their historical materialism proceeds from “the real 




already existing and those produced by their activity” (GI, 36-37). Consequently, the “first 
premise” must be “the existence of living human individuals,” and the “first fact to be 
established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the 
rest of nature” (37). They clarify this notion of physical organization by describing it as the way 
humans engage in producing actual material life, which is a “definite form of activity” in which 
they “express their life” and constitute a “definite mode of life” (37; their emphasis). Historical 
materialism begins from the active body that gains importance and definition through the way it 
relates to objects, nature, and others and, most importantly, through the way it produces what is 
necessary for the continuance of life. This production is not merely instrumental, but helps create 
the meaning of ‘life’ and ‘the human’. Marx and Engels construct a close connection between the 
fabrication of what is necessary for life and life itself: “producing their means of substance” – the 
distinguishing character of humans compared to other animals – means humans are involved in 
“producing their material life” (37).  
 For Marx and Engels, production of the means of subsistence is the fundamental core of 
human activity and produces life itself. For Deleuze’s Spinoza, something striving for and 
working to persist in its own existence is conatus (Deleuze 1988, 21). Both theories engage the 
experience and real activity of perpetuating being as a fundamental characteristic of life and 
elaborate this effort as not purely instrumental but instead as creative of meaning for life. 
Furthermore, both situate this essential mode in relation to the material environment. In pursuing 
conatus, we are “prompt[ed]” to “act differently according to the objects encountered” such that 
Spinozan conatus is conditioned “by the affections that come from the objects” (Deleuze 1988, 
21). For Marx and Engels, the production of means of subsistence is shaped by the “physical 




the means of subsistence” (GI, 37). Thus, the production of the means of subsistence – which is 
also the production of life – involves an active creation and transformation of objects and 
conditions as well as a shaping by those objects and conditions.15 In the resonance with Spinoza, 
we might say that the Marxist notion of production of the means of subsistence as a “definite 
mode of life” (37) necessarily implies a capacity to affect – the activity of production as 
transforming material conditions – and the capacity to be affected – being formed in part through 
these material conditions. Indeed, the Spinozan conatus invokes affective capacity, involving as 
it does both the “tendency to maintain and maximize the ability to be affected” (Deleuze 1988, 
99) as well as the “effort to augment the power of acting” and the capacity to affect (101). The 
physically organized Marxian human produces that which is necessary for it to persist in its body 
and thus produces life; its material environment also shapes it in its organization and capabilities, 
such that the human individual is not the only actant. When we proceed, as Marx and Engels do, 
from the real, productive human body in certain material conditions, we can lead ourselves, 
again, to the Deleuzean-Spinozan body.16  
 The discussion of consciousness by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology further 
deepens the connection with Spinoza vis-à-vis the body. Consciousness and bodily activity work 
in a constant feedback with one another, although in this text Marx and Engels give primacy to 
material activity and production. The materiality of the active body generates consciousness. 
“The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness” for Marx and Engels “is at first 
directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men – the language 
of real life:” “conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men at this stage still appear as the 
direct efflux of their material behavior” (GI, 42). In this sense, humans “are the producers of 




definite development of their productive forces” and by “the intercourse corresponding to these” 
(42). Consciousness is not some originary or primordial entity that imposes form upon the active 
body. Instead, real activity produces consciousness.17 By arguing that consciousness emerges out 
of persons’ “actual life-process” and thus “ascending from earth to heaven,” Marx and Engels 
situate themselves in opposition to German idealism “which descends from heaven to earth” (42). 
Humans in their account, “developing their material production and their material intercourse, 
alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and the products of their thinking”; 
consequently, it is “life that determines consciousness” (42). Marx and Engels’s historical 
materialism renders practical activity as the primary initiator of consciousness. There is no such 
thing as “pure” “consciousness” or “mind” independent of “matter” and the activity of matter 
(49). Given Marx and Engels’s commitment to dialectics, there cannot be only one-sided 
movement where activity wholly determines consciousness with no other processes at work. At 
some point in historical development, “real, positive science” begins, which involves “the 
expounding of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of” humans and 
replaces “empty phrases about consciousness” with “real knowledge” (43). This mode of thought 
engages and develops upon real practical activity.  
 Much as their materialism foregrounds in general the active production of the means of 
subsistence and the life-process itself in the theoretical imperative of historical materialism, on 
the level of the individual-in-relation, it underscores the dynamism and productivity of the body 
in the generation of thought. Not only does the privileging of the body and its activities in 
relation to the mind potentially link Marx and Engels to Spinoza, it connects them to affect 
theory more broadly. Affect theory, among many other projects, seeks to challenge Cartesian 




that we cannot separate mind from body or presume that thought is a pure disembodied activity. 
Indeed, in The Holy Family Marx and Engels criticize Left Hegelians for their insufficient 
materialism in the way the intellectual movement “separates thinking from the senses, the soul 
from the body” (cited in Schmidt 2014, 21). Affect theory’s focus on feeling and thinking out of 
Cartesian dualism differs from Marx and Engels, who adopt a different interlocutor than 
Descartes, critiquing German Idealism and turning Hegel right side up again,18 but both force 
one to reflect on the activity of the material body in experience and thought.  
Moreover, in some ways, Marx and Engels engage a variety of the classic Deleuze-
Spinoza question, “what can a body do?” Spinoza provokes us, in Deleuze’s rendering, to 
consider that we “do not even know what a body is capable of” and “do not even know of what 
affections we are capable, nor the extent of our power” (Deleuze 1990, 226). At best, we know 
through reason about our “power of action” as “the sole expression of our essence,” but only 
abstractly; in this situation we “do not know what this power is, nor how we may acquire or 
discover it,” and must pursue the actions of the body (226). Posing the issue in this way argues 
against a Cartesian primacy of mind over body and compels one to seek knowledge of the 
powers, affects, and capacities of the body in order to “discover, in a parallel fashion, the powers 
of the mind” (Deleuze 1988, 18; his emphasis). Deleuze asserts that Spinoza’s parallelism is one 
of his great “practical theses” and is crucial to his materialism.19 Challenging traditional 
ontologies and epistemologies – especially Cartesianism – Spinozan parallelism “disallows any 
primacy of” mind over body, or vice versa, and implies that the body and the mind surpass “the 
knowledge we have” of them (18). Here, “all that is action in the body is also action in the mind” 




case, it matters what practical activity and production a body engages in. Humans learn and 
develop powers of the mind because they actualize the powers of their body.  
Through the resonances I have been theorizing among materialism, the production of the 
means of subsistence, conatus, affective capacity, and life, we intensify the connection between 
Marx (and Engels) and (Deleuze’s) Spinoza and continue to draw out the affectivity at play in 
Marx’s thought. I continue to develop this affective figuration of Marx – from the earlier reading 
of the body in “Private Property and Communism” to this interpretation of early passages from 
The German Ideology, to those readings to come – to provide a grounding from which to 
theorize the affective component of Marx’s critique of capital. 
Nature 
The foremost challenge, I think, to a Spinozan-affective reading of Marx is his 
anthropocentrism. If a “great theoretical thesis of Spinozism” is the “single substance having an 
infinity of attributes … [with] all ‘creatures’ being only modes of these attributes or 
modifications of this substance” (Deleuze 1988, 17), then Marx’s (and Marx and Engels’s) 
dialectics and foregrounding of the human present a major tension between Marx and Spinoza. 
Where Spinoza theorizes this single substance Marx sets up a dialectical “metabolism” or 
exchange between human and nature. In this dialectical relationship, one might locate a potential 
ontological flattening20 that refuses to privilege human or nature, and thus open the metabolism 
of human and nature as constantly affecting and being affected. However, upon many readings, 
Marx forecloses this possibility by creating an anthropocentric philosophical system.  
Clough et al. (2007) argue that “affect-itself” moves beyond Marx’s labor theory of value, 
particularly his emphasis on “the laborer’s body,” the “body-as-organism” as opposed to labor 




bodies that are beyond the distinction altogether, that is, bodies that are conceived as arising out 
of dynamic matter or matter as informational” (62). By moving to “affect-itself,” the 
“generalized matter beyond the laborer’s body,” they intend to “disregard the bounded-ness of 
the human body” and thus “trouble[e] the conceptualization” and emphasis in Marx of the “body 
as the body-as-organism” (65). In doing so, they call attention to the ultimate privileging in 
Marx’s theory of labor and capital of the discrete individual human body. Instead, they want to 
focus upon “the ontological dynamism of matter generally” in a critique of capitalism, not the 
more limited notion of the body-as-organism such as that found in Marx. From the perspective of 
“vital materialism,” Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter questions the way that “Marx’s notion of 
materiality,” including its “anthropocentrism,” has “come to stand for the materialist perspective 
per se,” with the consequence that materiality in political theory “is itself often construed as an 
exclusively human domain” (Bennett 2010, xvi).21 She argues that in general Marx’s historical 
materialism” privileges the human through its focus “on human power-laden socioeconomic 
structures” as compared to a less anthropocentric materiality of “matter” (129n51). For example, 
Marx’s analysis of the commodity and commodity fetishism “show[s] them to be invested with 
an agency that belongs to humans” upon her reading (xiv).  
Alfred Schmidt, writing within the Frankfurt School tradition, pursues a detailed 
investigation of the status and work of nature in Marx. In his reading, humans and nature interact 
dialectically such that “society itself was a natural environment” and “nature” must be 
considered “from the beginning in relation to human activity” (2014, 15–16). Marx’s dialectical 
method means that there can be nothing like matter as such, “fundamental matter,” or matter as 
the “fundamental ground of being,” because nature or the “sensuous world” is always a product 




nonhuman necessarily implicates the human. One can only talk about matter as such from the 
perspective of humans (63); it cannot have its own existence, agency, or ontological status 
independent of the human standpoint. Nature can never be “separated … from the degree of 
power exercised by social practice over nature” (60). While humans also cannot extricate 
themselves from this metabolism with nature, Marx foregrounds the work that humans do on 
nature. Nature is crucial for labor – both its Subject and Object (74) – yet even as it “propels 
forward its process of creation,” this is realizable only through “the agency of human labour” 
(77). Nature’s own agency is obscure, or maybe even nonexistent; it requires the human for any 
potentiality in nature to be realized. Indeed, if labor becomes unalienated at some point, then it 
can truly “‘redeem’” the “‘slumbering powers’ of the material of nature,” “changing the dead 
‘in-itself’ into a living ‘for-itself’” (77; internal quotations to Capital, Vol. I).22 Reading 
Schmidt’s definitive work on nature in Marx’s thought, one is struck by the continual 
preeminence of the human in the metabolism between humans and nature, the human “mastery” 
over nature or “appropriation” of it. This does not stop with the instantiation of socialism or 
communism, or with freeing labor from alienation. A communist utopia in Marx, according to 
Schmidt, does not halt the appropriation of nature. It transforms the “mastery over nature” which 
benefits the few to “mastery by the whole of society” (13); the “exploitation of nature will not 
cease” because the “new society is to benefit man alone, and there is no doubt that this is to be at 
the expense of external nature,” which “is to be mastered with gigantic technological aids” (155-
56). While Marx’s dialectics may open a potential assertion of nonhuman agency, or at least a 
mostly non-anthropocentric system, it persistently privileges the human over the natural.  
Marx’s concept of nature opposes him, upon a reading such as Schmidt’s, to Spinoza. 




[ascribed to Spinoza] that nature exists ‘in-itself’ without human mediation” (31). Marx’s 
metabolism between humans and nature contrasts with Spinoza’s substance and his immanence, 
where Nature becomes an “immanent plane” that “composes all relations and possesses all the 
sets of intensive parts with their different degrees” (Deleuze 1988, 124; 77), without a dialectical 
opposition between human and nature.23  
Nature thus turns out to be one concept from Marx’s thought that works against an 
affective reading. I suggest that my reading can open up a less-dominating line of flight from his 
theorizing. At the least, this line of flight weakens Marx’s anthropocentrism enough so that it 
does not call into jeopardy the entirety of an affective reading of him, and at most enables this 
reading to push Marx in a less anthropocentric direction. I do not intend to ‘save’ Marx or 
suppose that affect provides a panacea that erases his anthropocentrism. Instead, I want to 
gesture toward the theoretical implications that an affective reading can open, especially in a 
more difficult area such as Marx’s concept of nature.    
As Schmidt notes at multiple points (2014, chap. 2.B), the crucial concept for thinking 
through nature in Marx is that of metabolism. In the “metabolic interaction,” “nature is 
humanized” and humans are themselves “naturalized”: not only is nature always “socially 
mediated,” but also “society is mediated through nature as a component of total reality” (78-79). 
Turning to Spinoza and Deleuze can, I would argue, more evenly situate humans and nature, 
although the concept of metabolism has an inextricable dualism between human and nature that 
is at odds with Spinozan immanence or more contemporary theories such as feminist new 
materialism. The category of affective capacity crucially insists on attending to the capability for 
both affecting and being affected. Insisting on both of these movements may bolster the 




than Marx himself does. For example, even in one of Marx’s especially anthropocentric 
moments, where he asserts that labour is a “process” by which man, through his own actions, 
mediates, regulates, and controls the metabolism” between humans and nature, and is a process 
that “appropriates the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs” (C Vol. I, 283), he 
retains some semblance of nature’s own ability to affect and humans’ capacities for being 
affected by nature. This process of labour, vis-à-vis nature, “acts upon external nature and 
changes it”; but, in a sort of formulation that appears in the early and the late Marx, this 
interaction with nature “simultaneously changes his own nature” (283).24 The ongoing 
relationship between humans and nature, while often taking the form of a kind of “appropriation” 
in Marx’s thought, is not one-sided, for nature affects humans – in an embodied way, as Maria 
Mies emphasizes (1986, 50–52) – even as it is acted upon by humans.  
One important area of Marx’s thought in terms of nature is its relationship to species-
being, another place where affect may open up a less anthropocentric reading of Marx’s texts. In 
the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx asserts in the course of his discussion on alienation that the human 
“is a species-being”: they self-conceptualize as “a universal and therefore a free being,” and a 
“physical” component of “the life of the species” is a relation to nature (EPM, 75; his italics). In 
this sense, “man lives on nature,” which “means that nature is his body, with which he must 
remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die”; ultimately “man’s physical and spiritual life 
is linked to nature” (76; emphasis Marx’s).25 While the framing of humans “living on” nature 
implies some mastery or privileging, the absolute importance of nature here – without continual 
interaction with it humans die – is perhaps also suggestive of a less anthropocentric approach to 




constantly affect and by affected by each other in a way that could center the activity and 
dynamism of nature itself, even if the idea of nature itself still implies a binary division.   
Yovel reads Marx’s dialectical exploration of humans and nature as akin to Spinoza’s 
concept of nature, especially when one considers the context of Hegel and German Idealism. He 
argues that Spinoza provides Marx a route out of the “lofty and semireligious heights of the 
Hegelian Geist” to a concretized, material “concept of nature and man” (1989, 78).26 While 
acknowledging that Marx’s nature is certainly not Spinoza’s immanent Substance or Spinoza’s 
God, Yovel maintains that Marx’s concept of nature serves a similar function in his theorizing as 
Nature did for Spinoza. Instead of something like immanent nature or substance, Marx presents 
the “dialectical unity” as a sort of “substrate” “in which everything else inheres” (79). This 
“dialectical relation” thus “constitute[s] the new immanent totality” that works in a similar 
ontological or ontogenic way as “Spinoza’s God or substance” (84). In this interpretation, even if 
Nature loses the ontological primacy it has in Spinoza, the reconstituted human-nature 
metabolism grounds Marx’s materialism in a way that maintains the activity, force, and 
potentiality of nature.  
While Schmidt understands Marx as anthropocentric when it comes to nature, he 
continues to recognize some active possibility inherent to nature itself. From “the point of view 
of the purposes, of human activity,” nature can “be regarded as” materiality as such (2014, 63). 
This still situates matter as mediated through the human, but this apprehension of nature opens 
up the activity and material dynamism of nature. Here, nature as materiality has its “own laws” 
determined “not just” by “history and society” but also “by the structure of matter itself” (63). 
This points to the “possibilities immanent in matter” that are then “realized” in a particular 




similar formulation later, discussing the way that in the human labor process that affects nature, 
“even the most ingenious human discoveries can only unfold the possibilities latent within 
nature” (78; my italics). In these instances, nature retains some potentiality and thus a greater 
degree of activity in the flux of acting and being acted upon.  
Schmidt describes labor as in part the process by which humans “incorporate their own 
essential forces into natural objects” (78). This raises the question, though, of whether nature, or 
objects, could themselves to be said to have their own essential forces. In at least the early Marx, 
I think this is indeed the case. As discussed above, the early Marx is interested in thinking 
through the ways human bodies and their senses and “essential powers” interact with the 
objective world around them. Here, Marx notes that when a human objectifies something 
external to themselves, the “manner in which they [the objects] become his depends on the 
nature of the objects and on the nature of the essential power corresponding to it”; moreover, the 
“peculiarity of each essential power is precisely its peculiar essence, and therefore also the 
peculiar mode of its objectification” (EPM, 108; Marx’s emphasis). The object is constituted by 
some essential power of its own that acts upon the human doing the objectifying as well as the 
particular mode and outcome of any particular interactions that incorporate the objects. Can the 
same be said of nature itself, which I presume to be not precisely equivalent to “objects” in the 
1844 Manuscripts? The two categories – nature, objects – share at least some qualities. Both are 
something external to humans, something to be grasped or incorporated through human activity. 
The object is something that relates to the human as “appropriation,” a “thing itself” in “objective 
human relation to itself and to” humans that, given the right set of relations, “become objects 
which confirm and realize” human “individuality” (107-108). Nature for Marx is “that which is 




it is an “extra-human reality” both independent of and mediated by humans (29). So, “objects” 
and “nature” similarly relate to humans and the processes of human activity. If this is the case, 
and if the Spinozan perspective is leveraged, perhaps feeling as a method is able to recover some 
essential power - an affective capacity – on the part of nature itself in Marx’s thought, even if 
nature remains dualistically and dialectically distinct from humans in contrast to Spinoza’s 
immanence. Doing so would emphasize the activity, dynamism and capacity to affect of nature 
itself, mitigating to some extent Marx’s anthropocentrism.    
The Materialist Connection 
A vital component of Marx’s account of humanity is the real connection among 
individuals that comprise it. Existence is social, and awareness of one’s self also constitutes 
awareness of the self as a social being; in this sense, society is not an abstraction but arises from 
relationality as a basic element of existence.27 Marx and Engels contend that “it is quite obvious 
from the start that there exists a materialist connection of humans with one another, which is 
determined by their needs and their mode of production, and which is as old as men themselves” 
(GI, 49). On the most basic level, Marx and Engels seem to imply that because needs and the 
production to fulfill them necessarily involve multiple people, this material connection exists 
insofar as their materialism is concerned with the human production of the means of subsistence. 
I want to argue, though, that there is a further affective component to this connectivity. As I 
demonstrated earlier, the very claim that materialism proceeds from the real individuals who 
produce their means of subsistence in given material conditions can situate it in the realm of 
Spinozan affect. If the social production of means of subsistence and thus life constitutes the 
materiality of this “materialist connection,” this connection is affective in the way it links 




bodies. Moreover, consciousness is “from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as 
long as men exist at all” (49-50). In its earlier stages, it is limited to consciousness “concerning 
the immediate sensuous environment” and the “limited connection with other persons and things 
outside the individual who is growing self-conscious”; it is also consciousness of nature (50; 
their emphasis). Above I outlined how consciousness for Marx and Engels emerges from the 
dynamic, productive, and ultimately affective body in its activity and productivity. Here we see 
that this consciousness is materially tied not only to the affective body, but also to other such 
bodies interacting with each other, with objects, and with nature. In my broader reading of the 
Marxian-Spinozan body, we can figure this material connection as in part a connection of 
interacting affective capacities. Through the mutual interactivity of individuals affecting and 
being affected by others, objects, and nature, they constitute a material and affective bond.  
Deleuze’s Spinoza constructs an affective relationality out of which consciousness 
emerges. He is deeply interested in interacting bodies and the effects of those relations on the 
bodies. In Deleuze’s account of Spinoza, “from the standpoint of nature or God, there are always 
relations that compound, and nothing but relations that compound” (Deleuze 1988, 36; emphasis 
his). Below I examine the ethical implications of this mode of theorizing vis-à-vis Marx’s 
critique of capitalism; what is most urgent here is the move Spinoza makes to think in terms of 
relations and compositions of bodies. The “order of causes” for Spinoza “is therefore an order of 
composition and decomposition of relations” (19), and composite bodies have different 
characteristics that come together in diverse formations with other bodies (32). In this schema, 
consciousness “appears as the continual awareness” of the effects of these compounding 
relations with other bodies, objects, and ideas, particularly their effects on one’s essential powers 




Turning back to Marx, we can now more forcefully theorize his and Engels’s “materialist 
connection” of humans with one another as affective, for both Spinoza and Marx and Engels 
seek to account for the way that bodies relate to one another through their activity and dynamism 
in a way that can underlie an entire philosophical project. If for Spinoza there is nothing from the 
perspective of nature except compounding relations, then for Marx and Engels there is nothing 
from the perspective of historical materialism except compounding relations. The Marxian 
conception of consciousness as arising from productive bodies working vis-à-vis other 
productive bodies might parallel the Spinozan notion of consciousness as arising from the effects 
of bodies on one another. In both accounts, I argue that we see a connection emerging from this 
interactivity, one that is material and affective because that which enables bodies to interact in 
the first place is defined affectively. That is, the capacity to affect and be affected is the essential 
power of a body and forms the basis for any interaction between bodies; consequently, any 
connection generated by interacting bodies is made possible by affective capacity. The Marxian-
Spinozan body enters into relations with other such bodies, creating an affective material 
connection between bodies.  
Marx’s Affective Materialism 
The affective and relational components of Marx’s materialism that I have articulated 
thus far are a crucial standpoint from which to engage the rest of Marx’s thought. Approaching 
Marx without attending to affect thwarts one from ever opening up this strand of the vitality and 
vibrancy of his work, including that of his critique of capital and vision for a communist futurity. 
A reading emphasizing affect – and especially in its relational force – insures against reducing 




Marx and Engels regularly critique throughout the 1840s, for instance in Marx’s “Critical Battle 
Against French Materialism” section in his and Engels’s The Holy Family (chap. 6.3.d).  
It also contests recent readings of Marx’s materialism in critical theory. Jason Edwards 
argues that if materialisms are “philosophical doctrine[s] that concern the nature and multiform 
manifestations of matter,” they should have “little to do with historical materialism as an 
approach to social and political analysis”; in his read, most attempts to “import into Marxism 
philosophical conceptions of materialism” have “proven wanting,” unable to apprehend the 
“systemic” “reproduction of modern capitalist societies” or “social and political, institutions, 
practices, and trajectories” (2010, 281). Defining “philosophical” materialisms out of historical 
materialism, he contends, enables a more critical perspective on everyday practices and lived 
space, particularly in their relations with larger-scale systems. However, I would argue that 
attention to the affectivity of materialism is necessary to fully analyze what Edwards calls the 
“dense but open totality of material practices that constitute and reproduce a given social 
formation” (291). For a historical materialism lacking something like an affective materialism, a 
set of practices and their bodily effects – i.e., the ways that capitalism works on and specifically 
appropriates affective capacity – will always remain inaccessible. Because of this, I think that 
historical materialism and affect theory ought to be deployed together in political and social 
analysis, the concerns of each enriching the other, even as they remain in tension with one 
another. I further discuss this below with regard to my affective reading of Marx’s critique of 
capitalism.  
Pheng Cheah (2010) confronts Marx’s “dialectical materialism” with materialisms from 
Derrida and Deleuze. His account of Marxist materialism emphasizes it as rational and law-




by negativity,” the negation of “given reality or matter” and “imposition of a purposive form” by 
humans (71). This rendering of Marx is then contrasted with Derrida’s critique of presence and 
deconstructive emphasis on radical alterity and the “entirely other” (72-81) as well as Deleuze’s 
ontology of difference and account of the virtual (81-89). He classifies these as non-dialectical 
materialisms that deny the “primacy of the negative” at work in Marx (71). My own reading of 
Marxist materialism makes the affective generativity of interactive capacities – not negativity – 
the crucial movement in Marx’s ontology and method, and in doing so deemphasizes the work of 
the negative in Marx. Instead of power as that which “reside[s] in the form of the human subject 
as the negation of mere matter that nature gives us” (79), I offer a reading of Marx where power 
involves the ability to act and be acted upon, and is not the exclusive domain of the human. I 
thus open Marx up to what Cheah refers to as the generativity and affirmation of these non-
dialectical materialisms. There are, to be sure, still differences between even this affective 
materialism and the Derridean deconstructive materialism Cheah outlines, although not nearly as 
much as when Marx’s materialism is limited to dialectical negation. More importantly for my 
purposes, my reading orients Marx to Cheah’s account of Deleuze, for whom matter entails 
“dynamism consisting of speeds and intensities that open up the composition of any individual 
being, putting it into different connections with other particles, thereby leading to its 
recomposition” (87). I move Marx in this direction through Deleuze’s Spinoza, making Marx’s 
matter more about intensities and forces that are then organized as human and nonhuman 
compositions that enter intro relations with other compositions. In doing so, I mobilize Deleuze’s 
materialism in an explicitly political direction by bringing it together with the critical power of 
Marx’s project. Indeed, Cheah ends the essay by noting that the political implications of 




Deleuze and Spinoza for an affective Marxist materialism will make explicit one mode of 
politicizing the more radical “force of materiality” (89) as the rest of this chapter unfolds.  
History as the “active life-process” – a life process I have argued is always affective – 
“ceases to be a collection of dead facts, as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or 
an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists” (GI, 43). Not only does the 
account of active, productive bodies animate history in this way, but so too does the very 
connection among individuals. The changes of this linkage constitute a certain kind of living 
history independent of different modes of organizing individuals. “This connection” – the 
“materialist connection of men with one another” – constantly “tak[es] on new forms, and thus 
presents a ‘history’ irrespective of the existence of any political or religious nonsense which 
would especially hold men together (49). Politics or religion do not in themselves create links 
across time and space or constitute history as such, but the material and affective connections 
among active, productive bodies do. One of Marx’s critiques of capitalism is that it severs this 
affective, material connection among individuals. Whereas the individual “appears originally as 
a species-being,” capitalism “dissolves” and “makes superfluous” the communal being, 
individuating people such that they stand opposed to one another and to the “true community” (G, 
496); capitalism takes species-being and its affective material connections, rendering the isolated, 
oppositional individual as such in its place.   
 
The Tension of Capitalist Affect 
 
Reading Capitalism Affectively 
In the previous section, I read Marx’s materialism for its affective, Deleuzean-Spinozan lines of 
flight, and in this section I pursue these lines to see where they take us in regards to Marx’s 




power opens up an additional component of Marx’s critique. The capacities of the body are 
constituted historically; what it is a body can do is shaped by the material conditions of a given 
social formation. Recall from above the prominence of the senses in relation to Marx’s account 
of the “essential powers.” As Marx insists, the “forming of the five senses is a labour of the 
entire history of the world down to the present” (EPM, 109; emphasis Marx’s). Capitalism 
produces a particularly inhibited mode of sense, where the “sense caught up in crude practical 
need has only a restricted sense”28 (109; Marx’s emphasis). The material social conditions in 
which the body is enmeshed limit its essential powers, in this case its senses. More broadly, the 
body-as-affective-capacity I read in Marx’s works does not exist in the same configuration 
transhistorically, but instead varies in its capacities as well as its expressions and relations of that 
capacity in response to changing material conditions. The essential powers of different kinds of 
bodies in a feudalist social formation will differ from those bodies under capitalism, and both 
will vary in relation to future communist bodies. The gendering, racialization, sexing, colonizing 
of bodies shapes their vital capacities; the next chapter takes up this point in its reading of 
Marxist feminism. A Deleuzean-Spinozan reading of Marx directs us to examining the particular 
configuration and relations of affective capacity of bodies in different epochs, and of course in 
capitalism most prominently. My engagement with Marx’s critique of capitalist affect thus 
becomes a necessary mode of this aspect of his affective historical materialism.  
Practicing feeling as method and reading Marx affectively, the reach of his critique of 
capitalism expands. We might summarize Marx’s critique as focusing on alienation and/or 
exploitation (particularly the appropriation of surplus labor), with any number of composite sub-
concerns. I argue that an affective reading of Marx should lead us to consider a connected third 




and exploitation it engenders, but he also identifies and critiques what I will call the tension of 
capitalist affect. On the one hand, capitalism amplifies the potential affective capacity – 
understood as the capacity to affect and be affected – of bodies and things through its 
development and organization of productive forces; on the other, capitalism transforms this 
increase in productive forces so that it enriches the bourgeoisie while immiserating the 
proletariat and reproducing capitalism. The amplified force of the laboring body and of the 
machine is productive, and it affects and is affected by other bodies and machines. Indeed, it 
does so for Marx to a greater extent under capitalism than at any other point in history. 
Capitalists, however, redirect these intensified forces and powers for their own enrichment and 
increased power, while systematically depriving the laboring body of its real capacity to affect 
and be affected. In “striv[ing] toward the universal development” of productive forces (G, 540) 
capital creates the potential conditions for bodies and machines to engage in ethical, mutual, 
affectively enriching encounters. In actuality, it seizes this potential for its own perpetuation. 
Capitalism seizes the vital forces of the affective, material, labouring body, and this constitutes 
the central injustice of what I argue is Marx’s critique of capitalist affect.  
Marx’s Affect Theory of Labor29 
My contention emerges from a close reading, inspired by Spinoza and Deleuze, of the 
linked recurring concepts of living labour capacity, vitality/vital forces, and capacity more 
broadly, primarily as Marx mobilizes them in the Grundrisse. This cluster of related terms 
expresses a creative, productive force. Drawing on my earlier reading of the essential powers, I 
argue that Marx’s account of labor and capitalism can be read as an account of affective capacity, 
where concepts such as living labor capacity or vital forces are capacities to affect – to create, to 




enter into relations with the product of labor, with other laborers, with the process of production 
and be changed by these relations. Deleuze’s Spinoza seeks to define an individual not in terms 
of a static classification scheme, but by “the affects of which it is capable,” its “affective 
capacity,” the “capacities for affecting and being affected” (124). When we situate this 
conception on the same plane with Marx’s account, I argue we open the way to read the laboring 
body – in its living labor capacity and vital forces, especially in the interaction of these capacities 
with other bodies, with capitalist social formations, and so on – as an affective body, and thus 
enliven Marx’s critique of capitalism. Here, I seek to mobilize the project posed by Rosemary 
Hennessy, but in the affective domain. Hennessy contends that we must follow what E.P. 
Thompson termed “‘the kernel of human relationships’” in capital – “relationships of 
exploitation, domination, and acquisitiveness” – through the ways it “imposes its logic at every 
‘level’ of society” (2000, 17). My own reading of Marx’s critique explores how these relations 
impose themselves at the affective level, so to speak, of society.30  
In doing so, I seek to turn the insights of Clough et al. (2007) back onto Marx himself. 
While, as I discussed above, their article marks a clear difference between a certain kind of 
theory of affect and Marx’s labor theory of value and emphasis on the “body-as-organism,” the 
critical emphasis of their project merits engagement with Marx’s own texts. The political 
question their intervention provokes, they argue, is that capitalist “exploitation must be measured 
along with oppression, domination, mistreatment and misrecognition as matters of affective 
capacity, a politics of the differential distribution among populations of capacities for living” 
(75). This section argues that we can read such a critical encounter with capitalism in Marx 
himself. Even if the affectivity – in Clough et al.’s sense – of Marx’s own account is to some 




“speculat[ing] about the ways in which capital is setting out a domain of investment and 
accumulation” (62) in terms of affect. He sharply theorizes exploitation in capitalism as a 
redirection and seizure of affective capacity that appropriates the capacity for living from the 
population of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie. Clough et al. generatively “reconceptualize labor 
power in relation to affectivity” (62); it is possible and important that an affective reading of 
Marx can create a similar rethinking such that labor power in Marx’s texts themselves works in 
the affective register.  
 Marx regularly depicts labor in an abstract sense in terms of bodily capacity. In a general 
relation to capital, “labour is the merely abstract form … which exists only as a capacity, as a 
resource in the bodiliness of the worker” (G, 298). Labor that is “present in time” in a form that 
will “form the opposite pole to capital” is “value-creating, productive labour” and “can be 
present only in the living subject, in which it exists as capacity, as possibility” (272; emphasis 
Marx’s).31 That which encounters capital becomes a capacity emanating from the body. Labor-
as-capacity situates Marx on a plane with Deleuze’s Spinoza. Marx does not define labor or the 
laboring body in terms of some static essence or inert property; labor is a dynamic, generative 
potentiality. What does this labor capacity do? It moves, creates, actualizes, affects, and is 
affected. When it comes into “contact with capital” as well as means and relations of production, 
it is “made into a real activity” and “becomes a really value-positing, productive activity” (298). 
Labor capacity acts: it is the subjective “activity … as the living source of value” and “general 
possibility of wealth” (296; his emphasis).32 More broadly, “labour capacity” is the “creative 
power of the individual” (307; emphasis Marx’s).  
Labor capacity flows through bodies and relations as a potential power and interacts with 




labor and depleted through the activity of laboring. This capacity also transforms those materials 
through its creative, value-giving power.33 We can read labor as affective capacity especially in 
Marx’s account of the absorption of labor by capital in the production process. In “being 
employed,” labor transforms the “raw material” of production by being “materialized” as a 
“modification of the object” that also “modifies its own form” (300). Here, labor capacity in its 
actualization affects the material and the labor process.34 In this sense, labor is, in a particularly 
vivid articulation, “the living, form-giving fire” (361). It is also affected by the raw material and 
by the laboring process. Once “set into motion,” labour capacity is “expended” in the form of 
“the worker’s muscular force etc.” such that the worker “exhausts himself” (300). In this instance 
labor capacity is used up in its encounter with material and labour process, and the body it flows 
through becomes tired and needful of replenishment. 
The Critique of Capitalist Affect 
Once we read Marx in terms of Deleuzean-Spinozan affect and theorize the body and 
labor capacity in terms of affective capacity, we extend new zones of Marx’s critique of 
capitalism. Marx, of course, demonstrated a clear awareness of capitalism’s world-historical 
power; his ruthless criticism involves a deep apprehension of the revolutionary force engendered 
by capitalist formations.35 This extends to his account of affective capacity under capitalism, 
which exhibits both an appreciation of the way capitalism amplifies affective capacity and a 
sharp critique of the capture of affective capacity for a select few. This capture dominates the 
many and deprives them of the potentially-increased force that capitalism develops.36 The 
particular level and configuration of forces involved in labor are constituted historically: all 
“natural forces of social labour” are “historical products” (G, 400; his emphasis). The affective 




capital, in its “universalizing tendency,” “strives towards the universal development of the forces 
of production” (540). In my reading, it seeks to organize bodies and materials such that 
productive capacity can be maximized and universally distributed: capitalism aims at, and to 
some extent enacts, a mass amplification of the capacity to affect and be affected.  
Deleuze and Guattari theorize that capitalism “brings about the decoding of the flows that 
the other social formations coded and overcoded,” but “it substitutes for the codes an extremely 
rigid axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital” 
(1983, 245–46). My own reading of Marx clarifies this sort of articulation of capitalism: the 
decoding of flows becomes the amplification and proliferation of affective capacity, while the 
rigid capitalist axiomatic binding energies becomes the redirection and capture of that capacity 
for the reproduction of capitalist social formation. By combining labor, developing powers, 
constantly expanding, and so on, capitalism generates this continual dynamic regeneration of 
affective capacity in order to perpetuate itself. In constantly encountering and seeking to further 
displace barriers to its own development and reproduction, capital requires an ever-increasing 
capture of affect. It “tear[s] down all the barriers which hem in the development of … 
exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces” (410). Capitalism needs labor to be 
more efficient – to affect and be affected at an ever-increasing rate – if it is to extract more 
surplus labor and thus reproduce and expand. It needs the creative power of labor capacity to be 
directed at the creation of goods for capitalist circulation. It requires situating many workers and 
their capacities together in the same spatial and temporal site – i.e. combining labor – to 
overcome the limits of the working day (cf. 399-400). Generally, capital “is productive” as “an 
essential relation for the development of the social productive forces” and it “incessantly whips 




emphasis Marx’s). Capitalism does not only produce particular social and economic relations, or 
particular forms of ideology, or specific types of worker-subjects, but also directly produces an 
intensification of affective capacity.  
The very “concept of capital” contains “the concentration of many living labour 
capacities” (590). Viewed as a general society-wide formation, it demands an amplification of 
these forces directed to its own reproduction and expansion. Capital does more than this, 
however; it also comes to posit itself as the exclusive agent conducting this power. In doing so it 
conceals the actual bodies generating and actualizing these forces as well as the effects on these 
bodies of capitalist processes. All the “social powers of production are productive powers of 
capital,” and the “collective power of labour” becomes “the collective power of capital” (585; 
emphasis Marx’s). Capitalist processes collectivize and increase affective capacity in a particular 
mode of production, then put it to work for the benefit of capitalists and the extension of 
capitalism, but in a way such that capitalism itself appears as the bearer of this power. The 
individual body realizes the capacity of living labor, but capitalism seizes this force as its own. 
By placing a mass of workers in the same location and compelling them to work toward the same 
end and in the same production process, “capital appears as the collective force of the workers, 
their social force, as well as that which ties them together, and hence as the unity which creates 
this force” (587). In the process of amplifying affective capacity, capital comes to posit itself as 
the bearer of and unifying energy behind this collective force. Doing this renders the actual 
forces themselves – those of laboring bodies – invisible in an affective form of fetishism. By 
standing in as the representation and unity of concentrated forces that in actuality result from 
actualization of labor capacities in the form of exploited, alienated laboring bodies, capitalism 




enervates and destroys the very bodies from which this affective capacity was extracted and 
realized for profit and further growth.  
Upon this reading, alienation in Marx’s works takes on a particularly affective character, 
as a force that confronts and opposes the laborer: capitalism alienates the worker from their 
material affective capacity, then opposes a warped affective force against the worker. As a result 
of the division of labor, “man’s own deed” – read: actualization of affective capacity – “becomes 
an alien power opposed to him”; the combined efforts of laborers comprise a “social power” that 
“appears to these individual[s] … not as their own united power, but as alien force existing 
outside them” that becomes “the prime governor” of human “will and action” (GI, 53-54). The 
language used by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts consistently depicts alienation in terms of 
external force, marking it as: “an alien object exercising power” in terms of the “product of labor” 
(EPM, 75); an “alien activity not belonging to” the worker – “activity as suffering” – when it 
comes to the “act of production” (75); and a “being alien to him” when discussing species-being 
(77; his italics). Similar formulations persist in the more “mature” Marx: for example, in the 
Grundrisse, the “product of labour … endowed by living labour” becomes “an alien property” 
(453; Marx’s emphasis) and “labour in general … comes to confront the worker as an alien 
power” (307; his italics). This external force confronts the worker and drains them of affective 
capacity. Alienated labor is “external to the worker” in a way that, instead of “develop[ing] 
freely his physical and mental energy,” “mortifies his body” (EPM, 74).  
Alienation thus describes in some ways the embodied experience of the worker in 
capitalism subject to the seizure or redirection of their affective capacity. Not only do social 
relations and productive processes capture the ability to act and be acted upon, this process on a 




As Sara Ahmed notes, alienation in Marx is both alienation vis-à-vis labor in “a kind of self-
estrangement” and is “a feeling-structure, a form of suffering that shapes how the worker 
inhabits the world” given that “the world they have created is an extension of themselves … that 
is appropriated (2010, 167).37 For Marx, the “collisions” between individuals “produce an alien 
power standing above them,” a “process and power independent of them” (G, 197). The worker 
puts their life – their dynamic mattering, material productive force – into labor, but this results in 
confrontation with an alien force. Living labour capacity becomes separated from “its own 
labour,” “alien to it”; as a result, it “has become poorer by the life forces expended” and 
transferred to the alien product, process, and force (462).38 Alienated labor means that instead of 
the laboring body realizing its capacity or power, labor wrests and appropriates this affective 
force in a way that both lessens the capacity of that body and poses as a warped, confrontational 
alien power against it. The “social relation of individuals to one another” has become, in a 
perversion of the potentiality and relational connectivity of affective force, a “power over the 
individuals which has become autonomous” of them (197). Marx’s account of alienation, like his 
broader critique of capitalism, centrally engages and works through the dynamics of affect. In the 
“production process of capital,” labour “appears just as subservient to and led by an alien will 
and an alien intelligence” in the form of an “animated monster” (470; Marx’s emphasis). This 
alien(ation) monster, like the capital-as-vampire figure below, feeds on affective capacity.    
It is in these many senses of capitalist affect that, as marked in the epigraph to this 
chapter, “capitalist production” has “rapidly and firmly … seized the vital forces of the people at 
their very roots” (C Vol. I, 380). When Marx makes this claim, we must read it affectively. Vital 
forces are not (or at least not only) metaphorical, nor does the statement refer exclusively to the 




Capitalism captures the essential powers of individual bodies, their capacity to affect and be 
affected; it is the usurpation of creative, generative, affective force. It makes labor capacity a 
force for capital alone. We might thus say that one defining characteristic of the proletariat as a 
class is its particular mode of enmeshment in these capitalist affective flows. That is, one 
component of the class status or process of the proletariat is that one’s affective capacities are 
amplified, but this power is captured for the reproduction of capital and enrichment of another 
affective class at the expense of one’s own body. The worker becomes “nothing other than 
labour-power for the duration of [their] whole life,” directing all the worker’s time and activity – 
education, intellectual development, sleep, social intercourse, the “free play of the vital forces” 
of “body and mind,” and so on – to the “self-valorization of capital” (375).39 Capitalism is 
affective and cannot exist outside of the concomitant intensification and redirection of capacity.  
When capital and labor encounter one another under conditions of capitalism, capital 
“buys [labour] as living labour, as the general productive force,” while the worker sells their 
labor and thus “surrenders its creative power” (G, 307; Marx’s emphasis). In this exchange, the 
creative power of labor capacity “establishes itself as the power of capital,” and “capital 
appropriates [labour as productive force], as such” (307). The buying and selling of labor power 
is also the appropriation by capital of affective capacity. The purchase by capital is a 
procurement of the worker’s “vitality,” the “objectified labour contained in his vital forces” 
(323). Capital “realizes itself through the appropriation of alien” living labour capacity (307; 
emphasis Marx’s). It depends on this affective capture for its own perpetuation. Consequently, 
“every increase in the powers of social production … the productive power of labour itself” – 
and as I have discussed, this increase is something required and continually produced by 




dominating over labour; increases only the productive power of capital” (308; his emphasis). 
Cheah, without any recourse to affect, argues that capital “appropriate[s] the source of life,” by 
“parasitically draining the life and labor” in a way that “trausmute[s] capital into a vital being” 
(2003, 197–98). Affect explains how this process works. Any amplification of affective capacity 
accrues to capital at the expense of the worker, and any increase in the power of the worker 
increases the power of capital and its domination of labor. Capitalist processes appropriate the 
worker’s vital forces and essential powers. As Negri contends, “Capital can only subtract life, 
can only mortify labor” (Casarino and Negri 2004, 180). If we read Marx across his works as 
exploring the relationships of economic and social power, then we must theorize the affective 
component of that power that I have elucidated. Ultimately, the “natural animating power of 
labour … becomes a power of capital, not of labour” (G, 357; emphasis Marx’s). Capitalism 
seizes the “value-creating possibility … which lies within” the laboring body and becomes 
“master over living labour capacity” (453). It engages in the constant capture of affective 
capacity, and this constitutes a central mode of Marx’s critique of capital upon practicing feeling 
as a method.  
This approach to affectively reading Marx and theorizing capitalism brings to the fore 
one important tension between affect theory and Marx, namely the extent to which affect theory 
can be part of structural analysis and/or systemic social theory. My argument is, in many ways, a 
structural one, following Marx: capitalism systematically organizes, amplifies, and captures 
affect, in a way that maps onto Marx’s structural theorizing about class positions within 
capitalism. In several ways this is in tension with affect theory. Massumi counterposes cultural 
and social theory focused on structure – where “nothing ever happens” and where “all eventual 




“collapse of structured distinction into intensity, of rules into paradox” (2002, 27).40 In this sense, 
bringing together affect theory and a structural understanding of Marx becomes quite 
complicated.  
My claim is that an affective reading of Marx can help bridge this divide, even as these 
tensions remain inextricable. Massumi notes that while “affect is indeed unformed and 
unstructured … it is nevertheless highly organized and effectively analyzable” (260n3). I 
understand my reading of Marx to be a quasi-structural analysis of the organization of affect 
under capitalism at a very general level. Even though affect always exceeds any attempts at 
containing it – and indeed I discuss this below vis-à-vis Marx’s account of the contradictions in 
capitalism – this should not preclude attempts to theorize large-scale political, social, and 
economic patternings of affective flows. Massumi closes the chapter I have been quoting from 
here by claiming that affect has the “ability…to produce an economic effect more swiftly than 
economics itself” and is thus “a real condition, an intrinsic variable of the late capitalist system, 
as infrastructural as a factory”; affect is maybe even “beyond infrastructural, it is everywhere, in 
effect” (45). I would argue that affectively returning to Marx provides one important route – in 
addition to, for example, Massumi’s own work on interactions between reason and affect in 
neoliberalism (2014), which does not engage Marx – for taking on the task of analyzing affect as 
infrastructural to capitalism and a real condition of economic existence. If I am right that Marx is 
theorizing capitalism as a social formation that amplifies affective capacities, but at the same 
times captures it from those actualizing such potentials, then affect is indeed “everywhere, in 
effect,” to use Massumi’s phrase. At the same time, I argue that my reading also responds to the 
critique that work bringing philosophical concepts about materialism into Marx has been unable 




theory to be a crucial tool for making legible large-scale processes that are constitutive of 
capitalism. While my work cannot fully resolve the tension between affect theory and structural 
explanation – my account is arguably too structural for affect theory and not structural enough 
for structuralists – but it does articulate one way of making that tension productive.  
My argument also diverges from some strands of the analytical attention paid to affective 
or immaterial labor over the past twenty years. In his article “Affective Labor,” Hardt claims that 
affective labor is “immaterial, even if it is corporeal and affective, in the sense that its products 
are intangible: a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion – even a sense of 
connectedness or community” (1999, 96). Hardt in his article (93), as well as Hardt and Negri in 
Empire (2000, 290–292), trace the importance of theorizing affective labor to what they variably 
call the postmodern, post-Fordist, postindustrial, and informational organizations of economy. In 
this account, the increasing shift to knowledge economies, so-called service jobs, carework, 
computing, and so on makes affective labor more important in late capitalism than in earlier 
stages. Indeed, for Hardt, while affective labor has never been entirely outside capitalism, 
“economic postmodernization” has “positioned affective labor in a role that is not only directly 
productive of capital but at the very pinnacle of the hierarchy of laboring forms (1999, 90). In 
this sense, affective labor “has become firmly embedded as a necessary foundation for capitalist 
accumulation and patriarchal order”41 (100).  
Drawing on my account of Marx, I would disagree that there is some subset of labor that 
is affective and becomes especially prominent in late capitalism. All labor is affective labor – at 
least from the perspective of a Spinozan reading of Marx. In thinking of affective capacity as the 
ever-present power of the active body, it becomes difficult to localize affective labor in only one 




capitalism, he is critiquing the organization of affective labor, among other things. It is not that 
the postindustrial, post-Fordist economy newly centers affective labor and displaces other modes 
of laboring activity, but that the post-Fordist economy organizes and directs that affective labor 
differently than earlier modes of capitalist production, perhaps even making it more prominently 
affective. A factory worker performs affective labor: it is a different sort of affective labor than 
that of today’s migrant careworker, fast-food employee, or social media manager, but is affective 
nonetheless.42 When Lazzarato, for example, contends that immaterial affective labor is “the 
labor which produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity” through post-
Fordist changes in labor processes and in activities not always traditionally understood as work 
(1996, 133), and “appears as a real mutation of ‘living labor’” (138), he obscures the way that 
industrial labor, including Marx’s account of such labor and of living labor capacity, is 
affective.43 The affectivity of labor under capitalism is not bounded to a period of late capitalism 
but is powerfully present, with severe effects on laboring bodies, in earlier modes of capitalist 
production.  
Ethics and Affect in the Critique of Capital  
The vital affective component of Marx’s critique opens up even deeper resonances with a 
Deleuzean Spinoza, in this case in the realm of power and ethics. As elaborated earlier, Spinozan 
power is closely tied to the capacity to affect and be affected. There is always both a “power of 
acting” and a “power of being acted upon” manifesting affective capacity (Deleuze 1988, 27; 
emphasis his).44 For Deleuze, this conducts us to a Spinozan ethics – which Deleuze insists is a 
form of ethology – centered on affective capacity and power as the criteria of this ethics. In his 
reading, Spinoza constructs an ethics where “everything that is bad is measured by a decrease of 




of this same power (72).45 Interacting bodies constitute this ethics, which appraises goodness or 
badness in terms of the effects of interactions on these bodies. For Deleuze’s Spinoza, “the good 
is when a body directly compounds its relations with ours, and with all or part of its power, 
increases our” own power (22); consequently, “goodness is a matter of dynamism, power, and 
the composition of powers” (23). The bad, conversely, “is when a body decomposes our body’s 
relation” and “it still combines with our parts, but in ways that do not correspond to our essence” 
(22). Within this ethical framework we can classify encounters into two sorts. Joyful encounters 
involve interactions where “power is added” to the interrelating bodies such that the affective 
capacity and “power of acting” are “increased or enhanced,” while sad encounters generate “a 
subtraction” wherein affective capacity and power of acting are “diminished or blocked” (27-
28).46 The ethical imperative thus becomes one of organizing a maximum of joyful encounters so 
that bodies interact in ways that mutually increase affective capacity and the power of acting.  
“Everything that involves sadness serves tyranny and oppression … and must be 
denounced as bad,” asserts Deleuze’s Spinoza (72). Capitalism, in my reading of Marx, can be 
denounced on precisely these grounds. Marx, obviously, was deeply attuned to the oppression 
and destruction wrought by capitalist production. I contend that theorizing Marx in relation to 
Deleuze’s Spinoza draws out an affective ethical component to his critique of capitalism. What is 
capitalism, for Marx, if not an organization of sad encounters that systematically decreases the 
capacity and power of the proletariat collectively and individually? The laboring body under 
capitalism is constantly acting in a way that actualizes its capacities and powers, yet these are 
seized by capital, leaving them powerless and dulled. The encounters between laborer and 
laborer, laborer and boss, laborer and machinery, laborer and nature, and laborer and capital are 




formations is methodically diminished, and from the perspective of Spinozan affect and ethics, 
this constitutes tyranny and oppression that ought to be denounced.  
Grattan argues that too much Spinozist Marxism – especially that of Negri, with and 
without Hardt – effaces the way that affect is not only joyful encounters or increases in the 
power to act; Spinoza also carefully theorizes the ways that encounters may be – and often are – 
harmful and diminishing of the power to act (2011, 7-8). The problem is that avoiding the 
possibility of harmful or sad encounters, or erasing them from one’s theory – as Grattan asserts 
Negri too often does – cannot in fact rid the world of sad affects and harmful encounters. Instead, 
because they are part of existence, “coming to terms with potential causes of sad affects is 
crucial to critical practice (7). This is one of the reasons that I find it so necessary to go back to 
Marx himself in relation to affect and to Spinoza. As I have demonstrated, Marx is perhaps the 
most incisive critical analyst of the material practices, relations, and conditions that organize life 
as a series of sad affects and harmful encounters.47  
Ruddick notes that the turn to Spinoza in critical theory has “invigorated a radical ethico-
politics of ontology,” one “embracing … an indwelling, vital, and immanent concept of power as 
potentia” that is “set against a parasitic capitalism” (2010, 24). Marx, I contend, provides a 
uniquely important mode of such theorizing given his vivid articulation of what I have called the 
tension of capitalist affect. Any affect theory proceeding from Spinoza will benefit from the sort 
of encounter with Marx that I have elaborated. That is, once we read Marx’s critique of 
capitalism for its resonances with Deleuzean-Spinozan affect, not only do we generate a 
newfound apprehension of the affective register of that critique, but also add to the critical 




For Deleuze, Spinoza theorizes how “in sadness our power as a conatus serves entirely to 
invest the painful trace and to repel or destroy the object which is its cause. Our power is 
immobilized, and can no longer do anything but react” (1988, 101). To a significant extent, this 
describes Marx’s account of capital: he details the painful traces of capitalism on the laboring 
body (cf. C Vol. I, chap. 10; Cvetkovich 1992, chap. 7), the constitution of the proletariat as a 
revolutionary class meant to destroy capitalism (MCP), and immobilization of the power of the 
proletarian body and its subsumption to the powers of capital. Capitalism produces a “throng of 
people … made up of generations of stunted, short-lived and rapidly replaced human beings, 
plucked, so to speak, before they were ripe” (C Vol. I, 380). In its ongoing need to absorb and put 
to use labor capacity, capitalist production quickly uses up the forces of the body themselves, 
“shortening the life of labour-power, in the same way as a greedy farmer snatches more produce 
from the soil by robbing it of its fertility” (376). Capitalism requires the amplification of 
affective capacity, but in realizing this necessity it depletes the source from which it seizes that 
capacity in the first place. Marx intensely describes this depletion of forces and bodies: 
capitalism “oversteps … the merely physical limits of the working day,” granting only “the exact 
amount of torpor essential to the revival of an absolutely exhausted organism” and leaving only 
“diseased, compulsory and painful” labour-power, “produc[ing] the premature exhaustion and 
death of this labour-power itself” (375-6). Perhaps when Marx writes about the “vampire-like” 
quality of capital, the way it “lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more 
labour it sucks” (342), we ought to think of capital as the affect vampire, sucking the capacity, 
force, and power from the depleted bodies it leaves behind.  
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Of course, for Marx the “universality towards which [capitalism] irresistibly strives 
encounters barriers in its own nature, which will, at a certain stage of its development, allow it to 
be recognized as being itself the greatest barrier to this tendency, and hence will drive towards its 
own suspension” (G, 410). Given my reading of Marx thus far, I would argue that the affective 
tension of capitalism – it amplifies affective capacity to ensure its own reproduction, but seizes 
that affect and systematically destroys the bodies involved in the realization of that capacity – 
contributes to what Marx understands as the contradictions producing the collapse of capitalism. 
Capitalism seeks to universalize the development of productive force, even if it can only ever do 
so partially. As Marx notes, this tendency also constitutes a limit for capitalist development as 
well as a precondition for the overthrow of capitalism and generation of a communist society. 
The “working-out of the productive forces” – in my reading the amplification of affective 
capacity – constitutes a “barrier to capital” because its “entire development process proceeds in a 
contradictory way” (541; emphasis Marx’s). This contradiction, though, “is fleeting, and 
produces the real conditions of its own suspension” (541-542). That is, as capitalism creates “the 
highest development of the forces of production,” it also generates the possibility for the “richest 
development” of individuals and their capacities (541). In amplifying affective capacity yet 
seizing it for the gain of capitalists and the reproduction of capitalism, capitalist production 
develops the power and force that can – and for Marx often will48 – overthrow it. Capital 
“possesses” this “tendency” towards the “free, unobstructed, progressive, and universal 
development” of productive force, but “since capital is a limited form of production,” this 
tendency “contradicts it and hence drives it towards dissolution” (540). Capitalism initiates a 
movement of capacities and powers in the direction of their universal development, which would 




intensified forces and destroying the bodies realizing them. This, Marx argues, proves 
impossible; once unleashed, these affective capacities will work towards their own realization in 
free conditions, overthrowing the capitalist formation seeking to contain and capture them.49 In 
the register of Clough et al.’s “affect-itself,” we might call this movement in Marx his 
recognition of the way that “with each actualization, there remains a virtual remainder of 
affective potential,” the “openness of bodily matter to its own unstable, pre-individual capacities” 
such that affect works as “potentiality, indeterminate emergence, and creative mutation” (Clough 
et al. 2007, 65). If capitalism “produces, above all, its own grave-diggers” (MCP, 483), then its 
death is in part affective, and the grave-diggers include the renewed communist force of 
proletarian affective capacity.  
This is one area where it is possible to locate agency, workplace organizing, trade union 
activism, and resistance. Capitalism cannot become entirely totalizing, such that there are no 
outsides, nonidentities, or fissures, even if Marx or Western Marxists often represent capitalism 
in a homogenizing or absolute way (J. K. Gibson-Graham 2006). One particularly affective mode 
of counterpower might take the form of what Spinoza calls common notions. These notions, 
arrived at and formed through joyful affects, are “representation[s] of a composition between two 
or more bodies, and a unity of this composition,” one “express[ing] the relations of agreement or 
composition between existing bodies” (Deleuze 1988, 54).50 A basic question for living beings 
thus becomes “knowing how we manage to form” enriching compositions of bodies and the 
common notions that embody them in an ideational sense (55; his emphasis). Joyful affects and 
joyful encounters – those amplifying the power to act and be acted upon – work as the conduits 
for and catalyzers of common notions in the becoming-rational of material, living modes in 




“feelings that agree with reason” in the “effort to select and organize good encounters” that 
“inspire us with joyful passions” as well as “feelings that are born of reason” in the “perception 
and comprehension of the common notions” to “deduce other relations” oriented toward new, 
“active” experiences (55-6; emphasis Deleuze’s). Upsetting Cartesian (or other traditions’) 
attempts to bifurcate reason and the feeling body, Spinozan common notions “represent the 
composition of real relations between existing modes or individuals” and hence capture 
embodied, material relations (57). Common notions supplement joyful affective relations with 
some degree of reasoned design, enabling the more intentional pursuit of compositions of bodies 
that increase the capacity for affecting and being affected.  
For Deleuze’s Spinoza, the formation of common notions proceeds through a trajectory 
of reasoned grasping of the compositions of bodies. The first, most basic common notions are the 
least general ones, forming a composition between two bodies, a relation generating joyful 
affects. This has the potential to create cascading active affects; if this intensification occurs, the 
first common notion and these spiraling affects produce the “force to form common notions that 
are even more general,” ones that compose bodies that do not agree with each other in full or are 
contrary to one another in some way (Deleuze 1988, 56). From “these new common notions, new 
affects of active joy follow,” replacing sad affects and encounters (56). That is, common notions, 
fostered in the proper environment, express tendencies to expand and extend themselves, 
drawing in greater bodies, relations, affects, and so on.  
Perhaps the formation of joyful encounters could be considered to be one of the tasks of a 
proletarian movement or of class struggle for the affective Marx. Class-consciousness might take 
the form, from the standpoint of affect, of creating and propagating common notions, drawing 




and relations of production that organize sad encounters. The action of these bodies brought 
together – in the form of organizing in a workplace or in a social movement, or of fomenting 
revolution – makes these common notions active, and might draw in more bodies into the 
common project. Simply being situated similarly with regard to the means of production – or to 
the social organization of affective forces – is not enough;51 common notions must be struggled 
for and actively realized by feeling-bodies.  
Marx’s writings on the Paris Commune in The Civil War in France (1978) provide one 
example from which we might understand anti-capitalist praxis in terms of common notions and 
joyful encounters. In Marx’s account, the “working class” of Paris – positioning themselves 
against the bourgeois ideologists’ screeds accusing them of naïveté – knew “that in order to work 
out their own emancipation” and the emancipation of society, they would “have to pass through 
long struggles, through a series of historical processes” because they were engaged in the project 
of “transforming circumstances and men” (635-36). They embraced “the full consciousness of 
their historic mission” and “the heroic resolve to act up to it” (636). A self-/class-consciousness 
operates here, as the Communards in their collectivity forged an understanding of their 
connection to history and to social upheaval. I argue that this could be theorized as a kind of 
common notion that becomes more general (in the Spinozan-Deleuzean sense discussed above) 
as more bodies network together in acts of resistance.   
Deleuze writes that from “new” and more general “common notions, new affects of 
active joy follow” (1988, 56). Such a process might provide an explanation for how and why the 
Communards bear a certain joyful presence in Marx’s tale. Perhaps these common notions 
leading to joyful encounters are a source for the way that the Commune was “radiant in the 




coarse invective of the gentleman’s gentleman…and at the didactic patronage of well-wishing 
bourgeois-doctrinaires” (636). In an overwhelmingly difficult situation, the Communards 
nevertheless fashioned a sense of historical purpose and a capacity for radiance, enthusiasm, and 
sardonicism, at least in Marx’s telling. The way an expanding network of bodies comes together 
to both reciprocally enhance their individual and collective capacity to act and to gain expanding 
common knowledge and joy provides one theoretical framework for understanding this situation. 
Such an explanation connects to current social movements as well, for instance Read’s 
discussion of how Occupy Wall Street and anti-student debt movements can be understood as 
“new collective imaginings” that resemble Spinozan common notions (2015, 13–14). More 
broadly, the linked concepts of common notions and joyful encounters present one place where 
questions of resistance and collectivity enter into an affective reading of Marx.  
Communist Affect 
Affectively reading Marx’s materialism and critique of capital necessarily provokes the 
question of the affectivity of the future communist society he envisions. My account of the 
affective component of Marx’s critique of capital provides the crucial departure: if capitalism 
systematically amplifies affective capacity and force but redirects this intensified force for its 
own reproduction while destroying the bodies that actualize such a capacity, then communism 
(among other things) coordinates productive activity so that intensified affective capacity and 
productive force are organized to feed back into the development of individual bodies and the 
overall cooperative augmentation of the forces of society. The communal society of the future 
would be one of joyful encounters, in which, to rephrase Marx and Engels in the Manifesto (491), 
we shall have an association, in which the free development of affective capacities realized by 




communism bodies affect and are affected by other bodies such that their individual and 
collective powers are continually augmented.52  
Communism would not just be communal direction of the means of production, but 
would be the communal amplifications of affect, force, and capacity.53 Capitalism, especially in 
the way it produces relations between individuals mediated through the exchange value of 
commodities, produces “universally developed individuals” who, while experiencing alienation 
and exploitation, have the “universality and comprehensiveness of [their] relations and capacities” 
developed (G, 162). Capitalism robs the potentiality of such relations and capacities for its own 
gain and reproduction, but develops them nonetheless. Only a communal development and 
organization can fully actualize the powers, capacities, and forces appropriated under capitalism, 
where the interaction between bodies does not enervate the many while enriching the few, but 
conducts the intensification of the capacity and forces for all. Unalienated labor, such as would 
be manifest in Marx’s vision, entails the human “really returning to himself out of the 
estrangement of his own essential powers, and in making himself at home in the external world 
transformed by those powers” (Schmidt 2014, 143). Marx’s “demand for the emancipation of all 
man’s essential powers” (151) is, given my affective reading, a demand for the emancipation of 
affective potential, unbound and newly capable of realization in transforming others and the 
world, and in being transformed by them. This “restructuring” of the human enables “human 
qualities [to] be universally unfolded” (144-45).  
When we surpass “the limited bourgeois form,” we find – in a passage that would be just 
as at home in Spinoza, or in Deleuze and Guattari54 – the “universality of individual needs, 
capacities, pleasures, productive forces,” the “absolute working-out of” the “creative 




and the individual who “strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute 
movement of becoming” (G, 488). In the end, this is what Marx describes as real or true wealth: 
“the appropriation of [one’s] own productive powers,” one’s “presence as a social body,” the 
“development of the social individual” (G, 705). We should, ultimately, read such an expansive 
vision affectively, especially considering the vivid resonances between Marx and Deleuzean-
Spinozan affect that I have traced throughout this chapter. What is the communal development 
and becoming of creative potentialities, capacities, and human powers in themselves, if not a 
Spinozan ethic where “powers, speeds, and slownesses [are] composed” such that “individuals 
enter into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad infinitum” and 
“capacities can compound directly to constitute a more ‘intense’ capacity or power” (Deleuze 
1988, 126)? Feeling as a method enables us to speculate that the free development of the 
individual and the community in Marx is in part a development of affect, constantly raising 
bodies in their individuality and relationality to higher, more intense capacities and power. From 
the standpoint of Deleuze and Spinoza, affective capacity is in the end never a matter of the 
disconnected or atomized body for which another poses a limit or constraint, nor of “utilizations 
or captures,”55 but “of sociabilities and communities” (Deleuze 1988, 126). Communism’s 
community involves a set of affective relations that reciprocally amplify affective capacity, 
creating sociabilities that mutually enrich power, rather than a more narrow increase in the 
ability of some to act at the expense of harming others, such as is the case in more repressive 
patternings of bodily capacity like capitalism, fascism, or colonialism.  
The most fully realized individual in a Spinozan framework seeks out such sociability, 
and persists in a social organization that enables such relations. As Deleuze renders it, “that 




to organize his encounters, to join with whatever agrees with his nature, to combine his relation 
with relations that are compatible with his, and thereby to increase his power” (1988, 22-23). The 
activity of such a notion of freedom is itself crucial. Freedom, for Deleuze and Spinoza, is an 
active process, a becoming. The individual “is not born free,” but “becomes free or frees 
himself”: freedom entails an actualization of the body’s powers, a seizing and “com[ing] into 
possession of [one’s] power of acting … from which active affects follow” (Deleuze 1988, 70–
71). At the root of these interrelated conceptions of goodness, freedom, and rationality lies affect 
in general and the active pursuit of encounters with others that mutually amplify affective 
capacity more specifically. Marx’s most fully realized individual similarly depends on 
community. As he and Engels write, “personal power (relations)” can only be seized from their 
appropriation by the division of labor by individuals in community: “only within the community 
has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom 
becomes possible only within the community” and in “real community the individuals obtain 
their freedom and in through their association” (GI, 86-87). The active taking hold of one’s 
bodily powers and the communal development of relations cannot be separated from one another. 
Only in community can individuals mutually amplify their capacities for affecting and being 
affected. 
There is thus an affective sense of Marx and Engel’s claim that the “real intellectual 
wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections” (GI, 59). In terms 
of affect, the connections of individuals as capacities, if augmenting and enhancing to all, 
condition the expansion of any individual power or movement toward free development. This, I 
argue, is one aspect of the kind of individuality “not antithetical to a Marxist tradition”: it is not 




larger social fabrics” (Petchesky 1990, 4). Instead, this is the free individual as a social being, a 
species-being, whose “human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual” but 
“in its reality” is “the ensemble of social relations” (TF, VI).56 Affect is an inextricable element 
of this social ensemble – once one theorizes the body as capacity and power – and becomes a 
precondition for the actualization of the human essence or of free individuality. As such, it 
comprises one quality of the “just community” that “is required for the full development of free 
individuality” (C. C. Gould 1980, xiv) when it takes the form of joyful encounters that 
compound capacities. In Gould’s reading of Marx, justice in the “communal society of the 
future,” understood as “a condition for the self-realization of all individuals,” “designates social 
relations in which agents mutually enhance each other” (171).57 These reciprocal social relations, 
I claim, must include affect, and they prove to be a particularly Marxist articulation of a society 
of Spinozan joyful encounters. As Schmidt notes, even if the basis of Marxist materialism is “the 
possibility of removing hunger and misery,” Marx retains a “eudemonistic impulse”; this leads 
him to a suggestive prompting, asking “but what is the value of men’s immense and not only 
theoretical efforts to transcend capitalism, if one of the objects aimed at is not pleasure, and the 
attainment of the satisfaction of the senses?” (2014, 40).58 Conceptualized as a fundamental 
constitutive force and as a rubric for analyzing interacting bodies, any just communist society 
must provide for affective self-realization – the increase in the capacity to affect and be affected 
and mutual enhancement as a set of joyful encounters, forming augmentative compositions of 
bodies. Nonetheless, whether all bodies across their various differences are able to realize joyful 
encounters is an open question, given Marx’s omissions and exclusions related to gender, race, 




Closely bound up in this realm of individual-social-affective freedom and development in 
communism is the Marxian notion of freedom as it related to human need. These needs, I claim, 
include an affective need, the need for the social organization to persistently enhance the 
affective capacities of bodies in their connected individuality and sociality. Petchesky argues that 
the “end of socialist transformation is ultimately the satisfaction of individual needs, which are 
always concrete and specific” as opposed to the needs of idealist abstract citizens (1990, 4). She 
cites Agnes Heller’s The Theory of Need in Marx (1976), where Heller contends that “when the 
domination of things over human beings ceases, when relations between human beings no longer 
appear as relations between things, then every need governs 'the need for the development of the 
individual’” (73). Because Marx’s entire philosophy proceeds from the active, productive, body 
– one I have insisted we can understand in terms of affective capacity – affect becomes one of 
the fundamental needs, for no body can produce or reproduce life, subsistence, other humans and 
so on without some prerequisite capacity to affect and be affected. Here, Rosemary Hennessy’s 
account of the human need for sensation and affect proves crucial. As she asserts, “affective 
needs are inseparable from the social component of most need satisfaction, then, but they also 
constitute human needs in themselves in the sense that all people deserve to have the conditions 
available that will allow them to exercise and develop their affective capacities” (2000, 210–
11).59 In her account, capitalist production “outlaws” the meeting of this need for affect (215-18). 
Communism must, then, fulfill some basic need for affect, as a precondition for individual and 
ultimately human freedom.  
An additional feature of these affective relations under communism might be the 
formation of new kinds of common notions. As I noted above, Marx and Engels state that “it is 




connections” (GI, 59). What is the work that the “intellectual” is doing in this assertion? The 
concept of common notions can help us to think through the intellectuality of these connections 
in a way that stays true to the historical materialist emphasis on consciousness and the 
intellectual as always contingent on the active body. Once the connections between people are 
such that they reciprocally amplify affective capacity in a concatenation of joyful encounters, 
these real, material, embodied affective connections can enable the intellectual representation of 
them as well as intentional and social effort toward their communal organization. That is, 
affectively enriching connections under communism create the conditions required for the 
ideational comprehension of the connections. There is thus some conceptual specificity to the 
intellectual wealth of the individual depending on their real conditions: this formulation, I think, 
suggests something like a Spinozan common notion, and especially so once the Marxist project 
is read affectively.60  
Consciousness – a “social product” – “only arises from the need, the necessity of 
intercourse with other” humans (GI, 49). Communism, though, can move this intercourse beyond 
the realm of necessity into an active seizing of social relations to amplify affective capacities. 
That is, in the pursuit of compositions that enhance power, consciousness can reach true 
intellectual wealth in its active striving for connection and intercourse. Common notions enable 
the active grasping of relations as opposed to the mere necessity of relations. Perhaps, then, 
species-being, as it can be realized in communism, may be read in terms of affect and common 
notions. Humans realize themselves as species-beings only in “free, conscious activity,” where 
“man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness,” and does so in 
a social sense (EPM, 76). This seizing of life activity as object(ive) resembles, I think, the active 




appropriates human capacities for a specific trajectory for enmeshed individual-communal life. 
Marx writes that one’s “general consciousness” is “only the theoretical shape of that of which 
the living shape is the real community, the social fabric,” while the “activity of my general 
consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my theoretical existence as a social being” (EPM, 
105; italics his). This communal vision contrasts with Marx’s “present day,” the rule of private 
property, where general consciousness “is an abstraction for real life” (105). Conscious activity, 
properly social, grasps the real lived relations of the community, providing some sort of 
theoretical account of these relations. Only then does one’s “existence for the other and the 
other’s existence for” them constitute the “life-element of the human world,” a bond with the 
species and with nature as a “foundation” of “human existence” (104; Marx’s emphasis).  
The common notion marks where the human “becomes free or frees himself,” a 
“com[ing] into possession” of the “power of acting” in composition with others, generating 
“adequate ideas from which active affects follow” (Deleuze 1988, 70-71). Realizing species-
being involves this sort of freedom. It is a positive apprehension of the capacity for relating to 
and interacting with others in a mutually enriching way to actualize the species-connection 
between individuals. This requires the positive transcendence of private property, enabling a 
“sensuous appropriation for and by” the human of “the human essence and of human life,” 
appropriating “total essence in a total manner” (EPM, 106). The element of active seizing is what 
shifts these movements and processes into the realm of common notions, and Marx repeatedly 
emphasizes the need for positively appropriating essence, capacity, life, activity, relations, the 
social fabric, existence, and reality.61 The affectivity of Marx’s understanding of bodies, relations, 
activity, production, and life itself situate these species-being appropriations in the affective 




not just intense, relational, reciprocal affective compositions of bodies, but the forming of 
common notions that grasp the forces at play in such socialities and strive for the open-ended 
organization of joyful affects and encounters. 
Nature, Objects, Machines 
 One of the limits to Marx’s communist imagination is that it – at least upon some 
readings – retains and in some ways deepens Marxist anthropocentrism and domination of nature. 
While I think his utopic vision generates a vivid portrayal of an affectively abundant sociality of 
interacting bodies, nature most likely does not become enmeshed in organized joyful encounters. 
Instead, as Schmidt contends in his reading of the relationship between humans and nature in 
Marx’s “utopia,” the “new society is to benefit [humans] alone, and there is no doubt that this is 
at the expense of external nature,” which is to be “mastered with gigantic technological aids” 
(2014, 151). When Marx (and Marx and Engels) critique the “unholy plundering of nature,” the 
concern is not so much with “nature itself but with considerations of economic utility”: 
communism signifies not the saving of nature, but the “rationaliz[ing]” of “encroachment into 
nature,” directing this appropriation for the benefit of all (155-56). Instead of affecting and being 
affected, it seems that nature in communism is only affected by humans, as it enters into 
consistent sad encounters depleting nature of its powers. At best, Schmidt argues, there “remains 
… a vague hope,” that humans will “learn to a far greater degree to practise solidarity with the 
oppressed animal world” (156), and that when they “are no longer led by their form of society to 
regard each other primarily from the point of view of economic advantage, they will be able to 
restore to external things something of their independence (158). In this kind of muted potential, 
maybe the human “view of natural things could lose its tenseness” and “have something” of the 




Marx would retain the human nature/nature dichotomy and dialectic. Affect might serve as a 
resource for modestly scaling back some of the anthropocentrism and propping up Schmidt’s 
hopeful anticipation. Spinozan affect always entails not just the capacity to affect but also the 
capacity for being affected. Explicitly infusing this into Marx through feeling as a method should 
compel one to hold on to the necessity of conceptualizing the human – even the free, social 
human of communism – as needing to be acted upon by nature instead of only acting on it and 
working to ensure nature not only is acted upon but can also act.62 Affect is not a means of 
saving Marx from his anthropocentrism or his vision of communism from its mastery over nature, 
but may provide a resource for “what could be salvaged” (158) from a Marxist vision, despite its 
non-immanent residual human-nature binary. Here, nature is not dominated but instead interacts 
with humans in joyful encounters and relations characterized by mutuality and their respective 
capacities for both affecting and being affected.   
 Communism, conceptualized from the standpoint of affect, not only systematically 
organizes joyful encounters, flows of reciprocal, enhancing affective interchanges, common 
notions, the meeting of affective needs, and so on, but it also reshapes the bodily relationship to 
objects and to the surrounding world. Marx’s elaboration of this achievement and appropriation 
of the human “total essence” (EPM, 106) immediately turns to an exploration of the active body 
as it connects to the world in which it is enmeshed. Transcending private property reorients each 
person’s “human relations to the world - seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, 
being aware, sensing, wanting, acting, loving – in short, all the organs of his individual being” 
(106; emphasis Marx’s). Instead of all these bodily processes being directed toward “one-sided 
gratification” in the way “of possessing, of having,” they relate humans to one another through 




orientation toward the utility of an object to an open-ended, multifaceted orientation toward 
objects, others, and humanity itself. 
 Following Sara Ahmed (2004; 2006), we might think through the effects on human 
relations to objects and others in this communist transcendence of private property in terms of 
disorientation. For her, emotions work to constitute bodies as they “shape the very surfaces of 
bodies, which take shape through the repetition of actions over time, as well as through 
orientations toward and away from” others, objects, and signs (2004, 4). Emotions are thus 
“relational” and orientated as they “involve (re)actions or relations of ‘towardness’ or 
‘awayness,’” such that changes in the way one encounters objects and others entails an “affective 
reorientation” (8). The circulation of emotions and the orientations of individuals constitute the 
mode of relations to others and objects. She argues in a subsequent work that the “orientations 
we have toward others shape the contours of space by affective relations of proximity and 
distance between bodies” (2006, 3). Orientation is a corporeal relation to objects and others in 
space, one that entails a directedness toward and away from objects and others. Disorientation, 
consequently, becomes how we can “face a different way” through questioning “forms of social 
gathering” (24); it upsets normative “ground” so that bodies can come together in new ways, 
differently orientated to each other and to the world around them (161-62).63 
 Marx’s vision of sense, species-being, and objects in his discussion of the transcendence 
of private property can be productively read in terms of orientation and disorientation, which for 
Ahmed are always bound up with affect and emotion. In the “emancipation of the senses” – and 
thus the emancipation of relations to humans and to non-human objects – “the object becomes … 
a social object,” the individual becomes “for himself a social being,” and “society becomes a 




one-sided, appropriative, utility-driven orientation to others and objects to one that reimagines 
these objects and others as constitutive of the social world and thus necessary for the individual’s 
existence in that world. In more Spinozan terms, one could say that the encounters and general 
orientation of objects and others become joyful encounters that mutually enrich capacities (for 
Marx, the “essential powers”) instead of one-sided sad encounters that deplete power. “Social 
organs develop in the form of society” such that “activity in direct association with others, etc., 
has become an organ for expressing my own life” (107; Marx’s italics). Marx discusses all this 
within the rubric of the sensing body, where “the senses have therefore become directly in their 
practice theoreticians” that relate to “the thing” as an expression of “human relation” (107; his 
italics). The embodied relation, thus disoriented, has undergone a drastic transformation, moving 
bodies in more enriching and closer proximity to each other and to objects, generating a new 
form of social gathering. Such shifts, Ahmed shows us, reorganize affective and emotional 
circulations. In this sense, communist affect is tied to disorientations in the embodied relations 
between bodies, selves, others, and objects.  
The role of machines in a future communist society marks a particularly notable 
refinement of this reoriented relation to objects. In the Grundrisse, Marx embarks upon a 
sustained engagement (often deemed the “Fragment on Machines”) with the functions and 
developments of machinery in capitalism as well as machinery’s relations to labor, alienation, 
the wage, and surplus value (G, 690-716). In the course of this analysis, Marx makes several 
provocative suggestions about the potential role of machinery in communism, possibilities being 
blocked by capitalist forces.64 With the development of an “automatic system of machinery,” the 
“most complete, most adequate form” of machinery, the living machinery becomes “a moving 




without “consciousness” of the “science which compels” the machinery (692-93). In this process, 
the “accumulation of knowledge of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain,” is 
“absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour,” and thus “knowledge appears as alien” to the 
worker” (694-95). Approached dialectically, though, this capitalist development of productive 
forces produces conditions for capitalism’s own dissolution. Living machinery depends on the 
coordination of social combination and cooperation to engender “general productive force” (700) 
while reducing the need for direct human labor – the need for their “expenditure of energy” (701).  
 These constitute, for Marx, conditions for the emancipation of labor (700-702). 
Machinery’s development achieves the level of a breaking point in the “moving contradiction” of 
“capital itself,” that “it presses to reduce labour time to a minimum” while positing “labour time 
… as sole measure and source of wealth” (706).65 As a “watchman and regulator to the 
production process itself,” there arises the potential for “the appropriation” of the worker’s “own 
general productive power” as well as “understanding” and “mastery” of nature through the 
worker’s “presence as social body”; this is, “in a word, the development of the social individual” 
(705). With this “transformation,” wealth on the basis of the appropriation of surplus labor 
“appears a miserable foundation” compared to living machinery, the “surplus labour of the mass” 
is no longer “the condition for the development of general wealth,” and “production based on 
exchange value breaks down” (705; his italics). This opens the possibility for the “free 
development of individualities” (706).  
 Affectively, this expands the range of the account of communist affect in Marx: the 
organization of joyful encounters is to incorporate the relation between human bodies and 
machinic things, not only relations between human bodies. Recall from the first section of this 




bodies. Marx tells us that interaction between sensing bodies and objects “depends on the nature 
of the objects and on the nature of the essential power corresponding to it” (EPM, 108; emphasis 
Marx’s); Spinoza insists that modes “act differently according to the objects encountered” and 
(re)act through “the affections that come from the objects” (Deleuze 1988, 21). Under capitalism, 
the affective encounter between worker and machinery is a sad one. Once machinery becomes 
“living” for Marx, seemingly self-animated, it confronts the worker as a powerful automaton that 
drains the worker: that “which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery … acts upon [the 
worker] as an alien power, as the power of the machine itself” (G, 693). Machinery “confronts 
living labour … as the power which rules it,” an “appropriation of living labour” in “the form of 
capital” (693). This is an exemplary sad encounter, as it precisely enacts the sad encounter’s 
“diminution of the power of acting” of the laboring body as it “encounters another mode” 
(machinery), that “decomposes it”: the “power of the other mode” is “withdrawn from” the 
worker, “immobilizing and restraining” that laboring body (Deleuze 1988, 50). As an alien 
power affecting the worker and subsuming them to this machinic power, machinery decreases 
their affective capacities. This is the case with knowledge as well, where one could argue that the 
knowledge-effects of living machinery thwart the development of common notions and adequate 
ideas. The “accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the 
social brain” redounds to “capital, as opposed to labour” such that “knowledge appears as alien, 
external” (694-95). If common notions are representations of how bodies and modes enter into 
compositions to generate higher powers and thus act a catalyst for the intention organizing of 
joyful encounters, then advanced capitalist machinery doubly blockades their formation. It 
systematizes sad, not joyful, encounters, but also obstructs the development of knowledge about 




notions in the first place. The workers engage in no active relation to machinery: instead of both 
affecting and being affected by machinery, they are only affected, “merely” the “conscious 
linkages” of the “moving power that moves itself,” the machinery with its “mechanical and 
intellectual organs” (G, 692).  
 Once workers appropriate “their own surplus labour” (708), their “own general 
productive power” (705) and “the power of knowledge, objectified” in machines (706), the 
affective encounters between workers and machinery become joyful. Instead of confronting the 
worker as an alien power that drains the forces of the laboring body, machinery enters into 
relations where human bodies both affect and are affected, in a reciprocally enriching way. The 
transformation and emancipatory subjectivization of the worker enabled by the temporal labor 
conditions organized by machinery reorients the relation to machinery and enables the 
constitution of the genuinely social individual and the freely-developing society.66 Here, 
necessary labor time comes to “be measured by the needs of the social individual,” while “the 
development of the power of social production will grow so rapidly that, even though production 
is now calculated for the wealth of all, disposable time will grow for all”; in general, now “real 
wealth is the developed productive power of all individuals” (708; emphasis Marx’s). For Negri, 
the Fragment on Machines points to a new antagonism and new subjectivity – actualized through 
changing relations to machinery – for the proletariat “whose power (potenza) becomes more and 
more immense as the capital tries to destroy its identity,” yet in the “compression of necessary 
individual labour” Marx theorizes the constitution of “a ‘social individual,’ capable not only of 
producing but also of enjoying the wealth produced” (1991b, 145; his italics). This immense 
power, the developed productive power, should be read from the standpoint of affect, as an 




reciprocally augmentative relations of affective capacity, except now the scope of these relations 
have been expanded to include those with machinic objects. Real wealth, as I have sought to 
argue throughout this section on communist affect, is affective wealth.  
Moreover, common notions may now be formed with a transformed relationship to 
machinery. Machinery marks how “general social knowledge has become a direct force of 
production” and the extent to which “the conditions of the process of social life itself have come 
under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it” (706; 
italics Marx’s). Whereas capitalist organizations of machinic power blockade the vast majority 
of people from access to the general intellect or social knowledge, transformations in productive 
relations open up knowledge of – in Spinozan terms – forming compositions of bodies and 
objects for the organization of joyful encounters and the achievement of higher degrees of power. 
Social relations themselves become directly productive, and with the development of common 
notions, community can direct these processes to feedback into the affective potential of all.  
The “free time” enabled by a reoriented machinery-human relation – taking the form of 
“both idle time and time for higher activity” –entails a “natural transform[ation] of its possessor 
into a different subject,” who “then enters into the direct production process as this” new sort of 
subject (712). I read this different subject as an affectively-enriched one, whose free time enables 
the proliferation of affectively reciprocal and intensifying relations, including with machinery. 
For Marx, this transformed process of production takes two forms. First, it entails the “human 
being in the process of becoming,” in a particularly Deleuzean moment in Marx (712). Second, it 
comprises a “practice” or “experimental science” that turns out to be “materially creative and 
objectifying” in “regards [to] to the human being who has become, in whose head exists the 




process of production, recall from earlier in the chapter, is itself an affective process of the body 
acting and being acted upon. The becoming-individual, through a capacious common notion of 
general, society-wide knowledge produced in concert, realizes the generative potential of labor 
and thus the affective capabilities of the body. In general, then, the reoriented relation with 
machinery constitutes an expansion in scope of the unfolding of freer communist affect.   
 
Conclusion: The Power of the Affective Marx 
 
To conclude, I turn to two markedly resonant quotes, one from Deleuze’s exegesis of Spinoza 
(here, he is thinking about the connections between Spinoza and Nietzsche), the other from the 
final Part of the third volume of Capital: 
This is what Spinoza calls Nature: a life no longer lived on the basis of need, in terms of 
means and ends, but according to a production, a productivity, a potency… (Deleuze 
1988, 3) 
 
The realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity and 
external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere of material 
production proper. … The true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as 
an end in itself, begins beyond [the realm of necessity], though it can only flourish with 
this realm of necessity as its basis. (C Vol. III, 958–59) 
 
The “sociabilities and communities” (Deleuze 1988, 126) imagined here by the two thinkers both 
offer a vision explicitly beyond need, and beyond utilitarian and consequentialist logics as well – 
“means and ends for Spinoza,” “external expediency” for Marx. What lies in a realm exceeding 
necessity is active, dynamic, and I would argue affective power. For the Deleuzean Spinoza, this 
takes the form of production, productivity, potency; for Marx, the “development of human 
powers as an end in itself,” as the “true realm of freedom.”67 Perhaps nowhere else do the 
political-ethical-material-bodily visions of the Marx and Spinoza resonate more strongly.  
Deleuze pronounces Part V of Spinoza’s Ethics to be a “launching of affects and 




between Marx, Spinoza, and Deleuze, my own embodied experience of this chapter is that of 
being caught up in the whirlwind. For Deleuze, one way someone can become a “Spinozist” is if 
they “receive from Spinoza an affect, a set of affects, a kinetic determination, an impulse, and 
make Spinoza an encounter, a passion” (129). The kinetic impulses that Marx receives manifest 
in the conceptual, critical, affective resonances I have traced throughout this chapter. The chapter 
thus works as the kind of Spinozan encounter Deleuze speaks of, making (Deleuze’s) Spinoza an 
encounter with Marx, and the affects launched as a result entangle me in my thinking-reading-
feeling-theorizing process. Following these generates the theoretical endeavor of this chapter, 
laying out Marx, Deleuze, and Spinoza onto a singular plane in order to trace the resonances, 
conceptual innovation, and critical power traversing it.  
 Negri posits that a contemporary reading of Spinoza “shows us that the living alternative 
to this tradition [of capitalist development] is a material power that resides within the 
metaphysical block of Modern philosophy” (1991b, xxi). This not only underscores the 
continued critical importance of Spinoza, but it also points to necessity of reading Marx and 
Spinoza alongside one another. Marx, perhaps the foremost theorist of capitalist development, 
prevails as a source of this living material power. This chapter has sought to rearticulate and 
reinvigorate the combined power of their critical force – the living material power, in the register 
of affect. The theoretical, ethical, socioeconomic venture that unfolds from mobilizing an 
affective, Spinoza-inflected reading of Marx reanimates his project, elucidating the generative, 
affective mode of his materialist philosophy, critique of capital, and vision for a future 
communist society. Important conceptual foundations for Marx (and Engels) – essential powers, 
life, production, labor, nature, consciousness, species-being, the human, the object, the body, and 




affective capacity, and power.68 The critique of capital becomes not just a critique of capitalist 
exploitation, appropriation, and alienation, but of the movements of the capture and redirection 
of proletarian affective capacity – their “vital forces” that debilitate their laboring bodies while 
reproducing capitalist relations and structures and enriching the bourgeoisie. Finally, Marx’s 
vision for a future communist society adds an affective project in which the relations of social 
individuals are organized for the persistent amplification of individual and collective capacities 
for affecting and being affected.  
 These are the affective-theoretical repercussions of such a reading of Marx. This project, 
though, has critical limitations. The next chapter, which shifts to an affective reading of Marxist 
feminism, elucidates exclusions in Marx’s theorizing in terms of gender. In doing so, it 
interrogates the viability and reach of the work the current does, problematizing and extending 
both the Marx and Deleuze-Spinoza frameworks. By engaging in an affective reading of certain 
Marxist feminists, the next chapter theorizes both that Marxist feminism is critical for continued 
inquiry into Marx, affect, labor, and capital and that the concept of affective capacity 






Chapter 3  
Social Reproduction, Marxist Feminism, and Affective Capacity  
 
Introduction 
Not all bodies circulate, produce, and interact in the same way within the relations and modes of 
capitalist affect, or in a more general sense. Gendered, sexualized, racialized, colonized bodies 
experience and are constituted by the affective structures of any mode of production in 
polyvalent ways. That is, there is not a singular capitalist body, proletariat body, or bourgeois 
body.1 Through practicing feeling as a method with Marxist feminism,2 this chapter seeks to 
problematize and extend the framework I developed in the previous chapter, which deployed the 
language of a singular body to explore Marx’s resonance with Spinoza and Deleuze and the 
affectivity of his critique of capitalism. This chapter asks several questions: how can affect 
theory – and particularly a notion of the body in terms of affective capacity – extend Marxist 
feminist concerns with reproduction in the term’s multiple valences? To what extent can affect 
contribute to different elaborations of Marxist feminism? Can an affective reading of Marx 
remain viable in light of the Marxist feminist critique of Marx and their theorization of 
interactions between economic and patriarchal forces? To answer these and related questions, 
this chapter positions Marxist feminism (or at least certain Marxist feminists) as a foundational 
text for political theory as such, and thus analogous to the status of Hobbes, Marx, and Beauvoir 
in my project.3  
I take seriously Weeks’s contention that our discussions of affective and immaterial labor 
today can and should be enriched by thinking through the lineages of these critical projects 
located in Marxist feminism, which in her account sought in many ways to grasp what we today 




feminism anticipates some of the concerns of affect theory as such, and does so especially as it 
rethinks labor and reproduction. This chapter hence renders explicit connections between 
Spinozan-Marxist notions of affect and Marxist feminism, in a way that expands Marxist 
feminism. In this theoretical revisiting, I follow Weeks’s call in her engagement with the Wages 
for Housework movement to construct a “nonlinear” and “multidirectional” relation to feminist 
pasts, even (perhaps especially) to trajectories such as Marxist feminism that some contemporary 
narratives about feminism posit as something irretrievably essentialist or superseded and 
transcended by more recent feminisms (2011, 115–18).4 Heidi Hartmann contends that one of the 
central tasks of a Marxist-oriented feminism is to explore the material basis of patriarchal control 
found in social structures through which the labor of women is controlled and directed (1979, 
11–12). Moreover, as Christine Delphy argues, feminism can “annex” the analysis of the 
oppression of women to a Marxist-oriented materialism that has historically ignored women, sex, 
and sexuality (1997, 62–63). I argue that my account of Marxist-Spinozan affective capacity 
proves to be a vital component of this material base for patriarchy, and this chapter reveals the 
continued importance of Marxist feminism for inquiry into affect, into Marx, into labor, into 
materialism, and into capitalism.  
In its first half, this chapter reaches back to the preceding one to problematize and 
rearticulate Marx, Spinoza, Deleuze, and affective capacity. I provide an overview of key 
passages from Marx (and Marx and Engels5) on reproduction and reproductive labor, followed 
by a brief review of the critiques of the Marxist and socialist traditions proffered by Marxist 
feminists. From here, I sketch an affective, gendered account of social reproduction. In the 
second half of the chapter, I engage an affective reading of four major works in the Marxist 




(1975) and the sex/gender system; Lise Vogel (2013 [1983]) and social reproduction; Ann 
Ferguson (1989) and sex/affective production; and most of all Rosemary Hennessy (2000) and 
the human need for sensation and affect. Similar to my above work with Hobbes and Marx, and 
the subsequent chapter on Beauvoir,6 I put these Marxist feminist concepts on the same plane 
with affect theory in order to explore the extent to which they are concerned with affect and the 
ways that attention to affect reanimates or extends particular components from this mode of 
theorizing. This reading, by exploring both the generative connections and the disjunctions 
between affect and thinkers within Marxist feminism, concludes that affect theory most 
productively works to extend and supplement central Marxist feminist concepts by rearticulating 
them in an affective register. This additional facet to an affective Marxist feminism – one made 
legible by feeling as a method – can deepen the reach and impact of its critical project. I 
conclude by sketching the implications of my account for the concept of freedom, which is 
complicated by the lack of intersectional and anti-racist analysis in the four thinkers this chapter 
focuses on.  
 
Marx and the Reproduction of Affect 
 
One of the central contentions of Marxist feminism broadly understood is that we must focus not 
only on production or productive labor as they read much of Western Marxism doing, but also 
reproduction and reproductive labor. More specifically, Marxist feminists regularly claim that 
conceptualizing productive and reproductive labor as clearly distinct and more or less mutually 
exclusive contributes to the oppression of women, especially when a gendered (and/or colonial, 
and/or racialized) division of labor is overlaid on top of the distinction (Rubin 1975; Hartmann 
1979; Mies 1986, 31; Petchesky 1990, introduction; Hennessy 2000, 37–41; Berg 2014, 162–63). 




52; Petchesky 1990, 8–10) is an early discussion from he and Engels in The German Ideology on 
life, sociality, and production. Here, one can distinguish the fundamental “three aspects of social 
activity,” all “determined by changing material conditions and social relations” (Petchesky 1990, 
8-9). For Marx and Engels, these are: the “production of material life itself,” that is the 
production of means for satisfying needs; the “creation of new needs” through the “action” and 
“instrument” of satisfying those prior needs; and the fact that “that men [sic], who daily re-create 
their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation between man and 
woman, parents and children, the family” (German Ideology [GI], 47-48). Here, reproduction is 
deeply connected to production, as they all require and are constituted by one another; they 
comprise three enfolded “moments” or “aspects” (Marx makes it clear they are not “stages”) of 
“social activity” that “have existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the first” 
humans, and “which still assert themselves in history today” (48). The simultaneity and 
inextricability of production and reproduction makes this formulation promising, as Marx 
emphasizes that we should not sever these moments from one another, nor set them into 
successive stages.  
Thinking about production and reproduction in affective terms clarifies the importance of 
their connection. Whether reproduction refers specifically to the reproduction of humans or to 
the reproduction of labor and the social conditions and relations of labor, affect inheres in these 
processes. What results when people “re-create their own life” and “propagate their kind” (GI, 
48) includes bodies understood in terms of affective capacities. If we think of the Marxian 
human body as interacting essential powers or capacities for affecting and being affected, then 




More broadly, re-creating life or social relations entails the replication of conditions, relations, 
objects, and modes of interacting capacities to affect and be affected.  
One of the arguments of this chapter is that attention to affect helps break down too-sharp 
distinctions between production and reproduction. Gayle Rubin insists that there are processes of 
both production and reproduction in what is traditionally considered to be the mode of 
production (1975, 166–67). In the account of Marx and affective capacity I have constructed thus 
far, affective capacity itself cannot be bifurcated into productive affective capacity and 
reproductive affective capacity. Bodies as essential powers and capacities for affecting and being 
affected resist splitting into distinct zones of activity, for affective capacity is not localizable into 
discrete, separate units in this particular way. The affective capacities shaped by the production 
of material life or the creation of new needs are the same affective capacities involved in the way 
humans “daily re-create [their] own life” (GI, 49). Affective capacity or essential powers can 
only be said to inhabit and act within and trafficking between different realms – whether 
productive and reproductive labor, or other distinctions such as a liberal division between public 
and private – if the social organization of those capacities, powers, and bodies channels them 
into discrete zones in that matter. That is, there is no necessary warrant for bifurcating 
production and reproduction, but patriarchal capitalist relations may seek to channel affective 
capacity into dichotomous and disjunctive spheres of activity. Affect itself works across any 
attempted divisions, and there can be modes of affective exploitation and domination in and 
across both realms.  
 This sort of concern with reproduction as it relates to production in general recurs at 
points throughout Marx’s works, although the further Marx moves through his critique of 




new humans. The so-called “mature” Marx is often more concerned with general, more abstract 
social reproduction than with the reproduction of humans as such. The late Marx echoes the 
fundamental connection between production and reproduction in the third volume of Capital. In 
the midst of a discussion on ground rent and surplus product in feudalism, Marx makes a far-
reaching comment on reproduction in general. He notes that the product of the serf’s labor “must 
be sufficient in this case to replace his conditions of labour as well as his subsistence” (C Vol. III, 
p. 926). This need to replace the conditions of labor and the laborer’s subsistence, though, is not 
limited to the feudal mode of production alone. It “is not the result of this specific form but a 
natural condition of all continuing and reproductive labour in general, of any continuing 
production, which is always also reproduction, i.e. also reproduction of its own conditions of 
operation” (926). Here, production is always already reproduction; productive labor is at once 
reproductive labor.  
If we shift to focus more on the reproduction of labor itself, as in the above passage from 
the third volume of Capital, the affectivity of production and reproduction persists. One set of 
the “conditions of labour” that Marx insists must be reproduced in the labor process itself is, I 
argue, the capacity to affect and be affected, that vital force of labor capacity that, as I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, is a dynamic, generative, capacity of the laboring body in 
Marx’s thought. If capitalism amplifies affective capacities but directs those toward the 
enrichment of the bourgeoisie while enervating the bodies of the proletariat, then the capacity 
that is to be captured must be recreated anew for the continuance of capitalist processes. If the 
enervated proletarian body was only depleted and destroyed, then it could no longer be a useful 
source of living labor with which to valorize material for the purposes of profit. Those vital 




specific to capitalist formations. He writes that the “labour-power withdrawn from the market by 
wear and tear, and by death, must be continually replaced by, at the very least, an equal amount 
of labour power” (C Vol. I, 275). In its destructiveness and power, capitalism demands a mass 
capture of the sustaining capacities of the body to affect and be affected, and consequently those 
capacities must be recreated and/or replaced. Because capitalism so enervates affective capacity 
such that workers are injured or die rapidly, the burden to reproduce more capacity and more 
bodies to actualize those vital forces increases. Affective reproduction may therefore prove to be 
especially important within capitalism.  
At the most basic level, the “maintenance and reproduction of the working class remains 
a necessary condition for the reproduction of capital” (C Vol. I, 718). This includes, I would 
argue, the reproduction of certain kinds of bodies, affective capacities, and essential powers. 
Their capacity to affect and be affected, as living labor capacity, composes an absolute 
prerequisite for capitalist production, and must be continually regenerated as such. Given my 
analysis of capitalist affect, part of what is being maintained and reproduced in this process are 
the particular relations of affective capacity that situates the working class as a kind of affective 
class. That is, the reproduction of the working class involves replicating a specific mode of 
affective relationality and social conditions that structure the capacity to affect and be affected of 
a particular group of people in a specific way, constituting them as a class. Marx continues from 
the above quote by noting “the capitalist may safely leave” this reproduction of the proletariat to 
“the worker’s drive for self-preservation and propagation” (718). By leaving the proletarian’s 
reproduction to some unspecified drive for self-propagation as opposed to an intervention by 
capitalist, Marx opens up more space for an affective reading to supplement his account, one 




affective capacities. If we understand the Marxist materialist body in terms of affect, this drive 
approximates something like the Spinozan conatus, and it connects production, reproduction, and 
affective capacity. Capitalism requires the reproduction of the working class, including the 
affective relations of that class and the affective capacities of the individuals comprising that 
class.  
 
The Marxist Feminist Critique 
 
Before proceeding to sketch a framework for a theory of affect and reproduction, it is important 
to briefly overview central Marxist feminist critiques of Marx. To simplify a multi-faceted 
literature, the critiqued might be summarized into four categories. First, we can turn to Marx’s 
notion of production. Maria Mies contends that there is the potential in Marx and Engels’s 
writing for an expansive definition of production and productive labor, one that consistently 
understood production in broad terms as the production and reproduction of life and “new life” 
and would thus not divide out reproductive labor as a separate sphere (1986, 47–52). Had Marx 
and Engels followed this thread, Mies argues that they would have constructed a theory with 
great promise for a project of women’s liberation. Instead, she argues there is a reduction – 
particularly in Marx’s work after the Grundrisse – of productive labor to the production of 
surplus value, in a way that erases non-wage labor, domestic labor, and the like from the realm of 
production. Hennessy asserts that Marx and Engels both were “blocked by a historical inability 
to understand the role of domestic labor in capitalist production,” specifically the way that 
capitalism depended on a “division of labor in the home” and that multiple divisions of labor 
were “historically regulated by patriarchal gender ideology” (2000, 41). 
The second area of criticism concerns the status of the division of labor vis-à-vis women 




despite the potential for a less deterministic and static view, end up conceptualizing the division 
of labor in naturalistic terms such that women and children appear as naturally inclined to do 
domestic and/or reproductive labor. The sexual division of labor thus transforms into a natural 
bifurcation instead of a historical, material product. As such, Marx and Engels come perilously 
close to a theory where “servile relations naturally constitute the internal organisation of all 
families in class-society,” in a way that “obscures their understanding of relationships within the 
working-class household” or attempts at historicizing divisions of labor (64-65).  
Third is the question of economism. This category of critique shifts the emphasis slightly, 
focusing not only on Marx but also on the way that Western Marxism more broadly – and 
particular socialist, Marxist, and/or communist groups more specifically – articulate a Marxist 
understanding of the “woman-question,” the common formulation of the issue of gender 
oppression in much late nineteenth and twentieth century Marxism (Hartmann 1979; Vogel 2013 
[1983]). Eisenstein (1979, 11) argues that too often in Marx and Western Marxism, all 
oppression is reduced to economic relations as the single source of domination. If this is the case, 
then as Mies emphasizes, the ‘woman question’ becomes a secondary concern, exiled to the 
realm of ideology, superstructure, or culture (1986, 1; 13). Hartmann writes of integrations of 
Marxism and feminism that fail for many feminists because concerns about gender are subsumed 
into and dominated by claims about ‘pure’ economic class relations. As a consequence, she 
contends, “Marxism and feminism are one, and that one is marxism” (1979, 1). Hennessy 
contends that social production is separated from reproduction and from sexuality in both Marx 
and Western Marxist traditions such that sex and desire are dismissed as important concerns for 




unable to pose the question of “social organisations of sexuality” outside of “economic class 
domination” (1989, 23). 
Finally, and connected to several of the issues raised thus far, there is the question of 
women’s liberation. Hartmann (1979, 2-3) critiques the early Marxist tradition in general and 
Engels specifically for assuming that women’s entry into wage labor from the private, patriarchal 
family was the key to liberation. The logic of this position, as Hartmann renders it, is that the 
institution of private property is the most significant factor in women’s oppression, but that 
capitalism’s effects on the patriarchal family tend to abolish gender difference from the 
perspective of capital and view all as potential sources of labor from which to extract surplus 
value.7 In Hartmann’s view, the political implication of this is the large scale entry of women 
into wage labor, and the need to join the struggle against capital and private property as such as a 
proletarian. She critiques this view for insufficiently attending to the differences of gendered 
experience within the capitalist mode of production, and its occlusion of both the way “women 
are oppressed as women” and the potential interest of men in the perpetuation of patriarchal 
systems and forces, including among the proletariat (3).  
 
Toward an Affective Marxist Feminist Theory of Reproduction 
 
As the discussion in the previous two sections indicates, reading passages from Marx on 
reproduction in terms of affect is not only possible, but productively articulates an additional 
quality of reproduction, the reproduction of affect. However – and this is quite a substantial 
‘however’ – there is nothing necessarily gendered about such an account. In this sense, a first and 
most direct attempt at affectively reading Marx on reproduction itself replicates the problems 
that Marxist feminists identify in Marx’s work and the Western Marxist tradition. For instance, 




content; concepts like class or wage labor require feminist intervention to be mobilized for any 
gendered analysis. For my part, I seek to add particularly affective and gendered content to the 
category of reproduction in Marx. Thus, I want to sketch out a possible outline – one especially 
informed by Lise Vogel’s work (2013 [1983]) – for understanding the reproduction of affect in 
Marx’s theory in gendered terms informed by Marxist feminism, with the subsequent section 
exploring this framework’s relation to an affective reading of four major Marxist feminist 
concepts.  
To outline this framework in a somewhat schematic way, there is an affective component 
of Marxian reproduction, whether that reproduction is of life, humans, social relations, or labor 
power. At the most basic level, because Marxian bodies in general or labor capacity more 
specifically can be read in terms of affective capacity and essential powers, the category of 
reproduction in Marx implicates the replication of power and capacity. Affect must be 
regenerated, as the organization of affective capacity in a particular mode of production must 
itself be reproduced as a basic requirement of the perpetuation of society as such. To gender this 
account of reproduction, we can posit that the burden for the activities, processes, and products 
that do the work of regenerating affect has historically and materially been governed in most 
societies by a gendered, patriarchal division of labor whereby those determined to fall into the 
category of woman and/or female must do this labor.8 Those socially determined to fall under the 
category of ‘women’ are thus functionally assigned – usually through violence and coercion 
(Mies 1986, 65–71) – the duty for the (re)production of life, a category that includes the 
reproduction of affect. Reproduction is an expansive category covering all those activities, 
processes, and relations involved in the (re)production of the capacity for labor power (Hennessy 




(Petchesky 1990, 8–10).9 This gendered, affective reproduction takes the forms of many 
activities: procreation, housework, child rearing, cooking, cleaning, care work, sex, sex work, 
socialization, and more. Ultimately, this framework posits that reproductive labor always 
includes the reproduction of affective capacity and essential power, and that this affective 
reproduction is subordinated to a gendered division of labor. One material basis of the 
domination of women is thus the differential distribution, direction, and shaping of affective 
capacity.  
The point of sketching out the framework in this way – and indeed, the point of the 
chapter thus far – is not to suggest that Marx was right all along, or that affect ‘solves’ the 
problems in Marx raised by Marxist feminist critique. Instead, it is to suggest that Spinozan-
Deleuzean affect usefully explicates and extends the Marxian category of reproduction, and that 
this account of affect and Marx is at least tentatively sustainable from a Marxist feminist 
standpoint in the potential for it to be gendered. Marxist feminist attention to gendered affective 
reproduction would center gender division in the material organization of affect and its 
reproduction. This framework also problematizes my claims in the preceding chapter to read all 
labor as affective, against those who temporally localize “affective labor” in late/neoliberal 
capital. Such a claim risks obscuring the specificity of domestic work and care work, including 
its global dimensions (cf. Hochschild 2000; Hochschild 2012; Parreñas 2015; Brown 2016). 
These modes of work are affective in ways that are particularly salient for understanding gender 
oppression, as this chapter works to elucidate. Marxist feminism – or other forms of critical 
sociological and political analysis – emphasizes the need to hold on to the way that labor can be 






Marxist Feminism and Feeling as Method 
 
With this reading of Marx on reproduction and tentative framework for a feminist analysis of 
affective reproduction, I now turn to more directly practice feeling as a method with Marxist 
feminist theorizing itself. By engaging in an affective reading of four Marxist feminists and 
through analyzing the extent to which my discussion of Marxist-Spinozan affect can be 
mobilized with central Marxist feminist concepts, this main section of the chapter explores 
several questions: to what extent does Marxist feminism anticipate affective concerns with 
reproduction and labor? In what ways does affect interact, connect, and diverge from Marxist 
feminist theorizing? When affect does conflict with Marxist feminist work, is this rupture 
inevitable? Most vitally, can affect theory productively extend and rearticulate the critical project 
of Marxist feminism? I think through these questions in relation to four major categories from 
Marxist feminist thought that seek to analyze the intertwining of economic and gendered forces 
and to deploy materialist feminist analysis to address the aporias in Marx’s own thought: the 
sex/gender system (Gayle Rubin); social reproduction (Lise Vogel); sex/affective production 
(Ann Ferguson); and most importantly the human need for sensation and affect (Rosemary 
Hennessy). 
Gayle Rubin: Sex/gender systems 
In “The Traffic in Women” (1975), Gayle Rubin articulates the need for analysis into 
what she terms “sex/gender systems,” the “set of arrangements by which a society transforms 
biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in which these transformed sexual 
needs are satisfied” (159). Considering the history of gender oppression, this most often takes the 
form of a “systematic social apparatus which takes up females as raw materials and fashions 




Freud, and Lacan, Rubin seeks to develop a theory where “sex and gender” are not just reduced 
to or subsumed under the “mode of production” such that the oppression of women becomes “a 
reflex of economic forces” (203). In doing this, she insists on the need to see production and 
reproduction, as well as “sexual systems” (209) and “economic and political arrangements,” as 
intricately and multiply intertwined. In her discussion of Marx and Engels, she conceptualizes 
sex/gender systems as in part an organizing of bodies and social relations to meet biological 
needs, one structured by what Marx calls the ‘historical and moral element’ that partially shapes 
the content of the requirements for the reproduction of the worker. This element determines, for 
example, that a wife is necessary for the a worker, that women do housework instead of men, and 
that women do not inherit property or assume positions of religious and political authority (163-
64). It is within this sex/gender system that Rubin claims the oppression of women can be 
located and analyzed.  
 Rubin’s conceptualization of the sex/gender system interacts productively with the 
concept of affective capacity and its reproduction. The schema that social and economic forces 
take “raw material” (in Rubin’s case, biology, or “females”) and transform them into products of 
these forces (socially constituted means for satisfying needs, or domesticated women) can also 
model the affective flows and reproduction that I have laid out. Affective capacity is to some 
extent a “raw material,”10 the biological needs can include the replenishment of affective 
capacity, and affect can be channeled, shaped, and appropriated by social forces, for example the 
affective relations of capitalism I theorized in the previous chapter. Crucially, this can include 
the direction of bodies into socially shaped roles delimited through the differential structuring of 
those bodies’ essential powers. Rubin’s framework may enable an examination of the way that 




oppression of one by the other. In this sense, sex/gender systems include an affective component. 
There is, presumably, a more or less similar affective capacity connected to different kinds of 
bodies for providing care and nurturance, or to perform the kinds of labor necessary for the 
reproduction of labor capacity. However, these potentials can be channeled repeatedly over time 
so that assigning such activities to a limited group appears natural or inevitable in a way that 
obscures how social forces – i.e., an affective sex/gender system – work on those capacities for 
reproducing life. I thus claim that an investigation grounded in Marxism and affect becomes one 
potential project answering Rubin’s call for modes of “Marxian analysis of sex/gender systems” 
that interrogate these systems not as “ahistorical emanations” but as “products of historical 
human activity” (204). The kind of Marxist-Spinozan perspective I have developed in this and 
the preceding chapter could productively take up one variety of this task by historicizing the 
general theoretical account of affect, the body, and reproduction I have developed thus far to 
examine particular forces, relations, objects, and historical moments constituting sex/gender 
systems that oppressively assign the work of reproducing societies, bodies, and life itself to 
women.  
Lise Vogel: social reproduction 
 Lise Vogel examines Marx, Engels, and the Marxist tradition from the perspective of 
social reproduction in her Marxism and the Oppression of Women (2013 [1983]). Arguing that 
one occasionally finds in the “mature” Marx the “rudiments of a theoretical foundation for 
analysing the situation of women from the point of view” of social reproduction and 
reproduction of labor power (60), Vogel locates oppression in social reproduction (8-9) and 
asserts that socialist or Marxist feminism must proceed from and expand upon Marx’s account of 




observation that labor power has to be reproduced: the “reproduction of labour-power is a 
condition of production, for it reposits or replaces the labour-power necessary for production” 
(144).12 In Vogel’s account, most societies organize social reproduction through a division of 
labor assigning women the role of performing the labor that maintains and reproduces labor 
capacity, especially work that nurtures and socializes children (152). While the “exact form” 
dominating relations of social reproduction take varies, the “arrangement is ordinarily 
legitimated by [men’s] domination of women and reinforced by institutionalised structures of” 
oppression (153).13 Domestic labor, for example, thus has “a material character” analyzable “in 
terms of social reproduction as a whole” when considered in relation to the “maintenance and 
reproduction of labour-power” (32-33).  
 Affective reproduction, as well as an affective reading of Marx, complement Vogel’s 
account of social reproduction. Vogel understands labor power as “a latent capacity borne by a 
human being,” and “its potentiality is realised when labour-power is put to use - consumed - in a 
labour-process”; social reproduction therefore involves the replacement of labor power (143-44). 
The language of the labor power being reproduced as a capacity that human laborers bear and 
actualize is similar to my own reading of Marx’s concept of labor capacity, although Vogel does 
not herself take this theorization in anything like an affective direction. Also, as I discussed 
earlier in this chapter, reproduction is always affective reproduction. Vogel claims that Marx’s 
discussion of ‘productive consumption’ “implies” a concept of reproduction “operat[ing] at the 
level of class-relations and social reproduction as a whole” that “would cover the maintenance 
not only of present wage-workers but of future· and past wage-workers (such as children, aged 
and disabled persons, the unemployed),” a category that contains “those who are not currently 




I argue that the maintenance of all of these kinds of people involves a regeneration of their 
capacities for affecting and being affected. Indeed, Vogel indicates that this productive 
consumption linked to social reproduction is an expansive category, comprising the consumption 
of “means of subsistence – food, housing, clothing, and the like” that lead to the result the 
workers “maintain themselves” (66-67). I suggest we add affective capacity and the essential 
powers of the body into the “and the like” from Vogel. In a later work reevaluating her earlier 
account, Vogel notes that the meaning of the reproduction of labor power is continually shifting 
(2000, 153), and that throughout the 1990s it tended to lose its Marxist and theoretical character 
in favor of functionalist and/or empirical study (154). Despite these changes, she argues that 
gendered economic processes and trends in the 1990s demand a renewal in theorizing “capitalist 
social reproduction” and especially domestic labor’s role in that reproduction (168-69). I suggest 
that a Marxist-Spinozan and feminist focus on affective capacity in its reproduction is one 
fruitful critical pursuit along these lines. If we are to locate oppression in the processes and 
relations of social reproduction as Vogel suggests, then this implicates an exploration of the 
affective forces that help constitute those processes and relations, especially as they relate to the 
division of labor.  
Ann Ferguson: sex/affective production 
 Ann Ferguson develops the concept of “sex/affective production” in her Blood at the 
Root (1989). The concept, a “socialist-feminist model,” constructs a “general analytic category” 
to analyze social formations in a way that examines the interplay of economic and social systems 
to interrogate “male dominance” (6). These “modes of sex/affective production” are “systems 
which socially construct ‘sex/affective energy’, that human physical and social interaction which 




bonding”; “just like economic systems, they are historically various. It is in these systems that 
male dominance in different forms is perpetuated” (7-8). The “human desires connected to 
sexuality and love and consequently to parenting and social bonding” are historically organized 
and shaped by these modes of sex/affective production (77). This notion of sex/affective energy 
that in Ferguson’s account is structured by modes of production invokes a “‘social energy’ 
“theory of sexuality” that Ferguson situates in a tradition including Foucault, Deleuze and 
Guattari, and symbolic interactionist sociobiology (chap. 3). Here, sexual energy becomes 
“merely one form of a social yet bodily based desire to unite with others,” and has “no particular 
‘natural’ objects or bodily functions” (78).14 The oppression of women can operate through these 
modes of sex/affective production, especially if they have “two major components”: “material 
forms of domination” such as the patriarchal nuclear family or “segregated wage labour” and 
“sexual symbolic codes,” sets of “normative regulations and oppositions” (90).15 When 
emphasizing the productive material aspects, Ferguson’s framework leads to the consideration of 
the way that the products, so to speak, of sex/affective production, such as “domestic 
maintenance,” children, nurturance, and care in the family are often the result of greater work by 
women than men even as women receive less of these ‘products’ (132-33). In general, 
Ferguson’s theory of sex/affective production and energy seeks to perform a socialist, materialist, 
and feminist analysis of a social energy theory of sexuality to explore the interaction between 
economic and social systems in the creation and sustaining of “male dominance.”  
 Most obviously in relation to my own project, Ferguson invokes “affect” in her work on 
sex/affective production. However, writing before the ‘affective turn,’ her use of ‘affect’ is more 
of a generic term analogous to feeling or passion than it has the theoretical specificity and 




contend that affect in this more precise sense – and particularly in the way I have articulated it in 
in relation to Marx, Spinoza, and Deleuze – helps to supplement and clarify the particularly 
embodied, material qualities of her socialist feminist concept of sex/affective production, 
especially in terms of the historical organization of bodily essential powers for affecting and 
being affected. That is, we can use affect theory to shift Ferguson’s account of sex/affective 
energy and production into the register of affective materiality. Ferguson herself likens the 
concept of sex/affective production to Deleuze and Guattari’s “desiring production” in Anti-
Oedipus, as well as to Rubin’s “sex/gender systems” (77). She critiques Deleuze and Guattari, 
though, for “emphasising the materialism of sexuality” so much that they “treat its sociality as 
merely an artificial aspect” that “leads them to emphasise the bodily aspects of sex to the 
exclusion of the desire for social connection” (73). While I would disagree with this reading of 
Deleuze and Guattari – I think the two accounts of the bodily and the social as they relate to 
sex/affective energy are closer than Ferguson indicates – the important point is an affective, 
Spinozan-Deleuzean Marx illustrates crucial aspects of the way that social relations constitute 
and are constituted by bodily and affective matter. This sort of perspective can give rise to a very 
rich account of the social desire for social connections, and the prevailing conditions that best 
support reciprocal and affirming bodily-social relations.   
My account of capitalist affect parallels the structure of the sex/affective production 
specific to women under patriarchal social formations in Ferguson. For her, women do most of 
the work of sex/affective production – in my terms, they intensify and actualize the generative 
capacity to affect – while not receiving the potential benefits: in terms of affect itself, their 
affective capacity is diminished and they are organized into relations and networks of sad affects 




are oppressed in a material way by the social organization of affective forces, where affect has a 
more specific meaning. Neither group receives the reciprocal intensity or increased bodily power 
or relationality that their own affective work produces. Moreover, Ferguson carefully attends to 
the effects of “sexual symbolic codes” – what might in some Marxist traditions fall into a 
secondary, purely ideological zone in the superstructure – on sex/affective energy. These codes, 
such as the construction of exclusive dichotomies like “married woman/prostitute” or 
“mother/lesbian” work, among other things, to “reduc[e] the sex/affective energy and 
interactions between women” (90). By shifting Ferguson’s discussion into the register of affect, 
it is possible to think through the effects of such separations in terms of a reduction in the 
capacity for bodies to affect and be affected by one another as they prevent, in Spinozan 
terminology, bodies to form compositions with one another. For Ferguson, women are blocked 
from forms of “social bonding” between each other that would enable the reciprocal exchange 
and “ongoing flow of sex/affective energy”; straight women are symbolically separated from 
lesbian (we might today also say queer) women, white women are separated from black women, 
and so on (83-90). From the standpoint of affect, these ideological or symbolic codes generate 
important material, bodily effects not unlike the effects on affective capacity of particular modes 
of economic organization.17 In general, Ferguson’s work is crucial in several ways in articulating 
an affective and feminist reading of Marx through her focus on the organization of material, 
familial, sexual, and ideological relations that constitute the domination of women; attention to 
Spinozan-Marxian affect in reading her work illuminates one vital component of these 
dominating forces.  




Rosemary Hennessy, in her Profit and Pleasure (2000), presents perhaps the hardest case 
for the viability of my account of affect and reproduction in the context of Marxist feminist 
theorizing, and for an affective reading of Marxist feminism. She offers a sustained critique of 
Deleuzean theories of affect from a Marxist feminist perspective, and I consequently want to 
spend the most time engaging her work. Hennessy provides a challenging opportunity to 
reevaluate the entire framework I have been developing; it is hence important to explore her 
broader critique in addition to focusing on a single concept, as I have done with my more 
selective theoretical encounters with Rubin, Vogel, and Ferguson.  
One concept important in Hennessy’s text is that of the human need for sensation and 
affect, which she understands as one of the “many basic human needs,” the meeting of which 
“capitalism has outlawed” (22). More specifically, she is interested in the way that “under 
capitalism sensation and affect have been historically organized so that some ways of meeting 
these needs have been considered legitimate while others have been” proscribed (22). This 
framework situates this need for sensation and affect, which she calls a “species need” having the 
same status as needs for “education, leisure time, health care, food, and shelter” (22). More 
precisely: 
Human needs also include the ability to exercise certain human potentials. As a species, 
humans have many capacities — for intellect, invention, communication; the capacity for 
sensation and affect and for affective social relations is another. … Moreover, many 
human affective capacities are integrated in the satisfaction of vital human needs in that 
they mediate the social relations through which these needs are provided. Affective needs 
are inseparable from the social component of most need satisfaction, then, but they also 
constitute human needs in themselves… (210-11) 
 
Hennessy thus seeks to historicize pleasure and sensation, noting her relation to Ferguson’s work 
in the process. In her history of the shaping of sexual identity and subjectivity by capitalism, she 




sensation and affect.18 This inquiry into the organization of pleasure, sensation, and affect 
interrogates the “structures of desire” and “formations of subjectivities” these processes produce 
(35). Her Marxist critique of the capitalist structuring of sexuality, sensation, and need opens 
onto an alternative political vision. Ultimately, Hennessy argues that if “we no longer ignore 
affect in the calculus of human needs, we create the possibility of “forging a collective 
standpoint for oppositional – even revolutionary – forms of consciousness” that “acknowledge 
how political agency, practice, and commitment are motivated, complicated, and undermined by 
our human capacity for affect” (208). This relation of affect and need – one foreclosed by 
capitalism – holds radical potential for her.  
Hennessy criticizes Deleuze and Guattari’s account of desire from Anti-Oedipus and 
Massumi’s elaboration of affect, both on their own terms and as they relate to one another (70-
72; 212-15). She also explicitly opposes her account of the “human capacity for sensation and 
affect” to accounts of “sensation-affect” as “the motor of production” – presumably a reference 
to Deleuze and Guattari – or “prediscursive matter or energy” – apparently referring to Massumi 
(72). Not only do I want to examine the potential of my Marxian account of affective capacity in 
light of her theorizing, I want to explore these particular critiques. Hennessy situates Deleuze and 
Guattari in Anti-Oedipus as in some ways the exemplar of what she discusses as the “postmodern 
left’s” “turn to pleasure and desire as categories of experience outside culture-ideology and prior 
to all social production” (71-72). “Desire in the form of energy flows between organ-machines” 
– Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘desiring-production’ – is “the starting point of social life” and the 
“basis of social production,” and in her reading, Deleuze and Guattari “locate desire,” the “very 




Her critique of this notion is threefold. First, she maintains that Deleuze and Guattari 
make it “impossible” to analyze the ways the “content and the forms the desiring subject has 
taken change from one historical formation to another and in different phases of capitalism” (70). 
Second, she claims that in Anti-Oedipus, “the separation of sexuality from historical and material 
production has become complete” and “the structures of exploitation on which capitalist 
production depends have completely disappeared” even though for her Deleuze and Guattari 
claim some interest to theorize desire in relation to capitalism (71). Third, and more generally, 
she situates Deleuze and Guattari as part of broader academic trajectories – along with Butler, 
Rubin, “avant-garde queer theory,” much of cultural studies, and other discourses – that at best 
have an “ideological affiliation” with late capitalism and at worst are allied with forces of late 
capitalism in “helping to consolidate a hegemonic postmodern culture” (68-69).19 While 
approving of Massumi’s efforts to work against “postmodern theories” that “ignore emotion and 
affect” and to develop an interface between affect, consciousness, and “social elements,” she 
argues that his “reduction of the material to matter” – which she sees as “similar” to Deleuze and 
Guattari – “undercuts his insights” (212-14). Looking at Deleuze and Guattari and Massumi 
collectively, Hennessey contends that this sort of affect ends up as “a corporeal energy 
autonomous from the division of labor” (215).  
I disagree with this particular reading of Deleuze and Guattari and of Massumi, and of 
desire and affect in that sort of theoretical tradition. I would contend that my own project 
performs precisely the kind of inquiry into the organization of affect under capitalism that 
Hennessy calls for, and that such a project is at the very least latent in the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari. The lengthy third chapter of Anti-Oedipus presents a quasi-history of varying modes of 




Civilized Capitalist Machine” and “Capitalist Representation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 222–
62) – specifically taking up flows of desire as they interact with capitalism and its capitalist 
machines. While neither historicist nor strictly Marxist – although they continually turn to Marx 
– Deleuze and Guattari are quite interested in changes in modes of desiring- and social-
production and in the desiring subject. Capitalism itself evinces some level of specificity, with its 
“singular nature of” a “conjunction” of “deterritorialized flows,” which they read into Marx as 
“the deterritorialized worker” with their labor capacity to sell and the “decoded money that has 
become capital and is capable of buying” this labor capacity” (224-25). That is, capitalism 
assembles and channels desire in particular ways, generating singular and contingent modes of 
production, representation, signification, family, material psychiatry, and so on. Rather than 
separating desire from social and material production, as Hennessy claims Deleuze and Guattari 
end up doing, they insist that desire always invests a social field and – even if desire is indeed a 
kind of “primordial matter of energy flows” (Hennessy 2000, 70) – it always conjoins with 
particular social machines. As Deleuze and Guattari write, the “truth of the matter is that social 
production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions” (1983, 
29; their emphasis). It is not the case that desiring-production functions in total isolation, but that 
it constantly interacts with these determinate conditions of particular social formations and their 
social machines. Nor is it the case that desire itself is exclusive of social organization. As 
Deleuze and Guattari put it polemically, “There is only desire and the social, and nothing else” 
(29; their emphasis).20   
Moreover, affect or corporeal energy need not be severed from concerns of the division 
of labor, as Hennessy contends they are. In the chapter on Marx, I demonstrated that affective 




the hierarchal division of labor that bifurcates workers – whose affective capacities are 
intensified but appropriated in the labor process of actualizing that capacity – from the 
bourgeoisie who benefit from the affective capture in capitalist production. Rather than dividing 
affect and the division of labor, there is a particular affective component to the division of labor. 
In this chapter, I have contended that affect helps elucidate the way that society is reproduced, 
and that one of the effects of the gendered divisions of labor is to disproportionately yoke a 
certain subset of people to reproductive labor. In other words, in both of these examples affect is 
at stake in the division of labor, and I would more generally assert that one of the divisions of a 
division of labor is a differential distribution of affective relations, capacities, and so forth.  
 Even if one were to concede Hennessy’s claim that Deleuze and Guattari and Massumi 
present theories of affect that are on their own too ahistorical, or lack specific enough accounts 
of “structures of exploitation on which capitalist production depends” (2000, 71), it does not 
follow that affect theories of this kind always necessarily have these potential faults. If anything, 
Hennessy’s critiques, as well as her broader account of sensation and affect, point to the need to 
assemble and think through the possible interactions between a Marxist and/or Marxist feminist 
critique of capital and Deleuzean affect theory, as I do in this and the previous chapter. 
Ultimately, my argument is that Hennessy’s Marxist feminist project on the one hand, and affect 
theory proceeding from Deleuze, Guattari, and Massumi on the other, can and should be 
articulated together, not constructed as exclusive theoretical or political endeavors. In her reading 
of Elizabeth Grosz on desire, Hennessy contends that theories of desire proceeding from Spinoza, 
Nietzsche, and Deleuze and Guattari (including Grosz’s), conceptualizations which “formulate 
desire primarily as production” (194), are effects of or complicit with late capitalism. For her, 




capitalism,” and the notion of desire as energy flows is particularly well suited to a capitalist 
regime of hyperconsumption and accumulation” (196-97). I would instead argue that affect, 
understood in similar ways, has the potential to be a fundamental critical tool for illuminating 
one particular mode of capitalist reproduction and capitalist domination: the way that it really 
does seize the vital forces – the affective capacity – of the people at their very root. To fully 
critique the capitalist organization of need, sensation, desire, and affect, as Hennessy wishes to 
do, we need an encounter between Marx, Marxist feminism, and this sort of theory of affect as 
mobile bodily energy.  
  Indeed, Hennessy regularly discusses affect and sensation in the language of capacity, 
and hints at the very reading of Marx that I offer. “As a species, humans have many capacities,” 
Hennessy writes, including “the capacity for sensation and affect and for affective social 
relations”; ultimately “all people deserve to have the conditions available that will allow them to 
exercise and develop their affective capacities” (210-11). It is theoretically fruitful to situate such 
a formulation in a trajectory such as my assemblage of Spinoza, Marx, and Deleuze that engages 
affect in terms of bodily capacity and essential power. Doing so enables access to the full range 
of affectivity, corporeality, and materiality of Hennessy’s account, as well to conceptual 
resources for rearticulating a Marxist critique of capitalism attentive to the affective features of 
bodily existence. This sort of reading is embryonic in Hennessy’s own work: she suggests at one 
point that “we might even say affective potential is included in what Marx means by labor,” and 
that even if Marx does not “explicitly name them as such, affective needs are part of the human 
potential for ‘self-realization’ that Marx often refers to when he contends that the development of 
needs is historically contingent on the development of human potential” (215). My own reading 




turning away from a Spinozan and/or Deleuzean account of affect, theorizing this besides Marx’s 
work itself as a way to open up expansions upon Marxist feminist critical projects is, I argue, the 
most generative way of carrying out the kind project that Hennessy intends.  
 This becomes clearer when turning to Hennessy’s particular theorization of the capacity 
and need for sensation and affect, with an affective Marx at hand. She incisively demonstrates 
throughout the text the ways that capitalism works to organize sensation and affect such that 
“some ways of meeting these needs have been considered legitimate while others have been” 
suppressed (22). More specifically when it comes to sexuality – one mode “through which the 
human capacity for sensation and affect and the human need for social intercourse” are organized 
– capitalism constitutes patriarchal heterosexuality as the “hegemonic form” of social relation 
(22). A framework of affective capacity via Spinoza, Deleuze, and Marx helps to clarify and 
expand a critical account of some of the mechanisms of this organization and reification of 
heterosexuality and heteronormativity. In this framework, one of the most important 
potentialities of the body is to enter into relations and compositions with other bodies so that 
both can reciprocally reach a higher level of power, a greater capacity for affecting and being 
affected as a result of that composition. These compositions take multiple forms, and one can 
speculate these include a wide variety of compositions of bodies (and objects) organized around 
pleasure, desire, sex, and sensation as various ways to meet what Hennessy calls the need for 
sensation and affect. For instance, one could follow Ferguson – and Hennessy approvingly cites 
Ferguson’s work – in her claim that sex/affective energy is a broad “desire to unite with others, 
i.e. to incorporate oneself with a loved other” without any “particular ‘natural’ objects or bodily 
functions” (A. Ferguson 1989, 78). If, as Hennessy argues, capitalism organizes capacities for 




of bodily needs and capacities, her work can be extended through a reading of this as the 
attempted channeling of all affective capacities in the realms of sex and sensation into a highly 
constricted set of socially sanctioned and organized relations and compositions. Capitalist social 
formations thus dampen and delimit the vast array of affect as capacity and power in regards to 
sexuality. This sort of affective analysis deepens the critical reach of Hennessy’s project by 
rearticulating into an additional register of affect. 
Hennessy explores the consolidation of heteronormativity as a “reification of the human 
capacity for sensation, affect, and social intercourse” in Europe in the mid- and late-nineteenth 
century (2000, 100). My account of affective capacity can clarify what she identifies here as the 
“contradictory relationship” of solidified heteronormativity in relation to “patriarchal gender 
ideology” (101). In her account, “changes in the division of labor, property, and consent law” 
start to create some small realm of “sexual agency” more open than a “bourgeois gender 
ideology of passionless womanhood” (101). However, the desire of the feminine subject 
becomes socially legible and authorized only on the condition of “direct[ing] that desire towards 
a heteronormative goal in which she was not the agent but the object of desire”; the possibility of 
lesbian or other non-heterosexual forms of desiring-subjectivity become relegated to an outlaw 
status (101-102). In terms of affective capacity, this dynamic at least formally resembles the 
tension of capitalist affect that I constructed in my reading of Marx in the previous chapter: in 
the fragmentary decomposition of rigid social forces – feudalism on the one hand, patriarchal 
“Victorian gender hierarchy” (99) on the other – emergent social formations free up affective 
potentials – labor capacity, sexual desire – to develop and amplify. Capitalist forces and relations 
then recodify and channel these capacities into oppressive forms – capitalist production’s 




Late nineteenth century sexology could have opened up “all combinations of desiring subject and 
object” – in my terms, any potential composition of affective bodies – but capitalism’s 
“investment in a heterogendered division of labor” leads to enforcement of “arbitrary boundaries” 
of sexuality and gender, “to be secured through heterogendered norms” (102). As a collection of 
forces channeling desire and sexuality into a heteronormative “component of labor and labor 
power” that reinforces oppressive divisions of labor and “the exploitation of women’s labor in 
the wage market” (104), capitalism, heteronormativity, and patriarchy work on, shape, redirect, 
and attempt to delimit affective capacity itself.  
More broadly, my own reading of Marx and affect resonates with Hennessy’s 
overarching critique of capitalism as such. Within capitalism, she argues, “sensation and affect 
often get separated from the meeting of human needs” (216). Commodity exchange produces not 
only commodity fetishism but also “a fracturing of our objective human capacities as sensuous, 
social beings”: “alienation from sensation and affect underpins the organization of commodity 
production and consumption and the logic of exchange value” (217). Furthermore, exploitation 
as the appropriation of surplus labor “requires that workers alienate themselves from their human 
potentials, including their sex-affective potentials,” because it “is only by severing her human 
potential to labor from her needs that the worker can present herself as ‘owner’ of her labor 
power” (217). This is consistent with my account of capitalist affective relations: the basic 
capacity of the worker under capitalism is in many ways amplified through the organization of 
productive forces under capitalism, but capitalist relations ultimately sever this intensified 
potential from the actual, long-term needs, bodily integrity, survivability, and power of those 
laboring bodies through which the capacity is actualized. Moreover, Hennessy specifies some of 




Not only can my reading of Marx and affect vis-à-vis Spinoza and Deleuze add a crucial 
affective valence to Hennessy’s project as I have demonstrated over the past several pages, but 
her account of capitalism and the capacity for sensation and affect – even if affect means 
something different for her – provides added clarity to my own analysis.  
Our projects ultimately share a comparable political-economic-ethical commitment, 
although I assert that it is a Marxist-Spinozan concept of affect that can help to mobilize these 
convictions. As “human needs in themselves,” affective needs demonstrate that “all people 
deserve to have the conditions available that will allow them to exercise and develop their 
affective capacities” (210-11). In my terminology, the ethical project is to construct prevailing 
social conditions and relations that conduct and compose reciprocal and joyful encounters 
between bodies such that the capacities for affecting and being affected intensify. This, in my 
reading in the previous chapter, constitutes a central component of Marx’s idea of communism. 
Within this general framework, Hennessy points to the vital need for particular attention on 
sexuality and gender in such a social-affective vision. She insists that in the processes of making 
legible and socially sanctioned certain modes of sensation, affect, and desire, “whole areas of 
human affective potential are effectively outlawed” (217). Just because they are outlawed, 
however, does not mean they dissolve away: there always are “unspeakable sensations and 
affects that do not fall easily into any prescribed categories,” for instance in the way that “the 
interface between the available modes of intelligibility [i.e., socially legible sexual identity] and 
human affective and erotic capacity is never complete” (218). The “human potential for 
sensation and affect” always manifests as “much richer than sanctioned identity categories 
capture” (218). These spaces – affective compositions, relations, and social organizations of 




more open futurities. Hennessy suggests reorienting oppositional politics to focus on “addressing 
and connecting the ways capitalism has outlawed the meeting of so many basic needs,” including 
the “species need” for sensation and affect (22). Hennessy’s work to situate capitalism, sexuality, 
and affect on the same plane is vital. In this spirit, there is a profound need to theorize together 
Marx and affect as it emanates from Spinoza and Deleuze. Rather than setting affect as a bodily 
capacity and essential power as opposed to a Marxist feminist account of capitalism, sexuality, 
and need, an interaction between the two is fundamental in order to fully interrogate the capitalist 
organization and limitation of the human need for sensation and affect.    
 
Freedom, Marxist Feminism, Whiteness: Material Limits 
 
It is important here to briefly sketch some of the implications for ideas of collective (as opposed 
to individual) freedom of this affective reading of Marxist feminism. Perhaps most direct among 
these is a renewed insistence that one cannot assume that something like the liberation of the 
working class, or a revolution in the mode of production, is ever sufficient for gender liberation, 
nor is liberation just about including women in productive labor, as Engels seems to suggest. 
This, one of the major lessons of Marxist feminism (e.g. Eisenstein 1979; Mitchell 1966, 18–19; 
Hartmann 1979, 3), extends to the affective realm. The affective flows and circulations of 
capitalism qua economic system help constitute patriarchy and gender oppression, but the 
affective structure of the latter is not reducible to the bourgeois appropriation of proletarian 
affective capacity. Affect is itself not reducible to economistic terms alone, and its oppressive 
channelings similarly extend beyond the economic realm. From the standpoint of an affective 
reading of Marxist feminism, preconditions for a more liberatory and open sociality of gender 
proliferate, requiring: a breakdown of oppressive divides between productive and reproductive 




division of labor; more open flows and production of sex/affective energy; the meeting of needs 
for affect outlawed by interacting capitalist, patriarchal, heteronormative, and racist social 
organization, and so on.  
Affect, then, can offer an additional valence to Eisenstein’s understanding of social 
contradictions that lead to domination but also open possibilities for transformation and 
liberation. She locates revolutionary potential in the tension between “real conditions” and 
“possibilities” in capitalist patriarchal society. For her, Marx’s “revolutionary ontology,” when 
“extended to women … suggests that the possibility of freedom exists alongside exploitation and 
oppression, since woman is potentially more than what she is” because “women are structured by 
what she is today – and this defines real possibilities for tomorrow; but what she is today does 
not determine the outer limits of her capacities” (1979, 9). In the context of this chapter, we 
might say a standpoint such as this can theorize the way in which the affective capacities of 
women exceed the structuring and relations of these capacities – and thus constitute an affective 
source of transformation. Indeed, Ferguson’s “socialist-feminist vision” posits a “society 
maximising egalitarian and democratic values” that “would, by that fact, tend to maximise 
reciprocal sex/affective energy and in so doing would increase the amount of sex/affective 
energy available to all” (1989, 230).23 Bodily, affective potential exceeds – or at the very least is 
able to exceed – its oppressive organization; as a result, one condition of possibility for freedom 
is the liberated, relational, amplifying flows and interactions of these capacities. As this chapter 
demonstrates, any such account of freedom must pay attention to the gendered organization of 
affective capacity, in addition to and in its intertwining with capitalist forces and configurations.  
The major problem with this account of affect and Marxist feminist freedom, however, is 




discussed the most thus far. If Marx “indexes the silences, the aporias, in the discourse of 
classical political economy” (Spillers 2003c [1991], 453), then one must also interrogate Marx’s 
own silences. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak discusses a range of issues in her rethinking of 
Marxism – Marx’s critique of the subject and of agency, the need to insert difference into the 
dialectic, the philosopher-activist relation, concepts of value and representation, Marx’s account 
of freedom, and more – but does so in the context of imperial and colonialist knowledge 
production (1999; see especially chap. 1). Marx, Kant and Hegel engaged in “authoritative 
‘universal’ narratives where the subject remained unmistakably European” (8). For example, 
Spivak provides a deconstructive reading of the idea of the “Asiatic Mode of Production” in 
Marx’s (and Engels’s) thought, arguing that it “marks the desire to theorize the other so that the 
object, remaining lost in its own space, can become an ‘Asia’ that can break into the circuit of 
the same by way of the crises of Revolution or Conquest,” and is not something that is 
theoretically “unimportant” to Marx (79).24 Denise Ferreira da Silva (2007) notes that while 
Marx and Marxist historical materialism create tools for challenging the ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings of Euro-imperialist notions of race and globality,25 they deploy 
similar notions of subjecthood, interiority and exteriority, transparency, determination, 
representation, and historicity – just in different registers – that continue to uphold the 
“ontoepistemological” order of European global racism (182-93). Moreover, Brittan and 
Maynard contest that Marxist discourses articulate race only within the context of class systems 
(1984, 38–39); race functions as an additive “to what already exists” that does not “change the 
character of the model taken as a whole” and denies the way that racial oppression is 
qualitatively distinct instead of only increasing the “degree of oppression” (69). Racism is 




Marx is not alone in his colonizing gestures: certain strands of Marxist feminism 
reproduced many of the exclusions and aporias of Marx himself. While critiquing Marx’s 
problems in accounting for gender, many early Marxist feminist thinkers exhibited analogous 
lapses in accounting for race. At the same, third world, women of color, and/or postcolonial 
feminists – Angela Davis, Chandra Mohanty, Gloria Joseph, Aihwa Ong, Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, Leela Fernandes, and so on – are engaged in Marxist feminist analysis. Gloria Joseph 
contends that most Marxist feminism of the 1960s and 1970s was usually “race-blind,” in a way 
that “do[es] a gross injustice to Black women” (1981, 93). When “the reality of the oppression of 
race relations within the woman question is denied,” theorists “commit a similar, parallel error” 
to the one they accuse Marxism of when it “focuses on the class question and shortchanges the 
woman question” (95). Taking on racism – including racism operating within parts of Marxist 
feminism itself – becomes a necessary precondition in order to effectuate the “happy divorce of 
patriarchy, capitalism, and racism” (103; 106).  
This occlusion of racial difference and racism operated in several linked ways. First, 
much feminist work ignored the historical reality and persistent effects of slavery, including the 
particular ways it violently disciplines black women’s bodies and structures their labor and 
reproduction (Davis 1983, chap. 1; Spillers 2003a [1984]; Spillers 2003b [1987]). Second, black 
women in the United States have a different relation to the family, motherhood, and reproduction 
than white women (Spillers 2003b [1987]). Domestic life was the one sphere of quasi-autonomy 
for Black women during slavery (Davis 1983, 14–18; Joseph 1981, 95) in a way distinct from 
more “hierarchal sexual roles” in most white families (Davis 1983, 12), yet feminist work on 
mothering has often “lacked an adequate … race analysis” (Collins 2009, 188). Family, the 




feminist theorizing of it allows. Third, ideologies of gender roles operate very differently for 
black women; the bourgeois notion of the housewife – either as object of critique or of 
celebration – is meaningful for black women in the US only as an impossibility (Beale 1970, 
110–11; Caraway 1991, 100–105). Fourth, the specificity of the presence of black women as 
domestic workers for white families has gone regularly unacknowledged in feminist literatures 
(Beale 1970, 111–14; Davis 1983, 90–97; Collins 2009, 13–15). Davis challenged the Marxist 
feminist wages for housework campaign for obscuring this fact (Davis 1983, 230–42). Finally, 
categories central to white feminism, including some categories articulated in Marxist feminism, 
have different meanings, implications, and relations to concrete experience for black women. 
These include domestic labor – which in white feminist theory often ignores black women’s 
domestic work – and reproduction, which can occlude the specific struggles fought by black 
women around fertility and reproduction (Carby 1982). Supposedly universal categories in 
feminist theory, including that of “women,” are often based in particularistic, white experiences; 
when difference is brought in, it is often rendered pre-theoretical instead of having broader 
conceptual import (Baca Zinn et al. 1986, 296–97). While not all these exclusions operated in all 
or most self-proclaimed Marxist feminist work, according to Joseph the Marxist feminist account 
of “the woman question” in the 1960s and 1970s “has never truly embraced Black women” 
(1981, 93).26 
In the course of discussing white feminist theory and the academy, Hortense Spillers 
underscores that just because “the feminist writer challenges certain symbolic formations of the 
past in correcting and revisiting them does not destroy the previous authority, but extends its 
possibilities”; thus, “the analytical discourse that feminists engage in different ways and for 




impermissible origins.” If they do this, they might come “to know the seductions of the father,” 
and knowing “who, in fact, the father is might also help the subject to know wherein she 
occasionally speaks when she is least suspecting” (2003a [1984], 168). The Marxist feminists I 
have most engaged with – as well as my reading of them – might accomplish a certain correction 
and revision of Marx. Marxist feminism incisively highlights the problems and occlusions of 
Marx on gender, and constructs conceptual resources for thinking through patriarchy, material 
relations, and capitalism. I have expanded this by bringing affect into its critique and theoretical 
elaboration. However, in doing so, these Marxist feminists extended the exclusions in Marx’s 
authority, and I extend the omissions of them both, yielding to the seductions of the (at this point 
in the tale, not exclusively male) theoretical fathers. Marx and Marxist feminism, especially 
when concatenated with affect theory, emanate analytical power. And yet, their enmeshment in 
colonial discourse and overlooking of race, gender, sex, and sexuality (Marx) and frequent 
inattentiveness when it comes to the histories and positions of women of color and racism (many 
strands of Marxist feminism) dampen this potential.  
More specifically, while I believe that the sketch of affective freedom I construct above 
drawing on Marx and Marxist feminism is a vital theoretical vision, its scope and generativity are 
theoretically and materially limited if the affective bodies of the vision are implicitly white. 
Attention to racial difference with regard to affect and Marxist feminist theory would help 
correct this. For example, bell hooks calls on feminists to redefine work with attention to black 
and lower-class women, arguing that both liberal feminist and Wages for Housework solutions 
fail to articulate a project that engages the needs of “masses” of women while also challenging 
white supremacist capitalism (1984, chap. 7). Because of ideologies that “judge [work’s] 




as synonymous with personal failure,” such that “women internalize the powerful’s definition of 
themselves” in a way that denies their “expression of dignity, discipline, creativity, etc.” (104). 
Angela Davis (1983, chap. 13) takes up the future of labor and gender from a Black and Marxist 
feminist perspective, and in the course of doing so intervenes in the Marxist feminist domestic 
labor debate to argue that housework-as-social-reproduction is a precondition of productive labor 
in capitalism, rather than productive itself (230-36). She also critiques the Wages for Housework 
movement for insufficient attention to Black women’s experiences doing housework for white 
families and to questions of organizing hypothetical remunerated houseworkers (234-42). Davis 
therefore calls for the “abolition of housework as the privatized responsibility of individual 
women” as a “strategic goal of women’s liberation” that also “contain[s] an explosive 
revolutionary potential” (243-44). Ultimately, there is an imperative for those “those who 
understand the workings of capitalism and imperialism to realize that the exploitation of Black 
people and women works to everyone’s disadvantage and that the liberation of these two groups 
is a stepping-stone to the liberation of all oppressed people” (Beale 1970, 116). Much of Marxist 
feminism is included in this category, and if it is to realize its articulated liberatory potential – 
most especially, in my project, the affective potentials – its problematization and revision is 
essential.27  
 
Conclusion: Affective Marxist Feminism  
 
This chapter indicates that Marxist feminism in many ways anticipates some of the central 
concerns of the affect theory to come after it. It thus supports Weeks’s claim that contemporary 
discussions of affective and immaterial labor have important lineages in earlier Marxist feminist 
theorizing, even if these genealogies are obscured or ignored (2007, 233). This point is most 




is different than the later, more theoretically specific valence the term will gain. As the above 
reading of these two thinkers indicates, their insights can be elaborated upon by affect at the 
same time that their work should inform discussions of affect today. This broader point, though, 
is applicable to the entire constellation of Marxist feminist thinkers I have assembled in this 
chapter. Concepts of reproduction, social reproduction, the sexual division of labor, as well as 
attention to the body as it is implicated in social forces and to polyvalent modes of power all 
prefigure central concerns of affect theory. The critique of Marx, focusing Marxist inquiry not 
just on production but also on reproduction and its connection to production, performs similar 
theoretical work. Upon an affective reading, Marxist feminism not only connects the 
reproduction of individuals, society, and life itself or challenges earlier accounts of the 
preservation and maintenance of the social body, but also accounts for the particularly affective 
kinds of material power and forces driving that reproduction. It moreover explores how those 
affective forces differentially shape and position various kinds of bodies.  
I have argued that even when Marxist feminist theorizing conflicts with the mode of 
affect theory I am articulating, the theoretical task becomes to work through the generativity and 
the conceptual work done by these tensions. Pursuing these lines of discord can, I think, extend 
both theoretical projects. Working through these divergences between literatures I claim as 
foundational qua political theory – Deleuzean-Spinozan affect, Marx, and Marxist feminism – 
exemplifies one of the main theoretical and methodological commitments discussed in the 
introduction: affect theory is a productive resource for exploring and working through 
divergences and problems between various canonical theoretical movements when they are all 
put on the same plane. So, in this instance, an affect-Marx-Marxist feminism assemblage, held 




both individually and in relation to one another. Indeed, through the tensions transmitted by and 
challenging to affect, one might generate new, productive, conceptual resources such as a focus 
on the affective force of the intertwined material bases of capitalism and patriarchy or a gendered, 
affective account of social reproduction. This necessitates thinking of affect as a crucial political 
concern that supplements and in some ways rearticulates other Marxist feminist political 
discourses, appeals, and resistances, just as it can and should be supplemented and re-elaborated 
by these others concerns. Affect and Marxist feminism are best understood as constantly and 
inevitably implicated in and acting upon one another. 
The discussion in this chapter underscores one of the limits to certain modes of a 
Spinozan-Deleuzian framework. If the concept of the “the body” becomes too universalized, too 
singular, too abstract – temptations that the previous chapters on Hobbes and on Marx, Spinoza 
and Deleuze as well as the current chapter succumb to in some ways – it is easy to conceal the 
ways in which bodies are always already multiply gendered, racialized, sexualized, and so forth. 
There is no guarantee that certain modes of theorizing affect can or necessarily will engage 
gender – or race, sex, sexuality, ability, class, and so forth. Such a conceptual framework, 
however, does not inevitably carry out this occlusion. In engaging in an affective reading of 
Marxist feminism in this chapter, I have sought to read affect together with Marxist-materialist 
feminists to carry out a gendering of the concept of affective capacity vis-à-vis Marx.28 Many 
concepts coming from Marx that, as Hartmann contends (1979, 7–8), are potentially useful in 
thinking about gender even as they have no necessary gendered content. Likewise, affective 
capacity as a concept in general, or in the way it mobilizes Marx- and Marxist feminism-
influenced accounts of reproduction requires an active theoretical intervention if it is to be useful 




The next chapter takes up a different thinker – Simone de Beauvoir – and turns to a 
different trajectory of theorizing about affect and emotion, primarily working with Sara Ahmed 
instead of Spinoza and Deleuze. Two projects these two chapters share, though, is first of all 
gendering affect and emotion and hence working to ensure that our contemporary affect theory 
continues to build upon feminist theories that comprise one of its lineages; secondly, they share a 






Chapter 4  
Emotional Orientations: Emotions, Subjectivity, and Gender in Beauvoir 
 
 
Introduction: Feminist Thought, Beauvoirian Emotion, and Affect Theory 
What is feminist emotionality? What emotions circulate in the emergence of subjects, Selves, 
and Others? How do concepts of emotion and orientation explain the formation of gendered 
subjects? Can emotions move us to freer and more reciprocal orientations to others? To explore 
these queries, this chapter brings to bear the framework and practice of feeling as a method that I 
have been developing thus far in order to re-read Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex 
(Beauvoir 2011; hereafter SS). I provide a reading of the theoretical work that emotions do in 
Beauvoir’s canonical text in order to think through the emotional valences of the questions she 
poses for political and philosophical thought, gender, and social-political transformation as well 
as to catalyze a connection between canonical feminist thinking and contemporary theorizing on 
affect and emotion. The chapter helps us to explore how one node of contemporary work on 
emotion can generate productive re-imaginings of feminist philosophy lineages; it also permits 
us to think through the ways the history of feminist thought can inform our accounts of emotion 
today. My central contention is that attending to embodied emotion in Beauvoir’s work enables 
us to trace her construction of a theory of subjectivity – and especially the gendered subjectivity 
of men and women – through what I call emotional orientations; from this, a feminist project of 
disorientation emerges.   
This chapter picks up from the preceding one by exploring a different tradition of 
feminist thought, and with a different strand of contemporary work on emotion and affect. It 
shares with the previous chapter a commitment to mobilizing affect theory in order to return to 




earlier thinkers and of current scholarship. It also shares with my reading of Marxist and Black 
feminists an explicit challenge to and rearticulation of the boundaries of the political theory 
canon – and produces along with the whole project a mode of reading and theorizing that puts 
affect and emotion to work in reconstructing the problems, concepts, and methods of political 
theory. At the level of the chapter’s form and organization, it is like the chapters on Marx and on 
Marxist feminism in identifying the emotional and/or affective circulations at work in modes of 
oppression, and then exploring how emotion and/or affect are active in striving to challenge and 
overthrow that oppression. In focusing on Beauvoir, this chapter practices the reading methods I 
have been developing throughout the entirety of the dissertation, but in the context of 
existentialism and phenomenology. Consequently, I continue to demonstrate the wide-ranging 
potentiality of feeling as method across a range of traditions and texts, in addition to the specific 
work I do with Beauvoir’s thought itself.  
Beauvoir’s theorizations of the struggle for reciprocity between Self and Other and the 
gendered conditions of men and women are replete with incisive analyses of the circulation of 
emotion and the way emotions stick to certain symbols, signs, myths, and other gendered bodies. 
Reading her alongside Ahmed, we throw her engagement with emotions and orientations into 
relief. In engaging this task, I take up the Beauvoir “renaissance” (Kruks 2005) in feminist 
theory and philosophy but move that renaissance into underexplored dimensions of her work. A 
constellation of interpreters have insightfully focused on embodiment in Beauvoir’s work 
(Andrew 2003; Arp 1995; Bauer 2001, 50–76; Bergoffen 1997; Heinämaa 2003; Kruks 2010; 
Kruks 2012; Lundgren-Gothlin 1996; Moi 2008, chap. 6; Murphy 2011; Scarth 2004; Simons 
2003; Ward 1995), yet not enough detail has been paid to the specifically emotional valence of 




has not directly engaged what precisely emotions are for Beauvoir, the specific embodied 
processes by which they are composed, or how exactly they work to shape subjects. Most 
importantly, it has thus far not sought to read Beauvoir’s account of emotion in relation to the 
affective turn in critical and cultural theory.  
Much incisive work in feminist philosophy opens up space for a project such as this one 
but does not itself take that route. My project is situated as an extension of the Beauvoir 
renaissance - particularly its turn to materiality and embodiment in her work – by enacting a 
sustained engagement with emotion. I theorize a more extensive account of the precise embodied 
composition and material processes of Beauvoirian emotion through an exploration of Beauvoir 
vis-à-vis Ahmed. This textual pairing provides a full theoretical background and foundation 
while also exploring particularly salient emotions and emotional relationalities. Readings of 
Beauvoir regularly gesture at or briefly mention emotion, but do not seek to provide an account 
of what, specifically, Beauvoirian emotion is, or to identify the processes by which it works. For 
example, Kruks discusses shame as it relates to investments in femininity and practices of self-
discipline (2001, 62–66), and Hengehold (2006) discusses the significance of emotions in 
parrhesiastic relations based on the practice of truth-telling. Bergoffen (1997) and Scarth (2004) 
both provide accounts of an ethics of eroticism and generosity in Beauvoir’s work, and they 
either imply or occasionally note some emotional aspects of this sort of ethics, as in Scarth’s 
discussion of the bond. In all of these instances, there are brief mentions or engagements with 
emotion, but no comprehensive inquiry into the composition of emotions or the precise work that 
they do. 
Those taking up embodiment in Beauvoir’s work similarly stop short of a full account of 




“unity of body and consciousness” (1996, 52), and Andrew argues that Beauvoir constructs “a 
phenomenological description of embodied consciousness in which we experience ourselves as 
willed bodies, passionate bodies, and thoughtful bodies, both at union with and in contradiction 
to the natural and the social worlds” (2003, 35). These philosophers, however do not explore how, 
exactly, emotions connect bodies, consciousnesses, and worlds. Kruks suggests that the “place of 
affect and emotion in politics is a continuous (if sometimes implicit) theme” of her recent work 
(2012, 24), but other than a brief discussion of the embodiedness of political judgment (125-27; 
149) and some exploration of the emotions attached to the “question of revenge” (chap. 5), this 
interest in emotion and affect remains implicit. We cannot carry out these ethical-embodied 
inquiries, I suggest, without retrieving the powerful work that emotions do for situated subjects 
and the lived body.  
Another trajectory of Beauvoir scholarship investigates her engagement with Descartes 
and her critique of the Cartesian dualistic subject (Bauer 2001, chap. 2; Bergoffen 1997; Vintges 
2006). Explorations of this implication of Beauvoir’s work would benefit from a fuller 
engagement with recent theorizing on emotion challenging the Cartesian model and more fully 
thinking through the configuration and work of emotion. Our rethinkings of Beauvoir remain 
incomplete so long as we do not read her work to engage the emotions that flow through her 
philosophy. Working with contemporary thinking on emotion in general thus becomes crucially 
important. It enables us to deeply engage an undertheorized element of Beauvoir’s thought in a 
way that connects her to a dynamic area of contemporary feminist thought. Sara Ahmed’s work 





As Ahmed contends, we cannot comprehend the constitution of the “I" or the “we” 
without close attention to the way that circulations of emotions “create the very effect” of the 
“surfaces and boundaries” of the “I” and the “we” (2004 [hereafter CPOE], 10). Bodies and 
subjects emerge through the circulation of emotions that are attached to signs, objects, and others. 
Moreover, they are also always “orientated”: there is always a “bodily inhabitance of space” that 
is intentional and is directed in some ways more than others, such that “the bodily, the spatial, 
and the social are entangled” (2006 [hereafter QP), 6; 181n1; her emphasis). Ahmed contrasts 
her work with everyday models of emotion that presume interiority and ownership – I have 
feelings that move out towards objects and others – as well as sociological and psychological 
“outside in” models in which “emotions are assumed to come from without and move inward” 
(CPOE, 9–10). Both models assume that emotions are things that we can have or possess instead 
of something produced only through circulation and motion, in the interactivity of bodies, signs, 
objects, and environments. Ahmed instead theorizes emotions as circulating, where the subject is 
only “one nodal point” in the “affective economy” of circulating emotions and this “movement 
of emotions” is “not contained within contours of a subject” (46). I work with Ahmed and 
emotion in this chapter rather than Spinoza, Deleuze, Clough, Massumi, and affect because of 
the specific way Beauvoir thinks through emotion. The emotions at work in critical wonder or 
the orientations of men and women, for instance, always refer back to a subject. In Beauvoir’s 
writing, emotions work to constitute subjects and are consciously felt by subjects; indeed, this is 
the primary reason why I read Beauvoir and Ahmed together rather than Beauvoir and other 
contemporary theorizing on affect.  
Beauvoir’s existentialism – and existentialism more broadly – is not a materialism. 




existentialism, arguing that it is compatible with Marxist historical materialism, and that it fails 
in its attempt to navigate a philosophical alternative beyond idealism and materialism. More 
generally, the existentialist emphasis on individual freedom can be seen to conflict with different 
kinds of materialism.1 Because of this, there is a certain tension between existentialism and affect 
theory: phenomenological and existential focus on consciousness, or on the subject and its 
experience, seems to push against many of the emphases of the kind of materialism affect theory 
constructs. I argue that is it important to read existentialism broadly, and Beauvoir specifically in 
terms of at least certain kinds of affect theory.2 In this chapter, I will demonstrate that reading 
Beauvoir alongside Ahmed can address some of the central concerns on Beauvoir’s 
existentialism. The work I do in this chapter is thus suggestive of the ways that emotion (and 
possibly affect) may be at play in other existentialist thinkers around questions such as 
subjectivity, freedom, and action, although I do not have the room to pursue that in this project. 
My sense is that paying attention to emotion with the help of certain kinds of affect theory could 
help reevaluate the situation of the person making Kierkegaard’s leap of faith or acting out 
Sartre’s bad faith. In these ways, this chapter seeks to expand the reach of my overall method 
into the realm of existentialism and phenomenology. I argued in the introduction that feeling as a 
method could potentially be generative alongside any theoretical or philosophical traditions, and 
this chapter expands the dissertation by engaging phenomenology and existentialism through 
Beauvoir.  
The possible tension between Beauvoir (or existentialism more broadly) and affect theory 
is one of the reasons I turn away from the Deleuzean affect theory of the preceding two chapters. 
Because of the centrality of categories of subjectivity, consciousness, and experience in Beauvoir, 




subjectivity and emotion than in affect as an asubjective force – become especially important. 
Beauvoir works at the intersection of a number of theoretical/philosophical discourses – 
phenomenology, existentialism, historical materialism and Marxism, feminism – that Ahmed 
herself harnesses. It is also worth noting here that Ahmed, while not engaging with Beauvoir in 
depth, names her as an influence on Queer Phenomenology and describes her as having 
“convincingly” “develop[ed] a phenomenology of sexual difference” (QP, 4; 27). The tension 
between existentialism and affect theory might render some kinds of affect theory incompatible 
with Beauvoir or another existentialist thinker, but this chapter will demonstrate that engaging 
Ahmed reimagines and adds to our understanding of Beauvoir.  
The objective of this chapter is thus to engage Beauvoirian emotion in detail through a 
sustained encounter between Beauvoir and Ahmed. I start by analyzing the imbrication of 
emotion and phenomenological orientation in Beauvoir’s account of Self and Other as well as the 
spatial and emotional components of gendered subjectivity. These sections depict the emotional-
phenomenological processes and situations that oppress and enclose. The rest of the chapter turns 
to explore the potential work of emotions to contest this oppressive situation. I first take up the 
critical potential of the bodily, emotional state of wonder and then read a feminist project 
emerging from an Ahmedian reading of Beauvoir as an emotional-phenomenological politics of 
disorientation. Throughout, I illustrate this conceptual and textual work with reference to the 
problematic of “the woman in [heterosexual] love” (SS, 683-708), underscoring what bringing 
together Beauvoir and Ahmed can disclose about this situation. Ultimately, I make a theoretical 
intervention and build a reading practice that connects a canonical feminist past to a vital area of 
our feminist present, in the process working to tell a different textual, temporal, and affective 




Hemmings’s (2011) challenges with regards to the way we tell stories about feminist theory. I 
focus on emotion and affect in a different way in order to construct and approach my feminist 
story: rather than following affect in reading and citations as she does, I use it as the explicit 
theoretical concern to link thinkers and concepts not often considered together.  
 
Emotions, Orientation, and Others 
 
Reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together throws into the relief the emotional 
phenomenology that constitutes subjects in general and gendered subjects in particular. Before I 
examine the specific ways Beauvoir analyzes gendered subject-formation, I want to explore her 
general approach to the struggle for recognition between Self and Other, working with Ahmed to 
give us a new way of understanding Beauvoir through feeling as a method.  
Emotions, in Ahmed’s framework, are bound up in the constitution of individuals and 
bodies: they “shape the very surfaces of bodies, which take shape through the repetition of 
actions over time, as well as through orientations toward and away from others” (CPOE, 4). 
Through the circulation of affective economies, our orientations toward these circulations and 
toward others constitute us as selves. It is in this sense that “emotions are relational” as they 
“involve (re)actions or relations of ‘towardness’ or ‘awayness,’” comprising an “affective 
reorientation” (CPOE, 8). We relate to others and objects – and thus generate our surfaces and 
selves – in the circulation and attribution of emotions and the orientations we adopt in these 
relations. Ahmed expands upon the concept of orientation in her Queer Phenomenology. 
Orientation as a concept turns our attention to “lived experience, the intentionality of 
consciousness, the significance of nearness … and the role of habitual actions in shaping bodies 
and world” (QP, 2). In situating this work in relation to The Cultural Politics of Emotion, she 




relations of proximity and distance between bodies” (QP, 3). Orientation is a bodily habitation of 
space in relation to objects and others. It also implies motion and directedness toward and away 
from these objects and others. Bodies are directed through the impressions of repeated actions 
and turnings as well as through the work of normativity and are directed in some ways more than 
others. Some bodies and some orientations can move and extend into space more than others: 
queer bodies, bodies of color, the bodies of women, and their multiple intersections have a 
different, much more constrained orientation (QP, 20). In reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together, 
a concept of “emotional orientation” emerges from Ahmed’s work, in which emotions and one’s 
phenomenological orientation to others and objects constitute and feed back into one another; 
such a process is at work in Beauvoir’s philosophy.   
The Other, Beauvoir writes, is “as original as consciousness itself”; it is “the fundamental 
category of human thought” – a One always has an Other (SS, 6). We must follow Hegel in 
understanding that “a fundamental hostility to any other consciousness is found in consciousness 
itself; the subject posits itself only in opposition” (SS, 7). In this passage, “posit” (and thus also 
“opposition”) can have multiple potential meanings. In its usage here, it most straightforwardly 
reads as putting forth something for consideration (such as positing a question), but “posit” here 
also invokes associations with “posture” and “position” – indeed, Parshley’s earlier translation of 
Beauvoir renders the passage as the subject posed in relation to another – as it may also imply a 
physical meaning of shaping or turning one’s comportment in a certain way or direction. We 
might read the subject fundamentally “posited” and “in opposition” in relation with others in 
both of these senses: she is in a metaphysical and symbolic sense able to be considered or to exist 
only in relation to others, but she also in a very corporeal sense is always posed in a posture 




forge a “fundamental unit” of “two halves riveted to each other” (SS, 9). There is a physicality to 
Beauvoir’s use of “riveted together”: the two are in their comportment and material constitution 
inseparable. Her subject takes shape through her fundamental connection to Others, who 
themselves take shape in their relation with other Others. Beauvoir’s subjects are orientated. As 
such, Beauvoir’s theorization of self and other points to understanding these figures as orientated.  
This orientation is emotional. “Self” and “other” can surface as subjects only through the 
circulation of emotions in their orientation toward and away from one another. Beauvoir, reading 
Hegel, notes a fundamental hostility between self and other, and in doing so underscores the 
importance of more fully elucidating the interactions between emotion and orientation. This 
hostility names a certain emotional relationship to an other, and if I am correct that Beauvoir 
writes of the Self-Other struggle as in part one of physical direction, then this hostility is carried 
in the body. Furthermore, the hostility between self and other is closely related to fear. Ahmed 
writes that “fear shapes the surfaces of bodies” and is caught up in the orientation of subjects 
(CPOE, 8). Beauvoir does not explicitly name “fear” as an emotion circulating between self and 
other, but we should read it into her text through her invocation of the hostility in the 
Master/Slave dialectic. Beauvoir’s reading of Hegel’s dialectic is influenced by Alexandre 
Kojève’s existential reading of the Master/Slave dialectic centering the “fear of death” in the 
confrontation between Self and Other (Lundgren-Gothlin 1996, chaps. 3–4; Kojève 1996, chap. 
1). Mussett (2006) contends that this fear “cannot be overemphasized in Hegel’s account” (284) 
and reads Beauvoir as describing it in terms of an absolute negativity women experience through 
oppression and then internalize (285-87). So, if we are to pay attention to metonymy in reading 
for the emotionality of texts, as Ahmed suggests (CPOE, 12–13), we ought to read Beauvoir as 




surfacing of subjects.3 Subjects characterized by emotional orientations, in a state of relationality, 
populate Beauvoir’s theoretical field.4 
Ahmed thus enables us to more deeply engage the emotional range of Beauvoir’s work in 
relation to her broader philosophical orientation, particularly the interaction between emotion 
and phenomenology. This account, though, feeds back into Ahmed’s theorizing as well. In my 
reading Beauvoir works as a kind of relay between Ahmed’s work that focuses primarily on 
emotion and her version of queer phenomenology. That is, reading Beauvoir through Ahmed’s 
own attempts to think through embodiment and orientation fills out connections between 
different aspects of Ahmed’s theorizing that are not always explicit. Moreover, Beauvoir’s 
rearticulation and transformation of Hegel may point to the generative potential for a fuller 
engagement with Hegel in Ahmed’s project of queer phenomenology. Ahmed insists on the need 
to rework “the orientation of phenomenology” by investigating how that which “appear[s] in 
phenomenological writings function[s] as ‘orientation devices’” for phenomenology and “offer a 
different ‘slant’” to “orientation itself” (QP, 3–4). If this is our project, perhaps a Beauvoir-
inspired return to Hegel that seeks to disrupt, reorient, or give a new slant to the master-slave 
dialectic in terms of emotion and embodiment is necessary.   
 
The Emotional Phenomenology of Gender 
 
Men and women, in my reading, are particular kinds of emotionally oriented subjects.5 Beauvoir 
concludes her discussion of men’s “Myths” by arguing that there “is a world of significations 
that exist only through woman; she is the substance of men’s actions and feeling, the 
embodiment of all the values that seek their freedom. … He projects onto her what he desires 
and fears, what he loves and what he hates” (SS, 213). Men’s subjectivity is an emotional 




space, and is directed in relation to these other emotional orientations. Moreover, this orientation 
is bound up with the circulation of specific emotions between bodies and signs, such as the 
desire, fear, love, and hate Beauvoir mentions in this passage.  
Disgust proves to be a particularly salient emotion in conditioning men’s emotional 
orientation qua subject. Beauvoir describes disgust as circulating between men and women 
through the signs of Nature, the body/the flesh, and sex, among others. Seeing themselves as 
transcendent and as having overcome the body, men end up feeling disgust because of their 
desires in pursuing “carnal” relations with women: “[o]nly a body can touch another body; the 
male masters the desired flesh only by becoming flesh himself,” and “[d]esire often contains an 
element of disgust and returns to disgust when it is assuaged” (SS, 181-82). As a subject, men 
project themselves as more than the body, yet still desire the bodily pleasure of sex. This desire 
and its consummation return them to their bodies, yet women – as Beauvoir points out 
throughout the “Myths” section – are supposed to be pure body: desire’s fleshly surface is 
projected through and into women. Disgust also sticks to women in the signs of Nature and life 
and death itself. Nature, associated with women through the mother and the womb, “provokes 
disgust because it is made only when it is being unmade”; man is once again returned to his 
“carnal contingence that he projects on” the feminine subject (SS, 165–167). This disgust is then 
stuck to other phenomena – menstruation, childbirth, and so on – as well as other emotions – 
mystery, repugnance, fear, and horror.   
What work does this disgust do? Ahmed conceptualizes disgust as ascriptive in the way it 
“reads the objects that are felt to be disgusting:” it is not about “bad objects” as such but the 
process that makes “the very designation of ‘badness’” a “quality that we must assume is 




performative. As a speech act disgust “can generate effects by ‘binding’ signs to bodies” in a 
way that obstructs “new meanings” (CPOE, 92). This performativity relies on previous 
associations, and figurations of disgust depend on extant norms and conventions. Significantly, 
Ahmed articulates the valence of disgust for power relations. The circulation of disgust 
hierarchizes space and the bodies that inhabit these spaces, rendering objects of disgust lower 
than/beneath/less than the subject who feels disgust. Disgust at that which is “below” “functions 
to maintain the power relations between above and below, through which ‘aboveness’ and 
‘belowness’ become properties of particular bodies, objects, and spaces” (CPOE, 89; her 
emphasis).6 This disgusting lowness is stuck together with sexuality and the lower parts of the 
body, with this whole figuration stuck to disgust over women and their bodies. Disgust thus 
separates one kind (man/mind/reason) from another (woman/body/vagina/sex/dirty) and assigns 
them qualities of higher/more advanced and lower/less advanced (CPOE, 89).  
We see both the performativity of disgust as well as its differential valuation of bodies at 
work in Beauvoir’s elaboration of men’s disgust. There is nothing inherently disgusting about the 
bodies designated as disgusting. Naming the woman’s body through association with other signs 
also named as disgusting renders it as such. Disgust’s effect and affect resonate with historical 
forms of oppression and denigration, amplifying the adherence of the disgust to the disgusting 
body. Beauvoir’s account of disgust also invokes the hierarchization of bodies. By rendering the 
disgusting woman’s body as that which brings man’s body down to nature, sex, and the flesh, 
man’s body appears higher than woman’s. This disgust is then further associated with the ‘lower’ 
parts of the ascribed-as-disgusting body, the vagina and menstrual blood (SS, 167–171). Ahmed 
notes one other aspect of disgust: its ambivalence. There is a desire or attraction for objects that 




that pulls us toward the disgusting object (CPOE, 84). Men’s disgust functions similarly: as the 
man is disgusted by and recoils from the fleshly, natural body that he reads as disgusting, he 
simultaneously desires it. Overall, reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together enables us to discern 
how the hierarchization of bodies entrenching power relations works through the performative 
enunciation of disgust stuck to certain kinds of bodies, and the embodied emotional way that this 
occurs. As Marso (2012) points out, for Beauvoir the body in particular and biology in general 
are interpreted in a way that ascribes political and social meaning. Ahmed enables us to think 
through the embodied processes through which these ascriptions stick to certain bodies, 
saturating them with these oppressive, hierarchizing meanings, such as in the attribution of 
disgust.    
In their subjectivity, men adopt two linked modes of orientation toward women. In 
Ahmed’s terminology, the first of these is orientation toward others, in which the “otherness of 
things is what allows me to do things ‘with’ them” and “what is other than me is also what 
allows me to extend the reach of my body”; as such, this othering is “not simply a form of 
negation” but also can “be described as a form of extension” (QP, 115). Secondly, there is an 
orientation around others that “makes” the other “central, as being at the center of one’s being or 
action,” it is what “allows us to ‘hold the center,’ or even to constitute ourselves as at the center 
of those other things” (QP, 116).  
Orientation toward others is present in the multiple instances in which Beauvoir invokes 
the woman as the one who enables or helps the man – sexually, in taking care of the house, and 
so on. For instance, in Beauvoir’s discussion of the way men mythologize and invest symbolic 
value in women, the woman becomes a source of “pride” in the way the man “forms” her, 




extension functions in more subtle ways as well. Emotional orientation toward woman enables 
the extension of men into space and his affirmation of their existence as active humans, because 
they are Selves oriented toward Others they view as lesser and inessential. Furthermore, men 
orient themselves toward women to grant themselves access to the pleasurable realm of the body 
without losing their transcendent Self, or so they hope. With women, he “ceases to assume his 
existence” and “situates himself on an inauthentic plane” where he seeks to satisfy his obsessions 
and whims while he “lets go” (SS, 652). This orientation enables the man to selectively extend 
into the realm of the body without being permanently tainted by its supposed inferiority.  
In their orientation around women, men are able to constitute themselves as the center of 
these Others. That is, their affirmation as subjects results from their orientation around women. 
As Beauvoir argues, “it is the Other as such that man wants to possess” (SS, 209). I contend that 
this taking possession of the Other productively interacts with what Ahmed describes as 
centering the Other in order to re-center the Self (QP, 116). Here, the man figures himself as the 
“center” of affirmative subjectivity only as an appropriation of and orientation around the 
woman. This involves both this affirmation of the Self and also the acquisition of knowledge 
about the Self through this relation. It is “[t]hrough her, through the best and the worst of her, 
man learns … about himself” (SS, 213). Beauvoir continues: woman “is the carnal embodiment 
of all moral values and their opposites, from good to bad; she is the stuff of action and its 
obstacle, man’s grasp on the world and his failure; as such she is the source of all man’s 
reflection on his existence and all expression he can give of it” (SS, 213). Here, Beauvoir 
theorizes the way in which centering the masculine Self requires first centering the feminine 
Other. Mussett (2006) argues that in Beauvoir’s rearticulation of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, 




way that resembles the slave in Hegel’s dialectic. This kind of orienting relationship, as this 
section demonstrates, has a particularly embodied and spatial element. These notions of 
orientation may also explain expressions of anger, violence, and/or denunciations of women who 
challenge normative modes of femininity. If the self-certainty of a man is predicated on the 
actions of women, and they refuse to act in a way that affirms that identity, then he has lost a part 
of the Other through which he orients himself.7 Rather than grapple with this – for example 
initiating a relation of mutual recognition – he lashes out and attempts to make sure that women 
behave sufficiently femininely so that his orientation and identity are retained. 
We see how this emotional phenomenology works in Beauvoir’s analysis of men in 
heterosexual love-relationships dispersed throughout her account of the woman in love. Any 
enthrallment of love is transient. Men, even in their “most violent passions” or “fall[ing] on their 
knees before” a woman “remain sovereign subjects” as a result of their socio-historical situation 
(683); they “view such loves merely as a phase” (685). Their orientations in relation to women, 
and the disgust they ascribe to them constitute the impermanent way they love. Women enable 
men’s access to the realm of bodily pleasure and desire, yet men’s sense of selfhood means that 
their “desire is as fleeting as it is imperious” as “it dies rather quickly” once “satisfied” (699). 
His particular orientation and the gendered disgust that circulates means he does not want to 
languish in the supposedly tainted world of sexual desire, but temporarily take pleasure and then 
return to the world of their transcendent selfhood. Men have no need to “abandon themselves 
completely,” as women in love do, but instead want to “possess” and “annex” women (683). As 
Beauvoir writes, men “want to integrate [the woman] into their existence” – in the terms of my 
discussion, orient themselves toward and around her - and “not submerge their entire existence in 




heterosexual man to reinforce his own sense of self as he orients himself to receive a woman’s 
absolute devotion and temporarily enter the realm of pleasure and sexual desire but ultimately 
subordinate all of this to the affirmation of his own subjectivity.  
Compare these orientations to the situation of women as described by Beauvoir: because 
of the “domain in which she is enclosed,” her “general attitude concerning her self and the world” 
is one of confinement (SS, 656). She is oriented but is more often than not following the 
trajectories of others, accumulated history, norms, and previous orientations (QP, 16). Whereas 
men can extend in space and can center themselves, in their orientation as Other women are 
limited in their horizons. One of the consequences of this confinement and shaping is the way 
that women are blocked and cannot extend into space. Ahmed conceptualizes in her discussion 
of race and orientalism a “political economy” of “stopping,” in which being stopped (stopped 
and searched, stopped and detained) is “distributed unevenly,” generating an “affective economy 
that leaves its impressions” upon those that are stopped (QP, 140). This phenomenological 
concept of stopping can prompt further insight into Beauvoir’s description of women’s 
subjectivity in relation to men and to social norms and conditions. Here, the move is not to 
simply analogize racist and sexist oppressions, but to deploy Ahmed’s concept of orientation to 
track the different kinds of economies of stopping at work; that is, Ahmed’s political economy of 
racialized stopping should provoke us to think through the modes of spatial and embodied 
constraint operating in the oppression of women as Beauvoir theorizes it.   
Ahmed writes that “movement for some involves blocking movement for others” (QP, 
141). In The Second Sex, men’s movement and directedness – the ability to extend into space and 
to selectively slide into the realm of immanence – depend on confining women. Thus, on a 




“confined in immanence” (SS, 751; 754). The social does not extend her body into space, instead 
leaving its imprints on her. The feminine subject’s “horizon is blocked:” if she “wallows in 
immanence,” it is because she “was enclosed in it … stifling in a dismal gynaeceum” (SS, 643). 
She is “enclosed in her flesh, in her home” (639).8 This is still a kind of orientation – all bodies 
are orientated – but it is an orientation that impresses upon her to block the extension of her body 
into space. Commentators regularly describe Beauvoir as linking women’s lived experience to 
embodied relations with the world; she accounts for “how femininity is shaped” (e.g. Lundgren-
Gothlin 1996, 179), and how “we experience – live – our bodies is shaped by … historical 
sedimentation” of body-world interaction (e.g. Moi 1999, 68). This is of course vital to 
Beauvoir’s project, and when we engage it we must insist on the corporeality of Lundgren-
Gothlin’s “shaping” and Moi’s “sedimenting”. My reading of Beauvoirian emotion through 
Ahmed thus provides important insight into the theoretical imbrication of gender, 
phenomenology, emotion, and the body in Beauvoir’s work. 
What are the other emotional resonances of this stopping or blocking, and what emotions 
circulate around women? Beauvoir describes one set of reactions to the condition of femininity 
in a bodily, affective way. When faced with the “hostility and the injustice of her lot,” she 
responds with the “moist trace on her cheek” and “burning in her eyes” that somatically display 
the “tangible presence of her suffering soul” (SS, 648). Beauvoir writes – in words that would be 
at home in any contemporary affect theorist’s writing – that in so-called “nervous fits” as a form 
of “symbolic outburst,” she “attempts to express,” “in her body,” “the refusals she cannot carry 
out concretely. It is not only for physiological reasons that she is subject to convulsive 
manifestations: a convulsion is an interiorization of an energy that, thrown into the world, fails to 




(SS, 648). Here, Beauvoir links the emotional, the bodily, and the social. The orientation of 
women generates an excess of negative forces blocked by their inability to act in the world – an 
inability to extend in space – that are then circulated – interiorized and then exteriorized, with 
effects and affects on the bodily surface. 
The situation of the woman in heterosexual love illustratively underscores this emotional 
phenomenology. Self-abnegating love remains as an option for the phenomenologically enclosed 
woman, a dream “of becoming one, of fusing with the sovereign subject” by “losing herself body 
and soul in the one designated to her as the absolute, as the essential” (SS, 684). In response to 
her general condition, she seeks to access selfhood and independence through the man she loves. 
In the terms described in this section, we can understand this as an attempt to use men’s 
orientation toward and around women for women’s own benefit. Women are confined by the 
gendered phenomenology of stopping, whereas men use women to extend their own bodies and 
subjectivities. In love, women “desire to go beyond [their] own limits and become infinite, 
thanks to the intervention of another who has access to infinite reality” (691); she “feels exalted” 
by becoming “necessary to a being” who “projects himself in the world” (693). Working with 
Ahmed, we can also see how Beauvoir is theorizing an affective economy of sorts. Beauvoir 
depicts the (potentially temporary) situation thus: “it is in man’s eyes that the woman believes 
she has at last found herself … The woman feels endowed with a sure and high value; at last she 
has the right to cherish herself through the love she inspires. She is exhilarated at finding a 
witness in her lover” (687). Indeed, Ahmed discusses the way that love – in her example, love of 
a nation – involves an idealization of the loved object in which the subjects seeks “to be itself in 
or through what it has” in the love relationships (CPOE, 128). In Beauvoir, the woman coheres 




signs of love and valuation that stick to her, all put into motion by loving a man. This process 
sets off a further reaction, the “great joy” that comes with “the magnificent possession of the 
absolute” (693).  
However, this situation in which women seeks to access and put to her advantage the 
emotional orientation and subjectivity of the man in the end works to further confine her; as 
Beauvoir writes, this “glorious felicity is seldom stable” but gives way to “the torments of the 
woman in love” due to the broader oppression of women and to a lack of reciprocity (694). This 
takes several forms, all of which exemplify the failure of the phenomenological and emotional 
hopes invested in the condition of heterosexual love. In trying to “abandon herself” to love “to 
save herself,” she “ends up totally disavowing herself” (691). The lived experiences of total 
devotion in love, contrary to the idealized relation, further women’s situation as an Other. Love 
expresses itself as “service,” “integrat[ion] into his existence,” “tyranniz[ing] herself in the 
lover’s name,” and allowing “everything she has, every second of her life” to become “devoted 
to him”; thus the woman in heterosexual love “gives up her transcendence” in the way “she 
subordinates it to that of the essential” because “all reality is in the other” (691-92). That is, 
while attempting to extend her body in phenomenological space through the man’s subjectivity 
and status in the world, she actually expands the way that the man uses the women for his own 
projects. Her increased devotion enhances the way that men orient themselves toward and around 
women in order to affirm their own subjectivity, at the expense of women’s phenomenological 
and spatial possibilities. Moreover, she discovers that the figure she had set up as absolute – and 
in many ways godly, as Beauvoir insists throughout the chapter – is ordinary, mundane, and 
mediocre, provoking a “heartrending disappointment” (694). The press of this realization and the 




humiliation, tyranny, detesting, suffering, self-deception, panic, delirium, worry, and jealousy 
(695-705). Ultimately, then, “her love itself disfigures her, demolishes her” and when the woman 
in love “realizes” this, her “distress” and lack of selfhood are amplified (704). In this sense, the 
woman in heterosexual love is both a response to and reproductive of a certain kind of emotional 
orientation.   
For Beauvoir, men and women constitute and are constituted by specific emotional 
relationalities and directionalities. Both are caught up in the circulation of emotions, objects, 
signs, and symbols. They are bound to one another – emotionally, materially, subjectively, and 
bodily. Reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together through feeling as a method throws into relief this 
emotional phenomenology and the way it works to oppress and confine women. However, as the 
rest of this chapter explores, emotions and orientations are also part of the process of liberation. 
 
Wonder: What is a Woman? 
 
If the general emotional phenomenology of gender is oppressive in these senses, how can 
emotions move individuals to contest and overthrow this condition, and establish more reciprocal 
relations in its place? One key to this, in my reading, is an understanding of Beauvoir’s project as 
one of generating an emotion of critical wonder. In her chapter on feminist attachments, Ahmed 
describes feminism as in part a politics of wonder which can “take us to a different relation to the 
world in which we live” (CPOE, 178). The emotion of wonder works to move bodies toward this 
different relation. As “an affective relation to the world that one faces and is faced with “as if” 
for the first time,” wonder “allows us to see the surfaces of the world as made” (CPOE, 179; her 
emphasis). This emotional approach to the world renders it contingent, historical, and produced 
through work instead of inevitable and given. As such, wonder “opens up rather than suspends 




familiar (CPOE, 179). That is, the recognizability or taken-for-granted-ness of the world covers 
up the history and sociality that shape the surfaces of the world and the bodies that populate it. 
The potential of wonder lies in the novelty of the “as if”: to “see the world as if for the first time 
is to notice that which is there, is made, has arrived, or is extraordinary” (CPOE, 180; her 
emphasis). The world is something it does not have to be, and because the world was made 
through action, action can re-shape surfaces and reconstitute relations.  
Moreover, wonder is bodily and emotional. It moves bodies – or at least has the potential 
to do so: the “body opens as the world opens up before it; the body unfolds into the unfolding of 
a world,” and wonder “keeps alive the possibility of freshness, and vitality of a living that can 
live as if for the first time” (CPOE, 180). Wonder re-reads the past to see a constrained openness 
to the future, situating the body in a contingent relationship to the world. It is an emotion of 
discomposure that refuses to rest one’s relation to the world on a “feeling of comfort,” “ordinary 
experience,” or “something that is already familiar, or recognizable” (CPOE, 179). From this 
orientation the world, bodies and collectives can adopt a different, more critical and 
transformative relationship to it. Specifically, wonder moves the individual to feminism by 
enabling one to “read” their “own life and the lives of others differently,” and it is “through 
wonder that pain and anger comes to life, as wonder allows” one to realize that what is unjust 
can be unmade as well as made” (CPOE, 180-81).9 
Beauvoir’s project in The Second Sex, I contend, provokes this kind of wonder. She 
opens by asking “first, what is a woman?” followed shortly thereafter by remarking that even the 
need to “pose” this question “is significant” (SS, 3; 5). Staging an encounter between Ahmed’s 
wonder and Beauvoir, I read this passage to insist that we must look anew at what we assume to 




becomes, woman” also can activate a set of questions and a posture of wonder toward the 
(gendered) world (SS, 283). If one becomes a gender, what history produces this gendering? If 
becoming is dynamic, can there be further change of the present into the future? If one becomes a 
gender, can gender become something else? The questions prompted by Beauvoir’s formulation 
reorient a reader to the world. The historicity of gender is called to the front, shattering its given-
ness and inevitability. The gendered world is something that was made and does not have to be; 
“it would be impossible to keep woman from being what she was made” (SS, 761; her emphasis). 
As Beauvoir opens her conclusion, no “physiological destiny imposes eternal hostility on the 
Male and Female as such” since humanity “is a historical becoming” (SS, 753). This, she claims, 
is also true of the specific condition of woman who, as “a product developed by civilization,” is 
“determined neither by her hormones nor by mysterious instincts but by the way she grasps, 
through foreign consciousness, her body and her relation to the world” (SS, 761). Throughout her 
work, Beauvoir challenges the apparent naturalness of the world and of gender relations, 
exposing them as historical products.  
Wonder, Ahmed notes, “involves learning,” coming to “see the world as something that 
does not have to be, and as something that came to be, over time, and with work” (CPOE, 180). 
Beauvoir’s general approach to question the ordinariness of women and their situation prompts 
precisely this kind of wondrous learning. She impels the reader to examine how and why women 
are Other and how their lived experiences are structured. If wonder “works to transform the 
ordinary” – that which is “familiar, or recognizable” – into something to be questioned and 
contested (CPOE, 179), then The Second Sex thus performs and inculcates wondrousness. It 
confronts the gendered world-as-it-is with a challenge to its given-ness by asking the reader to 




situation of women, and thereby accept the given state of affairs as inevitable, nondescript, or 
simply ‘the way things are.’ But Beauvoir pushes one to reject this bad faith, ask “what is a 
woman,” and insist that woman is a becoming, not a static fact. This enacts wonder, the “passion 
that motivates the desire to keep looking,” a “radicalisation” of one’s relation to the given world 
(CPOE, 180).  
There is a specific embodied, emotional component to wondrous critique. Beauvoir 
describes women experiencing the world as “a stubborn, indomitable resistance”: woman 
“experiences the resistance of a duration that the most ingenious machines fail to divide or 
multiply; she experiences it in her flesh…” (SS, 639). History’s impact through lived experience 
is affective and impresses upon female bodies in a particular way, as somatic resistance to one’s 
projects. Forging a different embodied relation to that history facilitates reorientation toward that 
history and the world it has shaped. Beauvoir advocates critical inquiry that does just this. 
Describing the characteristics of woman as not eternal but “suggested in negative form by her 
situation,” she calls for us to “to take a synthetic point of view” that makes it “possible to grasp 
the Eternal Feminine in her economic, social, and historical conditioning” (SS, 638). Note here 
the use of the word “grasp,” which carries connotations of understanding and a more physical, 
phenomenological meaning – one we should likely read as drawing on Merleau-Ponty – of 
stopping and apprehending. What I identify as this wondrous grasping joining together inquiry 
and a kind of seizing of history can reorient the subject to the world. The strength of historical 
continuity she feels in her body can shift into a relation of contingency and transformability. Her 
conditions “can be overcome as soon as they are grasped from new perspectives” (SS, 763). This 
grasping, I argue, involves precisely that wonder that “expands our field of vision and touch” 




motivating a more critical relationship to the given world, an oppositional perspective cannot be 
adopted and movement is stifled, even if their situation seemingly calls out for such resistance. 
From the critical perspective, a new relation to the world is possible, where this resentment (once 
paired with wonder) can move one to create anew. Once we adopt a position of wonder to the 
world – viewing it as “a situation that is showing itself to be historical precisely in that it is the 
process of changing” instead of feeling limited by a “mysterious essence” – the future, in a 
figuration evocative of Ahmed’s description of wonder, “remains wide open” (SS, 750). 
Although she does not invoke or name it as such, we should read Beauvoir, in her general critical 
position, as a philosopher of wonder.  
 Wonder is required to apprehend and change the situation of the woman in heterosexual 
love. The condition of love carries the force of a history where women are made “incapable of 
being self-sufficient” and sediments it on the body: the situation “weighs on women trapped in 
the feminine universe” of love (708). It would be easy to simply accept this condition as natural 
or inevitable; indeed, Beauvoir calls this “injustice” a “destiny,” (708), and women usually 
experience it as such (707). However, as much as myths about men, women, and love may 
profess otherwise, “it is the difference in their [men and women’s] situations” and not “a law of 
nature” that “is reflected” in how women and men act in love (684). The vicissitudes of the 
individual and relational path that Beauvoir outlines unfold not from the eternal feminine or 
inherent primordial characteristics of women (or men), but from a condition where “the woman 
knows herself only as other” (707). Beauvoir’s analysis of the woman in heterosexual love 
performs (and cultivates in the reader) the move from an acceptance of what is given to a 
position that understands that situation as made – and thus changeable. That is, it constructs a 




worldly (706-708). As a result the situation becomes something to be grasped, interrogated, and 




Beauvoir concludes her introduction to The Second Sex with an affirmation of existentialist 
morality:  
Every subject posits itself as a transcendence concretely, through projects; it 
accomplishes its freedom only by perpetual surpassing toward other freedoms; there is no 
other justification for present existence than its expansion toward an indefinitely open 
future. … Woman’s drama lies in this conflict between the fundamental claim of every 
subject, which always posits itself as essential, and the demands of a situation that 
constitutes her as inessential (SS, 16–17).   
 
How should we understand the transformation called for by Beauvoir, given my reading? While 
wonder plays a vital role in moving one to a critical standpoint, I argue that we also must follow 
Ahmed’s claim that feminism’s “emotional response” to the world involves a substantial change 
“of one’s bodily relation to social norms” (CPOE, 170–171), and read Beauvoir through 
Ahmed’s concept of disorientation. A “politics of disorientation might be to sustain wonder 
about the very forms of social gathering” so that we might “face a different way” (QP, 24). It 
necessitates thinking through, with, and against orientations to trace the breaking points that 
accumulate when something challenges normative ways of seeing and being. The crucial 
question is how experiences of disorientation “can impact on the orientation of bodies and 
spaces,” and what we do with such moments (QP, 158). Disorientation involves making familiar 
things and relations strange, and following “oblique” lines that are generated when things fail to 
normatively cohere. It can “disturb” the normative “ground,” and in doing so enable bodies to 




different direction (QP, 161-62). Other modes of orientation – other modes of becoming-together 
– might challenge the kinds of orientations and spaces that men take up. 
Might we read Beauvoir as constructing a call for a kind of disorientation? Does 
reciprocity between self and other, a joint effort toward liberation, constitute a disorientating 
project in relation to the prevailing situation of women? Beauvoir contrasts the current normative 
ground of women with a situation in which “freedom throws itself across an open future, 
emerging beyond any given” (SS, 645). Her language evokes the notion of movement and 
direction contrary to the limited lines of the present. In liberation, a free subject extends her 
reach into a world that has been, to use Ahmed’s terms from above, disturbed in a way that 
unsettles given actuality. Elsewhere, Beauvoir similarly describes transformation as “refus[ing] 
the limits of” the current situation and “open[ing] paths to the future” (SS, 664). The “only one 
way” to achieve freedom “authentically” is “to project it by a positive action into” society (SS, 
717).  This active movement and project – whether considered existentially or even more 
mundanely – is possible only insofar as the world undergoes disorientation in which the 
normative ground of oppressive relations is disrupted, a new mode of social gathering is opened, 
and the world is indeed set in a different direction.  
Liberation as reciprocity resituates Self and Other in their bond. Each “will remain an 
other for the other,” but they mutually “recogniz[e] each other as subject” (SS, 766; her 
emphasis). This would change the emotional orientation of all subjects: no longer would men 
orient themselves toward and around feminine others, and no longer would women be blocked in 
their orientation. Instead, both would forge new lines and directions in a mutual, freer way, 
disoriented and breaking away from the ‘original’ normative ground of domination. We should 




“moment of ethical connection” is in part “bodily” (2003, 30); the corporeality of this connection 
is also emotional. As I discussed above, we should read Beauvoir’s rereading of the Master/Slave 
dialectic as in part an emotional orientation involving the circulation of emotion in the 
orientation of two kinds of subjects vis-à-vis each other. As such, the liberation or transcendence 
that Beauvoir theorizes is in the end emotional. Re-reading Beauvoir through Ahmed enables us 
to reconstitute Beauvoir’s notion of liberation in order to recuperate its emotional orientation(s). 
Ahmed writes that it is through a new kind of emotional “alignment of the ‘we’ with the ‘I’” that 
“a new grammar of social existence may yet be possible” (CPOE, 188). Such an orientation 
toward liberation, I argue, is something that Beauvoir herself shares with Ahmed.   
A challenge to the emotional phenomenology of the woman in (heterosexual) love – and 
a more reciprocal alternative – would involve such a disorientation. Beauvoir traces the route 
that love takes to a kind of failure: a woman tries to lose herself in a man as a way to save herself, 
but because “all reality is” thus “in the other,” she loses herself absolutely, a “dream of 
martyrdom” turning into “self-mutilation” (SS, 691-92). This is disorienting to the woman in 
love, who was “fooled by a mirage” (685), ends in “catastrophe” (705), and faces a situation 
where it seems impossible to affirm one’s selfhood or start anew because “how could she begin a 
new life when outside her lover there is nothing?” (705). However, while acknowledging the 
riskiness and dread of this initial disorientation, Beauvoir posits that this “failure of love can be a 
productive ordeal” if “the woman is capable of taking herself in hand again” (706). The 
normative ground of the woman in love has been disturbed, and Ahmed shows us that such a 
situation opens possibilities for new social and interpersonal relations to cohere.   
Beauvoir sketches possibilities for an “authentic love” (694; 706-708), and Ahmed helps 




For Ahmed, disorientation makes possible new modes of relationality, sociality, and normativity, 
and new kinds of emotional circulations. Authentic heterosexual love, uninhibited by the stifling 
emotions and orientations sketched above, becomes for Beauvoir a real “inter-human relation” in 
which each person “take[s] on the other’s contingence” (694). Instead of a one-sided relation 
where the man orients himself toward and around women in order to affirm his selfhood at the 
expense of the phenomenologically and emotionally confined women, this new relationship 
would be “founded on [the] reciprocal recognition of” each person’s “freedom,” enabling each to 
“experience” themselves as self and other and to project a “revelation of self through the gift of 
the self and the enrichment of the universe” (706). The woman in heterosexual love endeavors to 
“escape from herself” and loves out of the “weakness” of her situation, but a generative 
disorientation of love – especially if aided by social and economic conditions that promote the 
independence of women – can move her to love out of “strength,” to “find” and “affirm” herself, 
and ultimately for the love relationship be a “source of life” rather than “danger” or self-
abnegation (707-708). New emotional orientations emerge, and lovers have a new comportment 
toward to the world as they “reveal values and ends” in it (706). When Bergoffen writes that “the 
erotic” in Beauvoir brings forth “a paradigm for an alternative understanding of the other, the 
couple, the ‘we’ and the world” (1997, 108), we should explicitly think of emotion and 
disorientation as crucial in engendering such a paradigm. The constitution of a new paradigm 
depends on a disorientation of an ingrained emotional phenomenology opening up new 
normative ground for a new cohering of selves, others, objects, and worlds.    
Beauvoir also underscores some of the substantial, particularly gendered obstacles that 
make disorientation difficult and points to the need to consider kinds of emotions and 




subordination Beauvoir posits. She contends that “woman makes no claim for herself as subject”: 
she “lacks the concrete means” for freedom, “senses the necessary link connecting her to man 
without positing its reciprocity,” and “often derives satisfaction from her role as Other” (SS, 10). 
Not only are women dispersed compared to, for example, workers in a factory, there is a certain 
“metaphysical risk” of asserting one’s freedom and a linked “temptation to flee freedom” and 
hence elide “the anguish and stress of authentically assumed existence” (SS, 10). This clearly 
poses a substantial set of barriers to disorientation. One is unlikely to disturb the normative 
ground or re-situate themselves to familiar things and relations if doing so disrupts one’s 
investment and complicity in those norms, relations, and things.  
This complicity has distinctively emotional features. Note the emotional valence of 
Beauvoir’s understanding of complicity: the complicit subject senses the necessity of the 
subordinating bond, is satisfied as Other, and seeks to avoid anguish and stress of taking the 
metaphysical risk. Complicity is itself an emotional orientation, with a subject emotionally 
invested in and orientated toward subjugating norms and relations and conditions, even as they 
may also recoil from or resent them. Shame is especially significant, for it forces a woman to 
“see herself” as society sees her – as an object – and entrenches “a generalized sense of 
inferiority” that “induce[s] docility” and investment in normative femininity (Kruks 2001, 64–
65). As Kruks argues, “Beauvoir accounts” for “how, through self-objectification and shame, 
disciplinary power is internalized” so the complicit subject “comes also to be [the] agent” of this 
power (2001, 68). The interaction between the individual body and the social world is not one of 
pure opposition but instead a multivalent and often contradictory emotional entanglement. 
Beauvoir’s account demonstrates the way that emotions may work against disorientating 




oppressive situations. It problematizes the prospects for achieving a position of wonder, or for 
disrupting one’s emotional orientations to the world; Beauvoir thus emphasizes a wide range of 
emotions at work in any discussion of something like liberation.  
Ahmed is aware of the difficulty and complexity of disorientation. Disorientation is risky 
and precarious, is not always radical, and the unsettling it implicates can cause a loss of supports 
(QP, 157–58). She is, moreover, interested in the effects of the emotion of shame: it is a “feeling 
of negation … taken on by the subject as a sign of its own failure,” “consumed by a feeling of 
badness” that involves a “turning away from” the self and a new orientation to the social world 
that functions as witness to shame (CPOE, 103–104). With Beauvoir, we are able to specify and 
expand the kinds of emotions and relationalities mitigating feminist disorientations. This is one 
reason why the concept of “disorientation” is so rich, especially when Beauvoir and Ahmed are 
read together. In addition to the meaning Ahmed is most focused on, that of breaking from a 
normative ground and instituting a new mode of common gathering, disorientation also means 
confusion, a loss of direction or clearness, and compromised awareness. For Ahmed, 
disorientation, particularly as a “bodily feeling,” can “be unsettling” as one risks becoming “lost, 
undone” (QP, 157). Indeed, Beauvoir emphasizes that a kind of safety and stability discourages 
women from challenging their situation. Any substantive contestation of this situation will 
necessarily be disorienting, across the whole range of meanings of disorientation: at the same 
time that it would disrupt the normative ground and generates potential for freer, more reciprocal 
relations, it would also entail an unsettling and challenging loss of certainty and stability.  
In this way, Beauvoir widens the necessary feminist emotions at work in disorientation. 
Given her account, we might argue that attaining a position of wonder requires first overcoming 




awareness and break from one’s complicity in deleterious norms and relations, a complicity that 
Beauvoir throws into stark relief. That is, Beauvoir provides specific articulations of how 
emotional, orientated investments in oppressive norms and structures work. Not only is shame a 
turning against the self as Ahmed demonstrates, it is, Beauvoir elucidates, a process that can 
amplify our investment in the social world that provokes such shame. There can be no single key 
feminist emotion leading to disorientation; reading Beauvoir and Ahmed together demonstrates 
the way that a panoply of emotions need to be recognized, reworked, and challenged in order for 
any sort of feminist disorientation to unfold. There must be disorientation not only of 
institutional, material, and normative conditions, but also of individual orientations to them, a 
challenge that demands tracking the emotional intricacies of normative femininity and potential 
feminist responses.  
 
Conclusion: Disorienting Beauvoir  
 
Collective and individual disorientations are the work of feminist theory and feminist 
politics. As Kruks contends, Beauvoir understands the situation of women as one where there is 
no “absolute freedom” or pure “‘inner’ subject” but a “range of choices … open as to how one 
interiorizes, assumes, and lives normalized femininity”; most women live in neither total 
immanence or transcendence, but “somewhere between, embracing various modes of complicity, 
compromise, or resistance,” a condition of ambiguity (2001, 67). Emotions circulate throughout 
this situation. One crucial task for feminism is negotiating collective responses to alter both the 
range of constraints and the modes of acting that take place within them; reading Beauvoir and 
Ahmed together highlights the need to tend to the emotional valences of these projects.11  In 
thinking about this mode of feminist politics and philosophy, my reading here seeks to provide 




that comprehends the ambiguity of the political subject (2014). In this register, Beauvoir 
provokes us to ask, what kinds of political and social actions or relationalities can induce a 
critical wonder? What changes in material conditions might be necessary for an emotional 
disorientation, and how might disorientation generate collective actions to challenge material 
conditions? What practices are necessary for challenging masculine disgust or disrupting the 
blocked feminine orientation, and what emotional circulations are at play in such opposition? 
What sorts of emotional responses are necessary to combat investments in deleterious norms and 
social formations, or to construct authentic love?  
In addition to such inquiries, further work along the lines I sketch in this chapter should 
seek to disorient Beauvoir’s own project by thinking through the emotional valences of the 
generalized default white, heterosexual, cisgendered female and male subjects of The Second Sex. 
Drawing on the work of Spelman (1988, chap. 3), Simons (2001), Marso (2014), and others on 
race and Beauvoir’s philosophy, one might ask how Beauvoir’s emotional phenomenology is 
limited in terms of racial differences, and how the emotions and orientations I have worked to 
illuminate are too universalized. What, for instance, are we to make of the emotional orientation 
of Black women in Beauvoir’s lament on the differences between the social positioning of 
women and African-Americans – and thus, what would happen when Black feminist thought 
meets Beauvoir, in the context of emotion or not? What various kinds of disgust and orientation 
are felt and constituted when different kinds of men encounter different kinds of women? How 
did Beauvoir’s intellectual relationship with Richard Wright affect, if at all, her emotional 
phenomenology? How might we situate Beauvoir’s political activism during the French war in 




Beauvoir and another important phenomenological thinker, Frantz Fanon, interact? These 
questions would bring disorientation and critical wonder to bear on Beauvoir’s own work.  
We might also take my analysis of Beauvoir on wonder and disorientation to its logical 
conclusion and explore the ways that not only is “woman” made rather than born, but to some 
extent so is gender itself. That is, pushing Beauvoir in a more wondrous and disorienting 
direction could lead one to revisit her work from the standpoint of queer theory and trans 
theory.12 The gender binary, the heterosexual couple, and the fact that all gendered subjects in 
Beauvoir’s work are presumed to be cisgendered would themselves come in for analysis and 
critique. Doing so could involve an exploration of the emotional phenomenology of processes of 
homophobia or homonationalism, it might also analyze the position on ‘radical feminists’ who 
deny the validity and possibility of transgender existence. One could further engage in more 
directed emotional readings of other situations theorized by Beauvoir, such as “The Lesbian,” to 
inquire into the emotions circulating through sexual orientation in Beauvoir’s accounts. All of 
these kinds of projects would take the insights of Beauvoir, pushing her thinking beyond its own 
limits.  
In pursuing these and related questions we must pay careful attention to the imbrication 
of emotion with the general project and specific concerns of feminist philosophy and theory. One 
modality of exploring this is the sort of encounter I have engaged in this chapter, reading 
Beauvoir’s feminist philosophy alongside Ahmed’s work on emotion. I have explored the 
emotionality of Beauvoir’s thinking, surveying ways in which Beauvoir analyzes the emotions at 
work in subjectivity, gender, critique, and liberation. I have explored some emotional strands in 
Beauvoir’s thinking, surveying ways in which Beauvoir analyzes the emotions at work in 




wonder and open new emotional relations to the world, that she creates a figure of subjectivity 
involving emotional, relational, and oriented subjects, that men and women are particular modes 
of emotionally oriented subjects and that her notion of transcendence involves an emotional and 
bodily politics of disorientation that engages difference in a freer, more reciprocal way than what 
is generally possible in gendered relations.  
Finally, this chapter suggests the need for political theory broadly understood to take on 
questions that Beauvoir prompts for politics about oppression and liberation in general as well as 
in the specific case of gender oppression. Concepts such as emotional orientation, disgust, men’s 
orientation around and toward women, wonder, and disorientation are likely to have critical 
purchase in various political realms and contexts; this is especially the case if they are brought 
together with the other conceptual resources developed in this dissertation. Beauvoir and 
Ahmed’s attunement to the emotional phenomenology of subjectivities bound up in networks of 
power has the potential to become crucial for the traditional concerns, thinkers, and texts of the 
political theory canon. Lori Marso argues that Beauvoir ought to be understood as speaking to 
the heart of political theory to offer a situated conception of freedom and the ambiguity of the 
subject’s situation, as well as a sophisticated analysis of political embodiment that challenges the 
persistent disavowal of the body in the canon (2012).13 In the theoretical work I do in this chapter, 
I draw out the particularly emotional valences of concepts that can speak back to and revisit the 











As I argued in the introduction, feeling as a method could potentially be used to read any text of 
political theory; as the preceding chapters have demonstrated, it is a mode of reading and 
theorizing that engages political thought across a range of traditions and theoretical orientations. 
This method enables one to let loose lines of flight from such texts, opening up creative 
reinterpretations, surprising connections, and new concepts to emerge from them. In this 
conclusion, I will articulate the way that one of the lines of flight is an emphasis on embodied 
political ethics.  
Making Affective Political Theory Useless for Fascism 
What is to be done with these affective and emotional lines of flight from political 
theoretical texts and concepts, whether they come from the main thinkers of this dissertation, 
other theorists and texts, or from political theory more broadly? Deleuze and Guattari insist that 
there is always the danger with lines of flight that they “turn to destruction, abolition pure and 
simple, the passion of abolition … a line of death” and that what is important is for a line of 
flight to be “connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence” (1987, 229).1 
Soon thereafter they theorize fascism as a singular example of the danger inherent to the line of 
flight, for fascism “is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of 
pure destruction and abolition,” assembling a “war machine that no longer had anything but war 
as its object” (230-31). Meanwhile, Walter Benjamin presents an injunction in the opening to his 
Artwork essay, writing that the concepts he develops therein differ from others because “they are 




formulation of revolutionary demands” (2002, 102). We might take this as a general guideline in 
doing any kind of theorizing, to make that theory completely useless for fascism.2 Reading 
Deleuze and Guattari and Benjamin together on these points poses a question for this dissertation 
along the lines of “how can one make sure that affective political theory is completely useless for 
the purposes of fascism, but instead cultivates connections for lines of flight and thus prevents 
them from transforming into lines of destruction?” In other words, affect and emotion can infuse 
fascist (or racist, or misogynist, or heterosexist, or colonial, etc.) politics just as they can more 
emancipatory kinds of politics.3   
 This project thus requires a constellation of ethical-political principles, which the rest of 
the conclusion will work to articulate. While it has been a thread running through the whole 
dissertation, here I outline how my mode of affective reading helps to uncover the kinds of 
embodied ethics at stake in the political realm. I will argue that ethics and politics are always 
implicated in each other insofar as all ethical encounters are politically organized, in response to 
critics of the so-called ‘ethical turn’ in political theory, who contend that attention to ethics is 
depoliticizing. Chris Beasley and Carol Bacchi posit the question of “what if we were to start 
from the levelling meaning” of “shared,” embodied social existence when we participate in 
“reconceiving political thinking?” (2012, 117; their emphasis). My claim is that the intensive 
encounter between affect theory and political theory can motivate an embodied political ethics 
that responds to this challenge.  
 A specific kind of conceptualization of ethics is required for such a project. Consistent 
with my mobilization of affect theory, I build on versions of ethics that emerge immanently from 
interacting materialities, rather than ones that construct universal or transcendental principles, 




ethics emphasizing “the qualitative difference” among immanent “modes of existence” and 
replacing a conception of morality “which always refers existence to transcendent values” 
(Deleuze 1988, 23). This dissents from attempts to organize behavior on the basis of moral laws 
that invoke some transcendent authority, articulating instead an ethics that unfolds from 
interactions between bodies defined by their capacity to affect and be affected. The Spinozan-
Deleuzean perspective resonates with Jane Bennett – herself an important reader of these two 
thinkers – who writes that the “ethical turn” in political theory entails an engagement with “a 
complex set of relays between moral contents, aesthetic-affective styles, and public moods” that 
are intimately connected to embodied dispositions and sensibilities, instead of “a set of doctrines” 
(2010, xii). In her work on enchantment and enchanted materialism, she outlines a 
“subdispositional attachment to the abundance of life that is deeply installed in [some human] 
bodies,” one that “provides a positive energetics from which some try to cultivate a stance of 
presumptive generosity” (2001, 158). The key move Deleuze, Spinoza, and Bennett share – 
which becomes central to my argument – is to center ethics at the level of encounters between 
dynamic, energetic bodies. It is these sorts of ethical dispositions that should orient a work such 
as mine that reads for precisely these kinds of bodies in political theory.    
Ethics of Becoming, Ethics of Vulnerability 
To assess the conditions, relations, circulations, and configuration of interacting bodies, 
in this section I engage two articulations of ethics: Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic ethics of becoming 
and affectivity and Erinn C. Gilson’s feminist ethics of vulnerability.4 For Braidotti, ethics 
involves “forces, desires, and values that act as empowering modes of being, whereas morality is 
the established sets of rules”; this is an “ethical pragmatism” that “is conceptually linked to the 




– a “faithfulness to this potentia, or the desire to become” – emphasizes “the body as an 
enfleshed field of passions or forces” and focuses on “affectivity and joy” in the “encounters and 
minglings with other bodies, entities, beings and forces” (2006, 134). As she writes:  
At the core of this ethical project is a positive vision of the subject as a radically 
immanent, intensive body, that is, an assemblage of forces or flows, intensities, and 
passions that solidify in space and consolidate in time, within the singular configuration 
commonly known as an 'individual' self. This intensive and dynamic entity is rather a 
portion of forces that is stable enough to sustain and undergo constant though non-
destructive fluxes of transformation. It is the body's degrees and levels of affectivity that 
determine the modes of differentiation (2009, 146). 
 
So, in Braidotti’s nomadic, Deleuzean-infused ethics, we focus on the intensive and affective 
body, the interplay of forces and powers between such bodies, the potential for the 
transformation of bodies, and subject-in-flux. The ethical task becomes the fostering and 
sustenance of the enhancement of individual potentia. It also becomes “turning the tide of 
negativity” as “an ethical transformative process” which “aims at achieving the freedom of 
understanding” of the boundedness and connections of bodies (2006, 134). 
 Braidotti ends her 2009 essay with the assertion that “cultivating the ethics of living 
intensely in the pursuit of change” is “a political act” (158). Braidotti insists that the “ethically 
empowering option” is what “increases one’s potentia and creates joyful energy in the process”; 
the crucial aspect of this for my account is that the “conditions which can encourage such a quest” 
for amplified power and affectivity “are not only historical, but also relational: they have to do 
with cultivating and facilitating productive encounters” (2006, 136-37). These historical and 
relational conditions that may potentially cultivate joyful encounters are where I locate politics. I 
would contend that one political impetus of Braidotti’s ethics becomes how to organize and 
structure government, economies, various kinds of flows, relations, and more in such a way as to 




them to experiment and to become. What kinds of norms can be shaped by formal and informal 
institutions in order to accomplish this? How do laws and legislation differentially position 
bodies with regards to the likelihood of affirmative encounters? How are agonistic disagreements 
to be negotiated? These kinds of issues are the political questions to ask vis-à-vis Braidotti’s 
ethics. She herself points us in this direction, avowing that because of the lifeworld that “all 
subjects share” to some extent, “there is a common ground on which to negotiate these 
encounters and their eventual conflicts” (2006, 137). The “ontological drive to become” 
necessarily “involves” what we might call traditionally political concerns: “inter-connection with 
other forces and consequently also conflicts and clashes”; the “violence” that is “part of this 
process”; the “negotiations” which “have to occur as stepping stones to sustainable flows of 
becoming”; and the “understanding of the inter-connections between the self and a multitude of 
other forces” (2006, 137-38; emphasis added). These inextricable components of the ethical flux 
direct attention to the political common grounds - the conditions, constraints, processes, norms, 
structures, regularizations, and institutions – that shape and are shaped by the encounters of 
bodies.  
 This is one area where the wide-ranging capacity of feeling as a method in political 
theory is especially helpful, creating the possibility to affectively engage other political theorists, 
in this instance for further analyzing the political considerations at work in Braidotti’s account. 
For instance, a reading of Arendt’s concept of power in “On Violence” might work with 
Braidotti’s ethics to make affective political theory useless for fascism. An interconnection with 
others manifesting an ontological drive to become – to use language from Braidotti – might 
indeed be useful for fascism, racism, colonialism, misogyny, and so on. If we read Arendt’s 




through power without collapsing power and violence, command, obedience, domination, 
strength, force, or authority into one another (135-43; 146-50), Arendt offers the following 
conceptualization:  
Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never 
the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as 
the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to 
his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name” (143; her italics).  
 
An affective reading of Arendt might pursue this from the perspective of Deleuzean-Spinozan 
affective capacity, about the way that ultimately it is bodies that come together to act in concert. 
She insists that power cannot be an individual property, resonating with contemporary 
understandings of affect that conceptualize it as exceeding the individual. Moreover, power is 
somewhat open-ended for Arendt: it is the “condition enabling a group of people to think and act” 
(150) and its legitimacy comes “from the initial getting together” – a getting together of bodies, I 
would insist – and not from “any action that may follow” (151). Affect, similarly, is an enabling 
and open-ended intensity. We could further speculate that Arendt’s concept of violence might be 
understood as a decrease in affective capacity in contrast to power as an increase in that capacity, 
for while power is generated when people come together to act in relation to one another, 
violence “can always destroy power,” for example the way that “the most effective command” 
coming “out of the barrel of a gun” can “result in the most instant and perfect obedience” rather 
than people coming together to act in common (152).5  
People may connect to embody an ontological drive to become in different ways. If it is 
to gather people together to act publicly in concert with one another in the act of creating 
something new – Indian resistance to British colonialism for Arendt (152) or an Occupy 
movement’s People’s Assembly for the contemporary condition, this manifests a power-full 




drive to become – the Soviet repression of the Prague Spring in 1968 for Arendt, or a Donald 
Trump rally in spring 2016 for us today – this constitutes the kind of violence that, as an 
affective reading of Arendt might demonstrate, ultimately amounts to a violent diminishment of 
power and affective capacity. If “an ethical life pursues that which enhances and strengthens the 
subject without reference to transcendental values, but rather in the awareness of one's 
interconnection with others” (Braidotti 2009, 149), then the political question is how to structure 
and regularize such a life. The capability of the subject to endure or to become and the 
potentiality for ethical encounters depend on political organization. Braidotti’s central question, 
found at “the core of the nomadic ethics agenda,” is that of “how can we (simultaneously?) 
increase affectivities as the capacity to invent or capture affect and look after affected bodies”; it 
is also the question of “what is the ‘cost’ of the capacity to be affected?” (2006, 143). Ultimately, 
this is a political question that must have a political answer.6 
 The other mode of ethical thought I work with is that of Erinn C. Gilson’s feminist ethics 
of vulnerability.7 Gilson’s analysis is like Braidotti’s in that her focus on the body opens up 
important questions about the nexus of the ethical and political realms, yet her understanding of 
the body differs from Braidotti, an issue I address below. For Gilson, vulnerability is “pervasive, 
fundamental, shared, and something we cannot ever entirely avoid” (2014, 2); it “refers to a 
primary and fundamental common condition” (2011, 310). She critiques common notions of 
vulnerability that limit it to negativity – as passivity, harm, hierarchy, fixity, stigma, weakness, 
dependency, and other disavowed conditions. Such conceptualizations, she argues, lead to a 
futile, ignorant, and ultimately oppressive quest for invulnerability (2011). In its place, Gilson 
elaborates a fourfold understanding of vulnerability, rendering it “in terms of potentiality (rather 




inequitable distribution and hierarchy), and a diversity of manifestations (rather than 
homogeneity)” (2014, 129).8  
Vulnerability is “a condition of openness, openness to being affected and affecting in turn” 
(2011, 310). I read this invocation of affect quite explicitly in terms of affect theory and affective 
capacity, even though that might not be what Gilson intends.9 Vulnerability’s status as a basic 
element of “the shared human condition” rests on a conception of the individual as embodied, 
such that vulnerability thus takes on concrete meanings and manifestations “only in light of the 
particularity of embodied, social experience” (311). Vulnerability in this form has critical ethical 
valence: it can become an “ethical resource” which “forms the basis for ethical obligations and 
as an experience we undergo that can compel ethical responses to others” (2014, 5). Gilson 
shares with Deleuzean-Spinozan ethics and with Braidotti’s project a commitment that ethics is 
always an immanent terrain. From this perspective, “any basis” for “making ethical claims” must 
be “internal to human life and experience”; it emerges from both “specific instances of 
vulnerability” as well as from “vulnerability as a common condition” (11). In this sense, 
“vulnerability forms the basis for any ethics whatsoever,” and “ethical action” takes the shape of 
“preserving vulnerability” as a basic condition of human embodiment and existence, 
“condemn[ing] the myriad ways” vulnerability “is exploited,” and “encourag[ing] the cultivation 
of forms of vulnerability that enhance shared social life” (11-12). 
Gilson insists on the imbrication of ethics and politics in her work: ethics, she claims, is a 
“space of political contestation” and always embedded in “a broader political, socioeconomic, 
and historical context” that frames the ethical evaluations of “choices and actions” (10). We 
should, though, further specify what politics consists of in her account. My claim is that the 




First, it plays a substantial role is shaping the disposition of individual subjects in relation to 
vulnerability and invulnerability. It can cultivate a receptive disposition to vulnerability or can 
encourage and reproduce the misapprehension of invulnerability, as a disavowal of vulnerability 
and assumption that vulnerability is always something negative. As she notes, “a certain kind of 
subjectivity privileged in capitalist socioeconomic systems” – the “arrogantly self-sufficient, 
independent, invulnerable master subject” – motivates the “denial of vulnerability” (76); 
invulnerability as “a form of mastery” is “sought because it is the paradigmatic characteristic of 
an ideal form of subjectivity in present socioeconomic conditions” (79). A background condition 
of this dynamic is, of course, the autonomous sovereign subjectivity presumed by and 
rearticulated within some varieties of liberal political theory. Political institutions, ideologies, 
norms, and so on will shape the relationship that subjects have to vulnerability and 
invulnerability.  
The second aspect of the political constitution of vulnerability relates to one of the 
qualities of Gilson’s definition of vulnerability – the way it “is manifest in a diversity of forms 
and kinds of experiences” (140). Drawing on Deleuze, she argues that univocity proves to be a 
fundamental characteristic of vulnerability such that “all are equally vulnerable” in terms of 
“open[ness] to being affected and affecting,” yet “it is quite clear that it is not actualized for all 
equally or in the same way” (137). Numerous kinds of “processes of differentiation that are 
formative of human subjects,” “patterns of affection,” “social positioning,” work to “constitute 
us as differentially vulnerable”; these “situate individuals and groups in ways that make them 
vulnerable to varying extents and in varying ways” (137). This diversity of manifestations of 
vulnerability results from political processes: institutional and bureaucratic workings, legislation, 




organization of the economy, and so on all work to differentially distribute the actualization of 
the fundamentally equal potential vulnerability of bodies.  
At first glance, Gilson and Braidotti are two thinkers who appear to be at odds with one 
another: vulnerability seems to tarry with the negative too much for Braidotti’s emphasis on 
affirmation. Indeed, one of Braidotti’s essays from which I most draw is entitled “Affirmation 
versus Vulnerability” (2009), where she contends that we need an “affirmative [ethical] project 
that stresses positivity and not mourning” (145).10 I think, however, that Braidotti too quickly 
discounts vulnerability in general, and that Gilson offers a model of vulnerability through which 
vulnerability and Bradotti’s affirmative ethics of becoming can reciprocally enhance one another. 
They share, to varying extents, several components that begin to draw them together: both work 
with Deleuze; each attends to embodiment and to affect – at least in my reading of Gilson; and 
they similarly insist on the open, relational subject-body against the bounded, autonomous liberal 
subject. I would argue that Braidotti underestimates the power and affective force of 
vulnerability and that Gilson moves vulnerability in a more affirmative direction. Gilson 
demonstrates how proceeding from vulnerability can generate a philosophy of becoming – and in 
doing so engages a similar Deleuzean notion of becoming as Braidotti. For Gilson, because 
becoming “requires openness to unknown others, uncontrollable and unpredictable change, it 
rests upon vulnerability”; in addition to “presuppos[ing] the openness of vulnerability, becoming 
comprises the “positive forms that vulnerability can take” (2014, 139).11  
Central to Gilson’s work is her assertion that vulnerability cannot be understood in the 
register of the negative if it is to have any ethical generativity; she consistently critiques 
conceptions of vulnerability as harm, dependency, violence, weakness, and so on. While she 




or negated, Gilson renders the concept more open to the kind of affirmative ethics that Braidotti 
articulates. I would further argue that there is indeed room for some kind of vulnerability in 
Braidotti’s project: she notes that “the knowledge about vulnerability, and pain” is “actually 
useful” for it “forces one to think about the actual material conditions of being interconnected 
and thus being in the world” (2009, 156). This attention to interconnection characterizes Gilson’s 
conceptualization of vulnerability, only she enables a more affirmative reading of the concept 
than Braidotti’s work allows for. Taken together, they elaborate an embodied and affective 
ethical trajectory, one I find especially crucial for the kind of ethics connected to affective 
political theory.  
 
The Political Organization of Ethical Encounters 
One axiomatic definition of politics in American political science is that it governs the 
processes that determine who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell 1936); another classic 
understanding is that politics involves the authoritative allocation of values in a given society 
(Easton 1965, 21). My claim, grounded in my readings of Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminists, and 
Beauvoir – as well as in the work of the ethical theories in this conclusion – is that even if one 
accepts these most traditional definitions of politics in American political science, then ethics, 
affect and emotion, and the body are all at play. Both mid-twentieth century American political 
scientists characterize politics as a mode of distribution: for Lasswell, the “getting” in terms of 
recipient, thing-to-be-distributed, time of distribution, and process(es) of distribution; for Easton, 
the allocation of values. In these accounts, politics produces effects through processes of 
organizing and systematizing.   
While I am not myself tied to Lasswell’s or Easton’s formulation, I mark them here to 




politics, and most of all to push them in directions that I very much suspect their originators 
would resist. I venture that even these most traditional conceptions of “politics” can be read 
affectively and ethically. Given the kind of ethics – immanent, embodied, interactive – that I 
work with, I argue that insofar as ethics involves encounters between dynamic bodies, the 
patterned organization of these contacts marks one imbrication of the political and the ethical. 
That is, a fundamental component of politics is the organization of embodied ethical encounters, 
the regularized conditions under which bodies affect and are affected by one another. In Easton’s 
terminology, the “values” that politics “allocates” become those that shape these encounters – for 
example, they could be values encouraging ethical generosity such as those taken up by Bennett 
(2001) or Connolly (1999). In Lasswell’s definition, the ‘who’ becomes a collection of bodies, 
the ‘what’ coverts into the conditions of ethical interaction, and the ‘how’ is the structuring of 
those conditions. A directive to organize a maximum of joyful encounters so that bodies interact 
in ways that mutually increase affective capacity flows from affect theory and Spinozan-
Deleuzean ethics. This imperative, I contend, is political. Ethics cannot be severed from its 
political and affective organization, and politics cannot be divested of the embodied ethical 
encounters of the bodies that constitute and are constituted by it. 
Braidotti and Gilson can help orient my claim about the political organization of ethical 
encounters. Braidotti’s project demands engagement with the authoritative allocation of (ethical) 
values, to twist Easton in an affective-ethical definition. Appropriating Lasswell, Braidotti 
prompts us to think through who (which bodies) are going to get what (resources, capabilities, 
relations, ethical possibilities) when and how (in a structured and consistent way? in a way that 
discourages ethical encounters?). The language Gilson uses to think through the transformation 




language – constitution, differentiation, situating, positioning, manifesting – resonates with the 
language of allocation, organization, and distribution from the classical definitions of “politics.” 
As Easton could ask, how are values cultivating vulnerability or encouraging invulnerability 
allocated? And as Lasswell could question, who gets vulnerability distributed to them or away 
from them, and how does this transpire? Once one moves to think through the operations of 
(in)vulnerability and ethics in society, they come to ask questions about politics – questions an 
affective political theory is especially well-situated to explore.   
One task of political theory becomes to trace the political organization of ethical 
encounters between affective, intensive, vulnerable bodies in their becomings and relations. 
Ethical values – of vulnerability and invulnerability, experimentation and endurance, affect, and 
more – must be allocated. We must work out who (which bodies) get what (becoming, 
responsiveness, openness), when and how (opportunities, inducements, cultivation, 
discouragement). Engaging ethical inquiry and practice as Gilson and Braidotti do necessarily 
implicates such political questions. Furthermore, when one asks a question such as ‘what 
legitimates a mode of governance’ or ‘how should a society its economy,’ one is always also 
asking about the kinds of ethical encounters between bodies that will be cultivated and 
encouraged and those that will be delimited and constrained.12 Ultimately, an embodied political 
ethics places its emphasis on how to regularize and organize joyful encounters, the 
transformation of negative affects, sustainable experimentation toward becoming, cultivation of 
and responsiveness to vulnerability, and an openness to ethical transformation. 
As John Tambornino writes, “seldom are our embodied selves congruent with the moral 
and political order in which we find ourselves, yet we strive for such congruence”; individuals 




they are subject” and  “respond to the incongruence” through some combination of “altering their 
bodies to better align with the order” and/or “challenging the order to better align it with their 
bodies” (2002, 41–42). This is also a matter of the political organization of ethical encounters 
relating to how a political order is going to respond to ethical and bodily incongruences. 
Tambornino also notes that we need reflective political theory that makes the body prominent in 
order to think through “ethical sensibilities and social arrangements” (42). My contention is that 
affect theory, Braidotti, and Gilson – especially when assembled together – offer important 
resources for such a political theoretical project. My account opens up modes of interrogating 
bodily-social incongruences, the forces at work in creating and maintaining them, and what 
ethical transformation of them might entail. An affective political theory can pursue these issues 
at the nexus of political theory and embodied ethics. 
 
The Limits of Affective Political Theory 
 
There are certain limitations to insisting on a formulation like ‘organize joyful encounters 
and the increase of affective capacity’ as a political and ethical paradigm. One is that making 
Deleuze’s Spinoza a sort of normative ground to some extent runs counter to Deleuze’s 
immanent perspective and his critique of Kant. His more categorical formulations, such as those 
at the end of the shorter of his books on Spinoza about increasing affective capacity (1988, chap. 
6) might even be read as an ironic recasting of something like Kant’s categorical imperative.13 A 
second and related problem is that a principle like ‘organize reciprocal joyful encounters’ or 
‘increase affective capacity’ may function as mostly empty maxims. They can leave open 
questions about which bodies are and are not included under its aegis, how bodies are to come 
together and organize to effect an amplification of affective capacity, what does and does not 




social contract but forced to be happy in the republic of joyful affects, or if solitariness or 
placidity or kinds of sadness (in the colloquial, not Spinozan sense) could count as an increase in 
affective capacity.     
One implication of these tensions is that the political and ethical actions affective 
political theory points to are experimental and provisional. In interpreting Deleuze and Guattari’s 
passage on how to make one’s self a body without organs – or, in political terms, “how does one, 
as a political actor, maximize joy and minimize sadness?” – Nicholas Tampio counsels thinking 
of Deleuze’s “practical rules” more as “ ‘counsels of prudence,’ given the various landscapes we 
each inhabit” rather than as categorical imperatives “which apply unconditionally” (Tampio 
2015, 14–15; internal quotations are to Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals). 
Tampio argues that on the one hand “Deleuze [and Guattari] clearly presses us to test out (Latin 
experiri) new possibilities of life,” and on the other hand their “advice to ‘keep a small plot of 
new land at all times’ indicates that we should not gamble everything at once in our experiments” 
(15; internal quotations are to Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 161). If one directive from this 
dissertation is to think more fully about how to organize a maximum of joyful encounters so that 
bodies interact in ways that mutually increase affective capacities, and if that directive risks 
being too categorical and/or empty, then maintaining some level of caution in one’s political and 
ethical experimentation becomes a crucial limit on the project’s reach. Moreover, engaging the 
imbrication of ethics and politics can help mitigate the possible emptiness of the directive. A 
focus on the necessity for political organization and structure compels one to provide some 
content – about institutions, policies, groups of bodies, values, and so on – for the axiom to 
cultivate joyful encounters or reciprocal increases of affective capacity. The multivalent interplay 




shortcomings in one another: the affective urgency for ethical experimentation and joyful 
encounters can provide a critical perspective on the political status quo and push that status quo 
beyond its limits, while traditionally political concerns can impart concreteness and content to 
the ambitious yet ambiguous axiom to increase affective capacity.        
A further complication of the project of the dissertation is the limits to ethical thinking in 
political theory identified by critiques of the “ethical turn.” Here, I want to briefly engage one 
prominent critic of this turn in political theory and political philosophy, Jacques Rancière.14 His 
position might be categorized into two linked claims. The first is that in the ethical turn, “the 
political community … tends to be transformed into an ethical community” in which “everyone 
is supposed to be counted” such that “there is no status for the excluded in the structuration of 
the community” (2010a, 189). The second is that the ontologization and affirmation of difference 
associated with the ethical turn becomes a “radical ethical indistinction” that collapses into “pure 
consent” and consensual politics (2010b, 217).15  
I would argue that even though an affective political ethics does indeed involve some (or 
even a great deal) of overlapping of “the political community” and “the ethical community,” this 
does not necessarily erase the “status of the excluded” as Rancière claims (2010a, 189). Rather, 
such an ethics can find its impetus from the excluded, for example in Braidotti’s claim that 
because “the center” is “dead and empty of active force,” it “is on the margins that the processes 
of becoming can be initiated” (2009, 157). The ethico-political questions affective political ethics 
asks can and should center the status of the excluded: who are those excluded from ethical 
experimentation and becoming? Who receives a differentially high distribution of vulnerability, 
and is not responded to in their vulnerability? How can political institutions, aesthetics, norms, 




to being affected and affecting? Claims for ethical-political transformation in an affective 
political theory can start from those positioned as the Rancièrean “part of those who have no part” 
(cf. Rancière 2001), as my readings of Marx, Marxist feminism, and Beauvoir are locate energy 
and agency necessary for transformative work in those excluded in some (but not all) ways.  
Affective readings of other theorists as an extension of this current project would be 
important here as well, for instance Frantz Fanon’s emphasis on the political affectivity of racist 
colonial domination and anticolonial struggle. To identify just one example from Fanon’s work, 
an affective reading might consider the way that he describes how colonial violence sediments in 
and through the body, such as his discussion of “psychosomatic disorders” in The Wretched of 
the Earth (2004, 216–19).16 In general, Fanon writes, “there is a pathology of the entire 
atmosphere in Algeria” and “the organism can respond” or “adapt” to the conflict’s atmosphere 
in a limited number of ways; more specifically, “the war in Algeria has created its contingent of 
cortico-visceral illnesses” (216-17). We might think of this in affective terms, where the 
atmosphere is a particular kind of (violent, oppressive, colonial) affective economy, and certain 
affects and emotions stick to and sediment on the bodies of those in the atmosphere, producing 
particular corporeal responses. Fanon observes a phenomenon distinct to the “colonial war in 
Algeria,” a “systemic muscular contraction” of the colonized subject: “This contraction … [is] a 
postural concurrence and evidence in the colonized muscles of their rigidity, their reticence and 
refusal in the face of the colonial authorities” (217). Here, a nexus of political and social forces 
concentrate in the body as the colonized body channels a concatenation of colonial violence, 
racism, resistance by the colonized, war, the psychic and material ravages of everyday life, and 




Importantly, Fanon’s work also involves articulating the material valences of resistance 
to colonialism. As part of “fight[ing] in order to put an end to domination,” the colonized subject 
struggles to “ensure that all the untruths planted within him by the oppressor are eliminated” 
(233; emphasis added). The white supremacist tropes circulated in the colonial affective 
economy and stuck to colonized bodies must be worked through and expelled. Ultimately, “the 
national struggle appears to have channeled all this anger and nationalized every affective and 
emotional reaction” (230). In the context of this conclusion, we might also read this as an ethical 
project having to do with the affectivity and emotionality of the bodies of the colonized. Fanon 
thus demonstrates the way that ethical attention to bodies should start from the position of the 
excluded, those who constitute the part who have no part. They have a political and ethical claim 
that can motivate radical political theorizing. More broadly, the political organization of ethical 
encounters – which bodies have access to becomings, responsiveness to vulnerability and in what 
ways – is in part a matter of interrogating ethico-political exclusions. 
As to Rancière’s second concern – that the ontologization and affirmation of difference 
collapses into ethical indistinction and consensus-oriented politics – I would argue that there is 
nothing inevitable about that collapse, and more importantly that the kind of affective political 
theory I have offered may be resistant to consensual politics. For Braidotti, it is only difference 
that can impel ethical experimentation, and she is wary of the danger of collapsing into 
homogeneity and indistinction that would sap the energy for becoming. Linking difference to the 
excluded, Braidotti argues that “only those who have been hurt are in a position” to “make a 
positive difference”: they become the source of “productive difference” that is not sublated into 
sameness or indistinction but provides the energy for ethical transformation (2009, 156-57). 




to avoid this problem, insisting that even if vulnerability is on some level univocal, there is 
always “a diversity of manifestations,” “rather than homogeneity” (2014, 129). Rancière may be 
correct that certain trajectories of the ethical turn collapse into indistinction, but there is nothing 
necessary about such a reduction, and I suggest that political-ethical theorizing will be generative 
to the extent that it is propelled by difference. Attention to embodiment and to affect can provide 
a crucial resource for working against the erasure of exclusion or collapse into indistinction. 
Affect can enable one to more clearly trace exclusions and operations of power in their effects on 
bodies in the way it emphasizes force, capacity, debility, race, gender, colonial violence, bodily 
changes, and more; an affective reading of Fanon would be generative here as well.18  
Even with these considerations in response to Rancière, the critique of the ethical turn 
and its implications persist in a way that places limits on affective political ethics. As Bonnie 
Honig argues, political theoretical attempts to ethically ontologize some dimension of existence 
always have costs, which often take the form of reinscribing some form of humanism and/or of 
obscuring the agonism and struggle fundamental to politics (2013, chap. 1). I think that a focus 
on affect and emotion can mitigate against these risks to some extent – by focusing on capacity 
and generativity, by exploring how oppression and power operate through these embodied modes, 
and so on – but these limits persist, and in the end ethics alone cannot be a panacea for political 
theory, affective or not.  
This question of agonism – or the lack thereof – in political theory’s ethical turn brings 
me to a further limitation of this project, its focus on theorizing the emotional and affective 
conditions of individuals bodies rather than on the collective encounters of bodies coming 
together for political activity. One finds collective moments in all of the thinkers I engage: 




Marxist feminism’s variety of social movements and activism, Beauvoir’s lament at the lack of 
collectivity among women and later personal participation in various movements. Bridging affect 
theory with social, collective, and democratic concerns is crucial if affective political theory is to 
fully engage political life, and future work with feeling as a method in political theory should 
focus on these and other collective encounters, not only on individual bodies enmeshed in flows 
of affect and circulations of emotions as I have primarily done in this project. Doing might also 
rethink the Spinozan category of “joyful encounters” to include the complex and conflicted 
emotional and affective life of collective political activity. 
Judith Butler (2015) and Deborah Gould (2009) – the latter working with strands of affect 
theory – have insightfully explored the politics of bodies coming together to assemble and 
protest. Analysis along the lines of this current project needs to engage and build on these works; 
it could also explore what an affective reading of Arendt on natality, action and the public would 
entail. This aspect of affective political theorizing is especially important for mitigating the 
possible obscuring of political agonism in a turn to affect and ethics, as focusing on moments of 
collective political action would ensure attention to modes of dissensus and areas of contestation. 
Such work could animate democratic theory in addition to addressing the limitations of my own 
project in this dissertation by exploring the affective register of bodies coming together to 
deliberate and work out differences, to act in concert, to resist and dissent, and more. Whether 
democracy is understood procedurally, deliberatively, agonistically, or in other registers, 
ultimately bodies are at stake, in ways that traditional democratic theory often misses. Ultimately, 
the potentiality of an affective political theory lies in its own openness to affecting and being 
affected, to becoming, and to ethical transformation, including being affected by and responding 





Affective Political Theory and Embodied Political Ethics 
 
 Even with these limitations, one of the crucial promises of affective political theory is the 
possibility to weave together political theory, affect theory, and embodied ethics in order to 
contribute to a political ethics of the body. Beasley and Bacchi argue for conceptualizing 
embodiment “as formed and located within a political sociality” and “operat[ing] as an arena of 
epistemological investigation, political metaphor, method and democratic political vision” (2007, 
287–88). The “political implications” of such an approach to the body “invoke an 
acknowledgement of interconnection and mutual reliance” (289). One of the lines of flight let 
loose from political theory in this project is this kind of investigation, exploring different 
affective currents and emotional circulations at work on and through bodies located within 
political sociality. Affective readings of Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminism, and Beauvoir have, to 
take just a few examples, analyzed ways of conceiving of the political body, how and why bodies 
form political entities, modes of economic and gendered power bodies affect and are affected by, 
and much more. I have thus sought to elaborate one way a political theory focused on 
embodiment might unfold, deploying affect theory as a method to re-read political thinkers and 
to reimagine what political theory can do.  
 Doing so illustrates the way that ethics – especially when conceived as immanent and 
embodied – are politically organized, and the way that politics always has inextricable ethical 
valences. This applies, as I have sought to demonstrate in the conclusion, even to the most 
traditional definitions of ‘the political’: if politics is the allocation of values (Easton), these 
include ethical values; if politics is about who gets what, when and how (Lasswell), this entails 
which bodies get opportunities for ethical connection and transformation. “A political ethic of 




“interconnection” between bodies “as the basis of a democratic sociality” and of “the sorts of 
institutional arrangements necessary to acknowledge” embodied sociopolitical existence (2007, 
292). The kind of political theory I engage in must elucidate what forms this interconnection 
takes and how it can be responded to, what this democratic sociality might involve, why and how 
institutions need to undergo ethico-political change, how to affirm embodied existence and 
becomings, and more.19  
To conclude, I want to return to one of the motivations for this project laid out in the 
introduction: Connolly’s notion of doing “positive ontopolitical interpretation” where “the idea is 
to interpret actively, specifically, and comparatively” by “project[ing] ontopolitical assumptions 
explicitly into detailed interpretations” (1995, 36–37). One does this in order to: “offer 
affirmative interpretations and positive ideals”; “jostle the sense of closure … governing 
interpretations” by “introducing them as contestable”; and attempt to answer the question of how 
new alternatives emerge, among other things (36-38). This dissertation can be productively 
understood as one version of positive ontopolitical interpretation. I have practiced feeling as a 
method, projecting affect, emotion, and the body into political theoretical texts, generating 
affirmative interpretations of Hobbes, Marx, Marxist feminists, and Beauvoir and the positive 
ideal of contributing to a political ethics of embodiment. In the conclusion, I have worked to 
recognize contestations and resist closure by noting future lines of inquiry to affective political 
theorizing. I have insisted throughout that attention to affect and emotion is an especially 
generative way to examine how alternatives emerge – alternative methods, concepts, and 
interpretations for doing political theory and engaging political life.  
Ultimately, this project has examined the way that affect theory enables one to explore 




bodies. In analyzing each of the thinkers in this study, I have demonstrated that affect and 
emotion are crucial theoretical tools for rereading and reconstructing the political theory canon, 
gathering together a subterranean20 thread of affective political theorizing. Assembling my 
thinkers together can induce one to more deeply consider the ways that politics is always about 
the systematic patterning of ethical encounters, and that questions of ethics are also questions 
about politics. I want to somewhat programmatically outline what these thinkers collectively tell 
us about the political organization of bodies, as a way to lay out the overall “affirmative 
interpretations and positive ideals” (Connolly 1995, 37) my own project has generated.  
The human subject21 of politics is concrete, material, and embodied rather than ideal, 
abstract, and disembodied. The body in politics can be productively conceptualized as 
constituted through concatenations of specific embodied and/or phenomenological processes 
(Hobbes, Beauvoir), flows of affective intensity (Spinoza, Deleuze, Hobbes, Marx, Marxist 
feminists), and circulations of emotion (Ahmed, Hobbes, Beauvoir) that construct and are 
constructed by the material environments in which they act and are acted upon. As dynamic 
matter, bodies constantly interact with other materialities, generating affective economies and 
fluctuating affective capacities. Relations and forces of power structure all of this interaction, 
whether they are those emerging from a lack of formal political entity or the institutions of the 
state (Hobbes), from capitalist sociopolitical and economic relations (Marx), from the 
imbrication of capitalist and patriarchal forces (Marxist feminists), or from a particular kind of 
emotional phenomenology (Beauvoir). Often, these organize bodies in oppressive ways, 
eradicating the potentiality of ethical interaction or collective political force as a result of the 
kind of affective economy present in the state of nature, the tension of capitalist affect, a 




However, modes of political-social-economic-ethical alternatives can be articulated on 
the same theoretical/political plane, even as they may take different forms: connecting bodies 
together to form a government; radical upheaval leading to the elaboration of a society of 
communist affect; a movement toward freedom as one dismantles intertwined capitalist and 
patriarchal power; a disorientation from the gender – and other – norms, orientations, and 
organizations of power toward a more emancipated alternative. They reimagine the regularized 
processes, norms, institutions, and relations through which bodies interact and change, in order 
to cultivate political, social and economic assemblages that could ethically respond to 
vulnerability rather than differentially (and oppressively) actualize it. The blockage of becomings 
would be replaced by an allocation of values and resources for ethical and affective 
experimentation. Intensive, affective, vulnerable bodies (Lasswell’s ‘who’) get opportunities for 
becomings (his ‘what’). A condition of possibility for the actualization of ethical bodily 
potentiality is an organization of liberated, relational, amplifying flows and interactions of 
affective capacity and emotional circulations. Along the way of exploring these, I have 
rearticulated concepts central to the study of political theory – subjectivity, the state of nature, 
social contract, power, historical materialism, consciousness, nature, capitalism, oppression, 
patriarchy, the social, social reproduction, phenomenology, ambiguity, freedom, and ultimately 
political theory itself – in the register of emotion and affect. Through the method and concepts 
that I have developed we are able to identify, think through, ask questions of, and re-envision all 





















1 Videos of the protest are abundant online, for example https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oV-
ZSP0zAuI  
2 Feeling is a term I will use to collectively refer to affect and emotion; I discuss my use of and the 
theoretical background behind “affect,” “emotion,” and “feeling” below.  
3 As Jason Frank notes, affect “plays a crucial though often neglected role in our understanding of the 
political culture of a given time or place” (2010, 78). I would expand Frank’s point to argue that also 
plays a crucial yet neglected role in understanding how political theoretical texts travel from their time 
and place and circulate today. Thanks to B Lee Aultman for pointing me to this passage from Frank.  
4 For a different example, see for instance the way that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank take up 
Silvan Tomkins’s theory of affects (2003). For a “snapshot” of different “orientations” to affect, see 
Gregg and Seigworth’s introduction to their Affect Theory Reader (2010, especially 6–9). 
5 One of the background commitments here is to be self-conscious and explicit about my methodology. 
As Leopold and Stears argue, the question is not so much whether doing political theory has a 
method/approach or not, but whether one thinks about it or “carr[ies] on unreflectively” (2008, 2). All of 
us necessarily approach the texts and concepts with which we work from a particular orientation, and here 
I desire to make my own approach explicit. It is important to note that feeling as method explicitly 
implicates the reader, and not only the texts, theories, and concepts. I am the embodied, material, 
emotional, affective, living political theorist engaging with the texts. Just as there are affective economies 
at work in the texts, I am myself one node in an affective economy that also involves the texts, political 
theory as a discipline, previous interpretations of the thinkers I study. The texts work on me as I work on 
and with and through them; I have my own emotional and affective responses. Any “critical interpretation” 
necessarily involves “implicit projections” that “exceed [our] explicit formulation of them”, and because 
this “condition/limit of reflection is unlikely to be eliminated” one of our tasks becomes to “convert” this 
“into spurs to productive thinking” (Connolly 1995, 36–38). I am struck by and feel connected to my 
thinkers, they resonate with me: this is a necessary (but far from sufficient) condition for spurring 
productive thinking that investigates what a body can do or what affective political theory can do. Of 
course, the essential question is how to ensure my interpretations and theoretical work are not so 
individuated that they are unable to themselves circulate in the discourses and affective economies of 
political theory and other fields. Part of mitigating that possibility is being candid from the start about my 
own implication in feeling as method – in the way that anyone engaging in this or a similar method is 
necessarily implicated. It is also important to consider this as an invitation for a productive exchange 
between you the reader, the text that is this dissertation’s own interpretations and affective production, 
and the political theoretical texts it examines. Also important is the way I remain very close to the texts as 
they move, produce effects and affects, create concepts, surprise, connect to other texts and concepts, and 
more. In order to allow my own projections to lead to productive thinking, I work to move with and 
document texts in a rigorous way even as feeling as a method opens them to new potentialities. Thanks to 
conversations with Sara Rushing and with B Lee Aultman for helping me think through this particular 
quality of the project. 
6 This distinction draws on Melanie Klein’s psychoanalytic theory to understand reparative and paranoid 
as positions: they are “changing and heterogeneous relational stances” instead of ideologies or personality 
types (Sedgwick 2003b, 128). Importantly for me, Sedgwick emphasizes throughout the essay that 





                                                                                                                                                       
7 A reading practice where “the most salient preposition” is beside is opposed to reading practices 
focusing on “depth” and “hiddenness” in which the objective is to determine what is going on beneath, 
behind, or beyond a text or set of texts (2003a, 8).  
8 To be somewhat more specific about it, focusing solely or primarily on ‘is X affective’ might preclude 
something like Jane Bennett’s superb exploration of Kant’s “subterranean theory of moral motivation, a 
Kantian picture of the affects of ethics” (2001, 134). Because Kant overtly and “officially resists any 
association between … moral law and will … [and] somatic affects and material effects” (135), it would 
be easy to dismiss him as superficially not affective or emotional, and thus miss the opportunity to 
creatively engage him in the way that Bennett does. For myself, in the conclusion I very briefly sketch 
what an affective reading of Arendt might entail, even though many have criticized her for attempt to 
“purify” the body from the political realm (Connolly 1999, chap. 7). I would also be interested in what an 
affective reading of someone like John Rawls would produce.  
9 On multiplicity, see Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 8; 31-38; 482-485. Haecceities “consist entirely of 
relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 261); in my project, affective and emotional transmissions are a kind of 
haecceity traversing theoretical texts that my methodology enables us to engage in a way that other 
political theory approaches may not.  
10 For a discussion of lines of molar segmentarity, lines of molecular segmentarity, and lines of flight, see 
Deleuze and Guattari’s “Three Novellas, or ‘What Happened?’” (1987, chap. 8) and “Micropolitics and 
Segmentarity” (chap. 9).  
11 See Deleuze and Guattari (1994, chap. 2) on the general notion of the plane, the “plane of immanence 
of concepts” (35).  The history of philosophy involves a multiplicity of planes, and Deleuze and Guattari 
trace some of these planes in Western philosophy, including their overlaps, connections, and disjunctions 
(50-58). 
12 Such a project extends Roberto Esposito’s claim that Nietzsche’s “originality … resides in the 
transferal of the relation between state and body from the classical level of analogy or metaphor, in which 
the ancient and modern tradition positions it, to that of an effectual reality: no politics exists other than 
that of bodies, conducted on bodies, through bodies” (2008, 84; his emphasis). My project deploys affect 
theory as a method of taking seriously and interrogating the implications of understanding politics to be 
about bodies in effectual reality. 
13 Of course, this method does not preclude or presume to replace more contextual, historically-grounded 
readings or readings that work through thinkers in terms of a more unified analytical concern.  
14 Additionally, as Sedgwick claims, the “desire of a reparative impulse” is “additive and accretive” 
(2003b, 149). My accretive desire in this project is to read across different historical and theoretical 
contexts and traditions. Here, I also draw on the way Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s idea of 
“reconstellation,” as she constructs her project as in part “to attempt to persuade through the discontinuity 
of odd connections or reconstellation” (1999, 65). She notes both Marx (90) and Deleuze and Guattari 
(107) to be engaged in kinds of reconstellation in their work. 
15 Thanks to Nicholas Tampio for pointing me to Tambornino’s book.  
16 They do, though, set up exclusionary schemas in various ways, as I discuss throughout.  
17 Thanks to Corey Robin for highlighting this passage from Wolin.  
 
Chapter 1 
1 For my citations in this chapter, I will provide the chapter number in the referenced text and the page 
numbers in: Hobbes 1996 for Leviathan, Hobbes 2008 for Elements of Law Natural and Politic, and 
Hobbes 1839 for De Corpore. De Corpore, gets its common title from the title of the original Latin work 
by Hobbes (Elementorum philosophiae sectio prima De corpore, 1655), while the English version has the 
title “Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning Body.” Hobbes provides a similar 
formulation to this quote in Leviathan, XXXIV: 270: “For the Universe, being the Aggregate of all 




                                                                                                                                                       
part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe.” Hobbes goes to great lengths in multiple works to 
demonstrate that something like an “incorporeall substance” is an “absurdity” (EL, XI: 65-6; L IV: 30; L 
V: 33-35; L XLVI: 465). As Shapin and Schaffer note, because Hobbes “Hobbes endeavoured to show 
the absurdity of an ontology that posited incorporeal substances and immaterial spirits … he built a 
plenist ontology, and, in the process, erected a materialistic theory of knowledge in which the foundations 
of knowledge were notions of causes, and those causes were matter and motion” (1985, 19) Notably, in 
early 1641 he “began a heated exchange with Descartes on mechanics and optics,” arguing that the 
“Cartesian notion of an incorporeal substance” was one of these absurdities, and that Descartes offered a 
“false definition of ‘body’” in his natural philosophy (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, 84). Below I more fully 
discuss the ways that Hobbes articulates a radically different ontology than Cartesianism, especially 
Cartesian dualism. 
2 For an excellent discussion of the inextricability of Hobbes’s materialist ontology and epistemology, 
political philosophy, natural philosophy, scientific worldview, and religious concerns, see Shapin and 
Schaffer (1985). As they emphasize, for Hobbes any distinction between science, philosophy, politics, 
and religion is artificial and destructive to the pursuit of knowledge: “For Hobbes, the activity of the 
philosopher was not bounded: there was no cultural space where knowledge could be had where the 
philosopher should not go. The methods of the natural philosopher were, in crucial respects, identical to 
those of the civic philosopher” (337). There is, in their view a “unity of those concerns” understood as 
“ethical, political, psychological, and metaphysical” with “philosophy of nature” in Hobbes, one that too 
often is “dismissed from consideration” of his thinking (8). Petchesky (1987) reads Hobbes’s materialism 
as in part a (gendered) response to the “epistemological explosion” (8) – one bringing the living body to 
the forefront – of 16th and 17th century Europe that encompasses and connects religion, political thinking, 
and science as well as ruptures hegemonic unities in and across these spheres. Consequently, Hobbes 
involved himself in a number of furious debates that link together these spheres, such as: the proper 
relationship between organized religion, the state, and social order (L, XLII; cf. Shapin and Schaffer 1985, 
chap. 3); the metaphysical status of the soul, spirits, angels, eternal life, etc. (L, XXXIV, XXXVIII, 
XLVI-XLVII; cf. Overhoff 2000, especially chap. 5 and chap. 6); mortalism (cf. Petchesky 1987); the 
emerging experimental form of life (most associated with Boyle) and its metaphysical, epistemological, 
religious and political effects (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, especially chap. 4), and so on. On the general 
historical, scientific, and philosophical context of Hobbes’s materialism, see Tuck (1993, chap. 7) and 
Kargon (1966, chap. 6). Watkins (1965) also argues for the need to read Hobbes’s “civic philosophy” in 
terms of his natural philosophy, although I sharply diverge from Watkins in his evaluation of Hobbes’s 
materialism as overly deterministic and mechanistic such that it cannot account for human complexity. 
3 For those understanding Hobbes as a crude mechanistic materialist, cf. Watkins 1965; Peters 1967; 
Sorell 1986; for a reading of Hobbes as elaborating a game-theoretical logic, cf. Hampton 1986.  
4 For accounts that compare the two in different ways, see for example: James on thought, passion, and 
action (1997, chap. 6); Steinberg on the right of nature and obligation (2013, 2.1–2.2); and Curley on 
power, right, and natural law (1991). We know that there are historical connections between Hobbes and 
Spinoza. Spinoza definitely read De Cive – which influenced his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus – and 
might have read Leviathan (Sacksteder 1980), Spinoza’s arguments in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 
are in part addressed to conceptions of “right” influenced by Grotius and Hobbes (Curley 1991, 103–105), 
and he was generally influenced by Dutch Hobbesians (Steinberg 2013, sec. 1.2). Hobbes and Spinoza 
shared a commitment to plenism in the seventeenth century natural philosophy debates between the 
“plenists” and the “vacuuists,” and a related critique of the emerging experimental epistemology and form 
of intellectual life (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, 253–254). Both are also sharp critics of Cartesian mind-
body dualism as well as Aristotelian Scholasticism (James 1997, chap. 6). Spinoza also dissented from 
Boyle, and in doing so linked Boyle and Descartes (Deleuze 1990, 228). 
5 Thanks to Lindsey Whitmore for encouraging me to think about the ways that Stewart might tell us 




                                                                                                                                                       
6 Notably for Hobbes, all are “equall, in the faculties of body, and mind”, at least in their ability to kill 
one another (L, XIII: 86-87). Hobbes notes in his discussion of paternal power that “there is not alwayes 
that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman” (L, XX: 139). This and 
Hobbes’s broader discussion of gender and paternal power (L, XX: 139-40) – including an invocation of 
“Amazons” practicing “dominion of the Females” (140) – have led some (e.g. Pateman 1988, 43–50) to 
read Hobbes as a sort of proto-feminist, or at the very least not justifying patriarchal power to the same 
extent that later social contract theorists will. For a contrasting view of Hobbes on paternal power, see 
Nyquist on Hobbes’s “female-free family” (2013, 311–15). In the conclusion, I discuss a kind of ethical 
project of maximizing the potentials of bodies in relation to modes of difference and to violence.  
7 Movement presents us with the body as “transition,” its “own variation,” such that “in motion, a body is 
in an immediate, unfolding relation to its nonpresent potential to vary” (Massumi 2002, 4). Hobbes 
presents us with an image of the body that is to some extent more fixed than Massumi’s account, 
especially the farther we get away from Hobbes’s direct exposition of the body, but the Hobbesian body 
does evince some capacity for self-transition or self-variation.    
8 For a similar account of sense, see DC, VI: 77-79 and L, I: 13-14; for a detailed account of the 
individual senses – and especially sight – see DC, XXV: 402-405 
9 Recall, for example, that Clough theorizes affect as “pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or 
diminishing a body’s capacity to act” that point to a “dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter 
generally” (2010, 207).  
10 See also L, II: 15, where Imagination is “decaying sense” resulting from an “obscuring” of the motion 
that caused the sense. For Hobbes, Imagination and Memory refer to the same general phenomenon but 
slightly different specific aspects: Imagination refers to the decaying sense itself while Memory refers to 
the way “we would express the decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past” (L, II: 16).  
11 For an account that excellently traces the materiality of sense and thought, see Frost 2008, 24-34. I 
extend this work by connecting sense and thought to affect. My project shares this task of underscoring 
Hobbes’s critique of Descartes through attention to his materialism with that of Frost, who argues that 
“Hobbes eschews a Cartesian understanding of matter … Starting with the presumption that there are in 
fact such things as ‘thinking-bodies’, Hobbes develops a complex account of thinking, desire, and action. 
And unsurprisingly, the conception of the self that he develops from this notion of animate, thinking 
matter is radically different from the conception of the self we get through relying on either side of the 
Cartesian binarism” (2008, 6-7). In my analysis I build upon Frost in my reading of Hobbes beside affect 
theory and more general focus on emotion as such in Hobbes’s work. On Hobbes’s critique of Descartes 
on this point, also see James (1997, 126–136), and Gaskin (2008, xxiv–xxv) 
12 For example, see Ahmed, who contends that we ought “to avoid making analytical distinctions between 
bodily sensation, emotion and thought as if they could be ‘experienced’ as distinct realms of human 
‘experience’ (2004, 6).  
13 She makes a similar argument in her later work as well (Ahmed 2010, 230–231n1). Frost’s articulation 
of Hobbesian sensation could also be used to support this argument, as she contends that any response to 
external stimuli (possibly, in my reading, something like Massumi’s or Clough’s affect as an asubjective 
force) is always “textured by the entire complex history of the organism’s experience and responses” 
(2008, 23). Or, in the terms of my reading, the affective experience of sensation involves an embodied 
response to some external force, but that response is always colored by previous bodily histories of 
thought-emotion.  
14 While Hobbes uses the terminology of “passion,” I will use “passion and “emotion” interchangeably in 
order to more clearly situate Hobbes in a contemporary register and lexicon. As I will demonstrate, his 
account of passion as an embodied process connected to both sensation and though resonates with 
contemporary work on emotion. Moreover, it is not as if Hobbes himself sets up a distinction between 
emotion and passion; the word ‘emotion’ does not appear a single time in EL or L. As I hope these 
paragraphs make clear, we should read Hobbes’s “passion” beside at least some version of contemporary 




                                                                                                                                                       
and, perception – albeit one that does not engage with more recent theorizing on emotion or affect – see 
James 1997, 131-136. I would disagree, though, with James that Hobbes’s “identification of body and 
mind” (136) is underdeveloped, arguing that the connections (not identifications) between the two are one 
of the most vital components of his critique of Descartes. 
15 From this Hobbes draws a series of further classifications: objects of appetite, desire, and love are that 
which is called good, while objects of aversion or hate are that which is called bad (L, VI: 39); pleasure is 
that which helps the “vital motions” of the heart, while pain is that which hinders it (DC, XXV: 406; also 
see L, VI:40).  
16 Or, for example, consider the refining of endeavor into appetite and aversion, an essential movement on 
the way toward producing emotion, depends on “things as are known by experience” (DC, XXV: 407), 
such that the appetites and aversions that will help form emotion are not generated anew each time but are 
instead connected to past bodily histories and environments. 
17 For an extended account of the working of desire in directing thought, see Frost 2008, chap. 2, 
especially pp. 54-64 
18 One might also seek to forge some connections between Hobbes and Elizabeth Grosz’s discussion of 
impressions vis-à-vis perception and memory in Bergson (2004, 164–175) as well as her earlier work on 
bodily inscription (1990).  
19 The reading of the state of nature that follows is deeply influenced by Ahmed’s theorization of affective 
economy (2004, 44-49); also see 55-56 (on affective economies of hate vis-à-vis hate crime laws) and 71-
80 (on global affective economies of fear in regards to the nation, mobility, migration, and “terrorism”).  
20 Even here, Hobbes proves interested in how emotions shift focus away from any one particular 
individual. In discussing the relative equality of peoples’ “faculties of mind,” he notes that people tend to 
imagine themselves superior and thus NOT equal to others. It is especially the case that “they will hardly 
believe there be many so wise as themselves” (L XIII: 87). Hobbes grants that this seemingly points to the 
inequality of faculties of mind; however, since everyone thinks thus, what he understands to be the near-
universal overvaluing of one’s own faculty “proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall” 
(87). The source of this high opinion of oneself is “vain conceit” (87), and is thus related, I would argue, 
to the passion of Vaine-glory, a “Joy, arising from imagination of a man’s own power and ability” that is 
“grounded on the flatter of others, or onely support by himself, for delight in the consequences of it” (L, 
VI: 42). So in this instance, the commonality and shape of a particular passion moves the focus away 
from the individual and toward the effects that this (widespread) passion generates. 
21 While Frost does not explore this potentiality, her account of vital motion’s effort to preserve itself 
could productively be read beside the Spinozan concept of conatus, the effort of a being to persist in its 
own existence (Spinoza 2005, bk. III; Deleuze 1988, 20–21; 99–100), as another possible conceptual 
connection to make between Hobbes and Spinoza.   
22 Brennan opens her Transmission of Affect by discussing how one “feels the atmosphere” of the space 
they enter. This “transmission of affect” is for her physiological as well as social and psychological, such 
that “the transmission is also responsible for bodily changes” as the “‘atmosphere’ or environment 
literally gets into the individual” (2004, 1). Transmitted affects thus “come via in interaction with other 
people and an environment” (3). This account is broadly consistent with my reading of Hobbes’s state of 
nature, although I disagree with her brief argument that Hobbes offers a theory of passions where 
“individualism is reconciled with determinism, and the passions are made equivalent to the soul or psyche” 
(104). As this chapter indicates, the picture is much richer and more complex than this.   
23 The full passage: “And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than 
an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably 
be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of 
his labour, but also of his life, or liberty” (L, XIII: 87). 
24 Or, in Spinozan-Deleuzean terms, we need to organize society so as to maximize the affective capacity 




                                                                                                                                                       
one another of the state of nature – particularly in terms of power, right and, natural law – see Curley 
1991. 
25 I would further note that Hobbes discusses prudence in the same chapter he discusses “traynes” of 
embodied imaginations related to motion and sense, and in a way that resembles Reason’s attempt to trace 
consequences. Prudence involves “desir[ing] to know the event of an action”, thinking “of some like 
action past” and its consequences, “supposing like events will follow like actions” (L, III: 22).   
26 He provides similar articulations elsewhere, for example EL XIX; XX; XXVII.  
27 Frost (2008, chap. 4) offers a version of a more sustained, fully-fleshed out materialist ethics emerging 
from Hobbes.  
 
Chapter 2 
1 Here, note the resonances between Yovel’s account of Marx rearticulating Spionza with Deleuze’s 
account of rethinking materiality and ontology in a Spinozan way: the body is “composed of an infinite 
number of particles; it is the relations of motion and rest, of speeds and slownesses between particles, that 
define a body, the individuality of a body”; life becomes “as a complex relation between differential 
velocities, between deceleration and acceleration of particles. A composition of speeds and slownesses on 
a plane of immanence … it is by speed and slowness that one slips in among things, that one connects 
with something else” (Deleuze 1988, 123).  
2 Marx’s footnote reads: “‘Determination is negation’, i.e., given the undifferentiated self-identity of the 
universal world substance, to attempt to introduce particular determinations is to negate this self-identity” 
and refers to a 1674 letter from Spinoza to J. Jelles (G, 90n11). Hegel also emphasizes the notion that 
determination is negation as central to Spinoza’s thought (cf. 1896, 3:252–90), at one point deeming 
“determinatio est negatio” “Spinoza’s great saying” (Hegel 1892, 1:252). 
3 Deleuze and Guattari read Spinoza as the foremost philosopher of immanence: “Spinoza, the infinite 
becoming-philosopher: he showed, drew up, and thought the ‘best’ plane of immanence – that is, the 
purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that 
inspires the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 60; 
also see 1994, 48-49). If Yovel and Deleuze and Guattari are correct, it is even more worth explicitly 
extending the Deleuze (and in the case Guattari) – Spinoza connection to Marx as I do here. Notably, one 
of Althusser’s more extended discussions about Marx and Spinoza (1979, 187-89) situate them as 
thinkers of a kind of immanence, albeit within Althusser’s structuralism.  
4 Most strikingly, Althusser writes that Spinoza and Marx provide the great, “unprecedented theoretical 
revolution[s],” and in this sense, “from the philosophical standpoint” we “can regard Spinoza as Marx’s 
only direct ancestor” (1979, 102). Holland notes that Althusser sought to use Spinoza and Lacan in his 
effort to purge Hegelianism from Marxism (Holland 1998, paras. 5–6). 
5 Negri has long been a prominent theorist of Spinoza, including his book-length treatment of Spinoza 
(1991b), which contains only a few mentions of Marx but does make the intriguing gesture to a 
Machiavelli-Spinoza-Marx “vein of thought” that “counters the ‘sublime’” tradition of Hobbes-Rouseeau-
Hegel (1991, 265n26). For an overview of his engagement with Spinoza situating his Spinozism vis-à-vis 
Marx, Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, and others, see his interview with Casarino (Casarino and Negri 
2004). 
6 A materialist and/or Deleuzean Spinoza is not uncontroversial – see Boros et al. 2009 for claims that 
some Marxists misread Spinoza’s materialism. The Deleuzean Spinoza is one of several Spinozas we 
have available to us today; on the variety of the different Spinozas, so to speak, see Vardoulakis’s edited 
collection (2011). For another particularly affective rendering of Spinoza – in this case vis-à-vis Negri 
and Deleuze – see an excellent article by Susan Ruddick (2010). I somewhat turn away from the Spinoza 
of Negri (with and without Hardt). Grattan (2011) incisively critiques Hardt and Negri’s elaboration of 
Spinoza, arguing that they fail to engage the full range of Spinozan affect and are not sufficiently 




                                                                                                                                                       
Ruddick (2010) favors Deleuze’s Spinoza over Negri’s, contending that Negri does not effectively think 
through the concepts of multitude and difference vis-à-vis Spinoza. 
7 This theoretical endeavor responds to Grattan’s provocation to practice “thinking Marx ‘with Spinoza.’” 
To this, I would add that such a project, in my own particularly affect- and Deleuze-inflected reading, 
seeks also to reinvigorate our receptivity to Marx in the present, going back to Marx himself to generate a 
different kind of Spinozist Marxism.   I pursue Spinozism in Marx, but this becomes a particularly affect- 
and Deleuze-inflected mode of Spinozan affect, conatus, and power that encounters Marx. As I trace 
resonances between Marx and a Deleuzean Spinoza, I seek to both intensify the connection between Marx 
and affect theory and to provide a generative reading of affect and embodiment in Marx’s philosophical 
project and critique of capital.  
8 More specifically, he asserts that idealism in general and Feuerbach in particular develop “the active 
side … only abstractly” because idealism “does not know real, sensuous activity as such” (TF, I).  
9 Throughout the chapter, I will leave the supposedly-universal “man” as written when quoting Marx and 
readers of Marx. As the subsequent chapter will investigate, Marx’s theory may indeed only take up 
(some) men, an important limitation that the use of “man” to stand in for all humans spells out.   
10 “Essential powers” is Milligan’s translation of Marx’s Wesenskräfte, which Milligan describes as 
“powers belonging to me as part of my essential nature, my very being” (108n1); this understanding is 
consistent with my Spinozan reading of Marx. He refers back to discussion in his “Note on Terminology” 
of the complexity of translating Wesen into English, which notes both the complexity of Marx’s concept 
of “essence” (the most direct translation), as well as other colloquial and Hegelian shadings of the term 
(Milligan 1988, 11–12). Another prevalent translation of the Manuscripts, by Gregor Benton, also uses 
“essential powers” in the passages I work with here.   
11 Elsewhere: “…define bodies and thoughts as capacities for affecting and being affected, many things 
change. You will define an animal, or a human being, not by its form, its organs, and its functions, and 
not as a subject either; you will define it by the affects of which it is capable. Affective capacity, with a 
maximum threshold and a minimum threshold, is a constant notion in Spinoza. Take any animal and 
make a list of affects. … [D]efine bodies, animals, or humans by the affects they are capable of” (Deleuze 
1988, 124–125). 
12 He writes that the “peculiar mode of each essential power is precisely its peculiar essence” and thus 
also the mode of its objectification and “objectively actual living being” (EPM, 108; emphasis Marx’s). 
Marx constructs this essence/essential power as necessarily dynamic, not as a static property but 
something realized only in relation and transformation. 
13 Conatus is the Spinozan notion of appetite, the “effort by which each thing strives to persevere in its 
being, each body in extension, each mind or each idea in thought” (Deleuze 1988, 21). On conatus, also 
see Spinoza 2005, pt. III, prop. 6; Deleuze 1988, 99–100. Jason Read (2015, 2–7) emphasizes that 
Spinoza’s concepts of affect and conatus avoid falling into either social determination or pure or abstract 
individualism, while accounting for the ways one’s conatus and affects are shaped by social relations. 
Here, Read builds on the work of Frédéric Lordon (2001; 2014). 
14 I return to this in the final section of this chapter, on communist affect.  
15 Of course, these constantly feed back into one another; for example, in discussing the “real” individuals 
and the “material conditions of their life,” the latter include both the conditions “they find already existing” 
as well as those “produced by their activity” (GI, 36-37). 
16 Also important to Marx and Engels, and central to debates in the 1960s-1980s, is the nature, status, and 
function of reproductive labor, especially as it is performed by gendered and racialized bodies. I return to 
this in the next chapter, on affect and Marxist feminism.  
17 I would thus disagree with accounts of Marx that situate him as a descendant of Aristotelian 
hylomorphism. For example, Schwarzenbach contends that “Marx’s naturalistic anthropology and his 
hylomorphism may be considered a variant of Aristotle’s” (2009, 95). However, the way that Marx and 
Engels theorize the generativity of active matter in the form of the individual body producing 




                                                                                                                                                       
characteristic of hylomorphic philosophies. For a general critique of hylomorphism, one building on the 
work of Alfred North Whitehead, see Shaviro 2012, chap. 3, particularly pages 52-55. 
18 Reading Marx and Marx and Engels as anti-Cartesians, though, might prove to be theoretically 
productive. Doing so would likely involve some of the connections to Spinoza I and others engage, as 
well as a serious reading of the section of The Holy Family on “England and Materialist Philosophy.” 
Schmidt contends that Marx’s materialism carries the implication that “he who separates thought from the 
senses, the soul from the body, is incapable of grasping the connection between the content of culture and 
the sphere of material production” (2014, 21). It is worth noting here that in Schmidt’s analysis of Marx’s 
epistemology, the Cartesian primacy of the subject is an abstract understanding of what Marx argues is 
the increasing “subjective intervention” into the “determinations of objectivity” (121-22). Also see 
Yovel’s brief argument that on the matter of thought and existence, Marx gestures toward Cartesian 
cogito but turns instead to the Spinozan immanence of thinking-human-in-nature (1989, 86–87).  
19 On Spinoza’s more general ontological and epistemological parallelism, see Deleuze 1990, 113-17 and 
126-28. 
20 Levi Bryant, drawing on the work of Manuel Delanda and Graham Harman among others, identifies 
four “ontological theses” of flat ontology (2011, chap. 6). Most relevant in contrast with Marx are: the 
third, “refus[ing] to privilege the subject-object, human-world relation” such it that is necessarily 
metaphysically different (read: superior) than “other relations between objects,” because while humans 
“have unique power and capacities,” this does not always mean that they have a qualitatively different or 
richer interaction with objects than objects do with themselves (246); and the fourth, that “all entities are 
on equal ontological footing and that no entity … possesses greater ontological dignity than other objects” 
(246). In general, flat ontology seeks to “diminish the obsessive focus on the human, subjective, and the 
cultural” in political and social theory and philosophy (246-47). Humans, thus “are not at the center of 
being, but are among beings” (249). It is interesting to note here, however, that Bryant does include 
“Marx’s mediations on how the money-form, technologies, and factories change our very identities” as an 
example of attending to “nonhuman agencies,” although he contrasts this with a contemporary 
“speculative tendency” of “Spinozism” that is not “obliged to relate everything back to the human” (247-
48).    
21 She schematizes it as a “Hegel-Marx-Adorno” tradition and a “Democritus-Epicurus-Spinoza-Diderot-
Deleuze” tradition of materialism (xiii). Her contention is that Marxist-critical theoretical modalities of 
“demystification” “presumes that at the heart of any event or process lies a human agency that has illicitly 
been projected into things,” such that demystification always “uncovers” something human and thus 
“tends to screen from view the vitality of matter and to reduce political agency to human agency. (xiv-
xv).” 
22 In the “indivisibility” of the human/nature metabolism, nature “attains self-consciousness in” humans, 
and “amalgamates with itself by virtue of their theoretical-practical activity” (79). 
23 Holland also makes the contention between the two explicit. For him, Marx constructs a humanism 
where humans become “Master” of nature, while Spinoza “offers a kind of anti-humanism” where 
“productive forces” are “not exclusively or primarily those of humankind, but those of Nature as a whole, 
of which humankind is of course an integral part, but only a part” (1998, para. 15). 
24 As Mies argues, in the “‘exchange of matter’ between human beings and nature,” humans “not only 
develop and change the external nature,” but also change “their own bodily nature” (1986, 52; her 
emphasis). She also contends that the sharp separation in much Western Marxism of historical 
“development of the means of production” from natural and reproductive processes – which then get read 
as ahistorical” contributes to the theoretical inability to develop a “historical materialist conception” of 
women and labour traditionally understood as women’s work (50-51).  
25 Consequently, the “estranging” from nature “estranges the species from” the human, turning the “life of 




                                                                                                                                                       
26 He describes this movement of “Marx’s naturalism” as “Hegel’s legacy brought back to Spinoza 
without the Hegelian Geist” (81) in a process where “nature has been humanized” for Marx, but without 
Hegel’s “spiritualizing” of nature and without “an inherent teleology” vis-à-vis nature (79).  
27 There is an important tradition of reading Marx as a social ontologist; see, for instance, Gould 1980. I 
do not engage this literature directly, but thinking through how my affective reading of Marx might 
suggest modifications to accounts of Marx-as-social-ontologist could likely prove fruitful.  
28 For example the “starving man” for whom food exists only in “its abstract being as food,” or the 
“dealer in minerals” who senses “only the mercantile value but not the beauty and the unique nature of the 
mineral” (EPM, 109).  
29 Thanks to Alyson Cole for suggesting this phrase to describe my account of affect and Marx’s living 
labor capacity.  
30 In this sense there is somewhat of an affinity between this chapter and much of Lyotard’s work on 
Marx in Libidinal Economy (1993). See, for example, his argument that “capital captures force and turns 
it into a means of social labour, countable as time regulated by the clock,” in his broader schema in which 
“the Marxist dialectic is fulfilled entirely within the interplay of force and system” (144). Where Lyotard 
reads “force,” I conceptualize affect, but the implications for our theorizations of capitalism are similarly 
oriented.  
31 Interestingly, immediately after this formulation in the Grundrisse, Marx notes that “this marginal 
remark is an anticipation, must first be developed, by and by” (272). Even in the text itself, Marx creates 
openings for lines of flight that he may only anticipate and need some further development. Clearly, many 
of these anticipations are taken up and elaborated in the volumes of Capital. I seek to explicitly pursue the 
affective anticipations of such remarks.  
32 It thus has a specific relation to wages, which arise from “the objectified labour necessary bodily to 
maintain not only the general substance in which [the worker's] labor power exists, i.e. the worker himself, 
but also that required to modify this general substance so as to develop its particular capacity” (G, 282-3).  
33 My reading here moves Cheah’s reading of Marx’s ontology in an affective and Spinozan direction. He 
argues that for Marx human labor is “a process of self-actualization ontologically unique” with its 
“defining feature” as the “ability to incarnate ideas and actualize the potentiality in nature and the human 
subject as part of nature” (2003, 191–92). Whereas Cheah situates this central movement in Marx under 
the aegis of Hegel and German idealism, I theorize it as an affective line of flight running to Spinoza.  
34 Elsewhere, Marx describes it as the “transformation of the material by living labour, by the realization 
of living labour in the material” (G, 360).  
35 For example, in the famous description of the global, revolutionary scope of capitalism from he and 
Engels in the Manifesto (MCP, 475-476). 
36 Lordon also discusses capitalist “capture” in terms of affect (2014, 117–21), arguing that analysis of the 
employment relation demands a theory of capture which specifies the object of master/employer capture 
as the “power of acting” of employees so that the “conative energies of others work” in the “service” of 
the “master-desire” (117). While I think this is generally correct, I disagree with Lordon in his claim that 
Marx himself does not have a theory of capture in his account of capitalist exploitation. As I demonstrate 
throughout this section of the chapter, Marx’s critique of capitalism includes a wide-ranging analysis of 
the capitalist capture of affect, even if he never explicitly names it as such. Part of the problem is that 
Lordon limits his engagement with Marx at this part of his book to the appropriation of surplus value. 
What Lordon understands as an “impasse” in Marx (120) is an underappreciation of the potential for an 
affective theory of exploitation in Marx himself. It would be generative, I think, to read mine and 
Lordon’s accounts together to think about the way that the capitalist capture of affect I theorize in Marx 
works to shape what we might call, using Lordon, the conatus of capitalism itself. If capitalism has a 
conative impetus to persist in its being, then turning the conatus of workers against themselves and 
towards the capture of affect that reproduces capitalism and enables it to endure would be crucial. 
37 Soon thereafter, using Fanon to read the revolutionary as an “affect alien” that is alienated from their 




                                                                                                                                                       
intense burning presence; it is a feeling that takes place before others, from whom one is alienated, and 
can feel like a weight that both holds you down and keeps you apart. You shift, drop your head, sweat, 
feel edgy and uncertain. Everything presses against you; you feel against the world and the world feels 
against you” (2010, 168-69). For a different reading of affect and alienation, see Lordon 2014.  
38 The system of exchange values “presupposes alien labour capacity itself,” the “separation of living 
labour capacity from its objective conditions” (G, 510; Marx’s italics). Moreover, living labour capacity, 
in its realization and transfer in production, becomes opposed to an “alien power” (454) 
39 Moreover, Mies ascribes the “dualistically and hierarchically structured” “colonizing divisions” of 
mind and body, rationality and emotion, humans and nature, and men and women to “the capitalist-
patriarchal paradigm (Mies 1986, 210). Recall that affect theory takes challenges to these polarities as one 
of its central projects  
40 For more of Massumi’s critique of structural approaches, see 2002, 68-70. Further work on this tension 
between structuralism, social theory, and Marxism on the one hand and affect, and emotion on the other, 
should also engage Raymond Williams, particularly his concept of a “structure of feeling” (Williams 
1977). 
41 On the interface between affective labor and feminist theorizing on Marx, labor, work, and affect, cf. 
Weeks 2007 and Weeks 2011. 
42 Such a claim, however, risks obscuring the specificity of care work and domestic work, a potential 
problem I discuss in the subsequent chapter.  
43 Negri’s theorization of affect, labor, and value (1999) is more compelling, as it does not delimit 
affective labor to the degree that Hardt’s article does. Ruddick (2010, 31-33), though, effectively critiques 
Negri’s affect for still positioning affective labor as the vanguard of labor in the contemporary setting, 
asserting that “we cannot presume that affect is suddenly ‘present’ at work as was not there previously” 
(33), among other points. Grattan (2011, 7–8) notes that Negri in his account of affect problematically 
emphasizes only the power of acting, thus ignoring the power of being acted upon. In different ways, each 
of these accounts are consistent with my own critique of aspects of the affective labor literature.  
44 On power, in addition to my earlier discussion of Deleuzean-Spinozan power vis-à-vis Marx on 
“essential powers,” see Deleuze 1988, 97-99.  
45 Deleuze argues this replaces a morality based on Good and Evil with an ethics based on good and bad 
(1988, 23) and thus situates Spinoza in a “lineage from Epicurus to Nietzsche” (72). One might note here 
that Marx himself wrote his doctoral thesis on the philosophy of nature in Democritus and Epicurus.  
46 Deleuze elsewhere explains it thus: “An existing mode is defined by a certain capacity for being 
affected (III, post. 1 and 2). When it encounters another mode, it can happen that this other mode is ‘good’ 
for it, that is, enters into composition with it, or on the contrary decomposes it and is ‘bad’ for it. In the 
first case, the existing mode passes to a greater perfection; in the second case, to a lesser perfection. 
Accordingly, it will be said that its power of acting or force of existing increases or diminishes, since the 
power of the other mode is added to it, or on the contrary is withdrawn from it, immobilizing and 
restraining it (IV, 18 dem.). The passage to a greater perfection, or the increase of the power of acting, is 
called an affect, or feeling, of joy; the passage to a lesser perfection or the diminution of the power of 
acting is called sadness” (1988, 49-50; emphasis Delezue’s). 
47 Indeed, a fully materialist Spinozan Marxism must first “fundamentally challenge the exploitative 
nature of capitalism” in the organization of daily life (Grattan 2011, 15).  
48 From the perspective of a teleological reading of Marx, it is will; from the standpoint of Spinoza or 
affect, it is can; thanks to Marc Sable for pointing out this distinction. Marxist teleology is one instance 
where Marx pushes affect and Spinoza into a realm in which they do not usually dwell. As Eugene 
Holland notes, teleology is one of Marx’s greatest differences from Spinoza’s immanent materialism 
(1998, para. 16).  
49 Or, as Deleuze and Guattari render the concept of the limit in relation to capitalism, on the one hand 
capitalism “is continually surpassing its own limits, always deterritorializing further” in its immanent 




                                                                                                                                                       
are interior and immanent to itself, and that, precisely because they are immanent, let themselves be 
overcome only provided they are reproduced on a wider scale (always more reterritorialization - local, 
world-wide, planetary” (1983, 259–60). Again, my own reading of Marx provides some more specificity 
– in terms of affective capacity – to this sort of theorization.  
50 Elsewhere: “…when we encounter a body that agrees with ours, and has the effect of affecting us with 
joy, this joy (increase of our power of acting) induces us to form the common notion of these two bodies, 
that is, to compound their relations and to conceive their unity of composition” (Deleuze 1988, 118-19).  
51 This would remain solely in the realm of “passive” affects and “inadequate” ideas; see Deleuze 1988, 
50-51; 82 as well as Ruddick 2010.  
52 This is, admittedly, an optimistic reading that abstracts away from the racial, gendered, and colonial 
exclusions and omissions that partly constitute Marx’s thinking. Insofar as Marx himself does not 
incorporate racism, oppressive gender divisions, and patterns of colonial violence, this future communal 
society will remain unrealizable in the confines of his project alone. I address some of these issues in the 
subsequent chapter.    
53 The two, of course, are intertwined; see Lordon 2014, 127-134 on the interplay between an overthrow 
of exploitative employee-employer relations and affect.  
54 In fact, in an informal poll of about a dozen colleagues familiar with these thinkers, I presented them 
with this full quote without attribution and asked them whether they thought it was from Marx, Spinoza, 
or Deleuze and Guattari. Only one answered Marx.   
55 As Gould notes throughout her work on Marx’s social ontology (1980), conceptualizing the individual 
and the community as necessarily opposed to one another is, for Marx, a result of “the limited forms that 
they [the two concepts] take in both social life and social theory under capitalism” as dichotomous and 
conflictual (xii).  
56 If, as Gould emphasizes, “individuals freely create and change their nature through their activity” (C. C. 
Gould 1980, xiv), then affect in a Deleuzean-Spinozan register becomes crucial in theorizing this nature 
due to its emphasis on the creative power of action and being acted upon. Also see Negri on the social 
individual in communism (1991a, 145–47), especially for my purposes that the social individual entails in 
part the “expansion of enjoyment, founder of that expansion” (147) – or, the expansion of joyful 
encounters.  
57 It is in this sense that mutuality as “a form of non-instrumental relations among agents” and “the most 
developed form of reciprocity” constitutes an essential condition of justice and the “full development of 
positive freedom” in Marx (C. C. Gould 1980, 175).  
58 For Schmidt, this “eudemonistic impulse” is something Marx “shared … with the ethical materialists of 
antiquity” (40). This, I argue, is another reason to move Marx into an ethical realm, as I do in regards to 
Deleuze’s Spinoza.  
59 She expands on this notion thusly: “…we might develop this corporeal-social aspect of experience in 
terms of human needs. Affective capacities are tied to cognition and to the traces of social contexts that 
register in them. But as only one of a host of human potentials, they also have a relationship to the body’s 
other material needs — its dependence on sustenance, shelter, recovery from illness or injury — all of 
which require some form of social cooperation in order to be met” (214). It is important to note that 
Hennessy and I deploy different concepts and theoretical lineages when discussing affect; I explore these 
differences at length in the next chapter, on Marxist feminism.  
60 At a more basic level, if Marx’s vision of communism entails the systemic, communal, reciprocal 
amplification of affective capacity, then the baseline possibility for forming common notions vastly 
expands when compared to capitalism or feudalism. The widespread augmentation of these positive 
affects in communism raises the quantity and quality of the joyful encounters that are able to be 
represented, and generates a more intense and active social reservoir of the joyful affects that provoke and 
conduct the forming of these common notions.  




                                                                                                                                                       
62 I think there is some affinity here with Spivak’s reading, in which “Marx attempts to break into that 
pure outside – pre-originary and post-teleological – of pure nature and humanity” (1999, 328). 
63 The later chapter on Simone de Beauvoir engages Ahmed – including her account of orientation and 
disorientation in greater depth. My brief discussion here of Marx, communist affect, and disorientation is 
suggestive of the ways we might think through potentially shared projects between Marx and Beauvoir. 
Recall here that Ahmed uses “emotion” and “affect” somewhat more interchangeably than more 
Spinozan- and Deleuzean-influenced affect theory, as I discussed in the introduction.  
64 These passages in Marx have proven important to Italian autonomist Marxism, the Wages for 
Housework movement, and contemporary discussions of affective and immaterial labor; see, for example, 
Antonio Negri (1991a, 139–50). Thanks are due to Carol Gould for urging me to think through how the 
“Fragment on Machines” works within my affective reading, and to Kamran Moshref for helpful 
conversations on the passage.  
65 As Marx vividly describes it: “Forces of production and social relations – two different sides of the 
development of the social individual – appear to capital as mere means, and are merely for it to produce 
on its limited foundation. In fact, however, they are the material conditions to blow this foundation sky-
high” (706). This is the point at which “the mass of workers must themselves appropriate their own 
surplus labour” (708). For Negri, the “Fragment on Machines” becomes “without doubt, the highest 
example of the use of an antagonistic and constituting dialectic that we can find” in all of the Grundrisse 
and possibly in all of Marx, as well as “the peak of Marx’s theoretical tension in the Grundrisse” as “the 
point where the antagonism takes on the form of working class subjectivity” (1991b, 139). The 
importance of free time and disposable time in the Fragment suggest the possibility for a deeper 
engagement between this passage from Marx and Weeks’s work on anti- and post-work politics (2011).  
66 As the next chapter discusses in relation to Marxist feminism, the individual – social or not – is a 
limited one in terms of racial and gender divisions and of colonialism. A fuller articulation of the social 
individual, including its affectivity, would have to work through the white, male, European default of the 
social individual.   
67 Such a vision works against the problematic tendency of some Marxist imaginaries that view a future 
society predominately in terms of unencumbered, creative, fulfilling labor freed from the dominations of 
capitalist formations. Weeks critiques such productivist visions which she reads as making the “goal” to 
“restore work’s dignity and worth, not to contest its status as the pillar of social value” in a way that is 
“hindered by a tendency toward nostalgia for an earlier time,” for example the “romanticization of craft 
production” (2007b, 86–87). Focusing the critique of “socialist humanism” – especially Erich Fromm – 
Weeks contends that once labor is conceived of as the primary “human essence, from which we are now 
estranged and to which we should be restored,” too much emphasis is placed on the individual, and the 
“self-realization” of the human is limited by being “inextricably linked to the activity of work” (85-86). 
As she notes, this passage I cite from Marx names the reduction of the working-day the prerequisite for 
freedom. In her critique of the “work society” and effort to generate “a more radical imagination of 
postwork futures,” Weeks insists that Marx-inspired futurities must go beyond “a vision of unalienated 
and unexploited work” (15). Affect enables a more capacious vision, one still grounded in Marx’s texts, 
for futurities that are not just about work; from the standpoint of affect, the free development and 
amplification of forces and capacities, the organization of joyful encounters, the augmentations of bodily 
power imagine something beyond a productivist focus on work.  
68 As such, I would revise Bennett’s critique of the Marxist dominance in political theory and 
philosophy’s histories of materialism. She argues that “Marx’s notion of materiality – as economic 
structures and exchanges that provoke many other events – come[s] to stand for the materialist 
perspective per se” (Bennett 2010, xvi). While Marx is certainly an exemplar of the kind of 
anthropocentrism that Bennett brilliantly works against, Marx’s materialism is far more capacious, 
affective, and vibrant than Bennett’s encapsulation. Coole and Frost argue that only a “revised” Marxism 




                                                                                                                                                       
to gain insight into the intricacies of” contemporary global capitalism. I offer my reading of Marx as one 
way forward in this direction.  
 
Chapter 3 
1 For example, the laboring body engaged in productive work has regularly been understood as white and 
male, and work in general has consistently been masculinized. This renders much of women’s labor, as 
well as the conditions of that labor, invisible, in a way that reproduces modalities of gendered, racialized, 
and colonizing power, particularly in the context of global capitalism (Mohanty 1997).  
2 While some authors distinguish sharply between socialist feminism and Marxist feminism and 
materialist feminism, I follow Weeks (2011, 236n15) in preferring the term “Marxist feminism” as a 
general signifier even when drawing on sources labeled as socialist feminism. As she notes, the 
“distinction between Marxist feminism and socialist feminism is not always clear” (236n15). Moreover, 
given my own interest in these strands of feminism vis-à-vis Marx himself, and of the overall project of 
an affective reading of Marx and Marxism, I use “Marxist feminism” broadly and inclusively; Weeks 
provides a similar reasoning for her own use of Marxist feminism.  
3 In doing so, this chapter admittedly abstracts away from the activism with which Marxist feminist 
theory is inextricably connected. Much political theorizing, of course, responds to its enveloping political 
circumstances; Hobbes writes in aftermath of the English Civil War and Marx engages European 
industrialization, revolutions, and labor organizing, to note the conditions surrounding the thinkers of the 
previous two chapters. Marxist feminism, though, directly emerges out of social movements and is more 
tightly bound up with them. In this chapter, I focus more exclusively on its explicit theoretical 
expressions. See Petchesky 1979 for an account of the relations between Marxist feminist organizing and 
theorizing, and Cox and Federici 1975 for an example of Marxist feminist theory coming out of the 
Wages for Housework movement.   
4 Weeks cites two narrations of feminism that do this in regards to Marxist feminism (2011, 115-18). One 
posits Marxist feminism as thesis, radical feminism as antithesis, and socialist feminism as synthesis that 
transcends earlier versions. A second narrates ‘essentialist feminisms’ of the 1970s – liberal, Marxist, 
radical, and socialist feminisms – as challenged and surpassed by anti-racist, third world, and 
poststructural feminisms. Weeks contends that both of these accounts of feminist pasts posit, to some 
extent, these earlier feminist projects as irretrievably failed, mistaken, and frozen as mere historical 
artifacts. In response to this, she insists on the need to not bound different theoretical paradigms such that 
they become unavailable – or worse, seen as antithetical or regressive – to feminist projects today. 
Ultimately, we can turn to feminist pasts to animate our critical presents while remaining heedful of the 
problematic elements of those pasts.   
5 Engels’s The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (2010) was a major influence on 
early Marxist feminist thought, which regularly took the text as both a point of departure and object of 
critique. In this chapter I focus on the Marxist feminist critique of and work with Marx/Marx and Engels 
more exclusively. See Vogel 2013, chap. 6 for a thorough Marxist feminist reading of Engels, among 
many others.  
6 This chapter also seeks to show that ‘affect as method’ can perform similar work with a theoretical and 
political movement just as it can with one particular thinker.  
7 This is a position one can extrapolate, for example, from the Manifesto and its emphasis on the supposed 
dissolution of the family generated by capitalism. 
8 I use this formulation of “those determined to fall into the category of woman and/or female” to attempt 
a slight shift away from the gender binary that nearly all of these Marxist feminist thinkers were 
embedded in. Throughout this chapter (and the next one, on Beauvoir), the texts – and, ultimately, my 
work with them – retain to a large extent this binary in a way that neglects trans and gender non-
conforming lives and theorizing.  
9 In Berg’s recent formulation, reproductive labor is that which produces affects, bodies, desires, social 




                                                                                                                                                       
discussed it in this and the preceding chapter, infuses all of these realms instead of being localizable as a 
separate object of (re)production.  
10 For instance, we might think of affect as raw material in terms of Clough’s theorization of affect as 
“pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body’s capacity to act” pointing to a 
“dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter generally” (2010, 207), or to Massumi’s conception of 
affect as “autonomous” (2002, chap. 1). It is interesting to note here that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
reads Rubin alongside Deleuze and Guattari – in addition to Foucault – as engaged in projects akin to one 
another in the way they talk up the problematic of “value” and “coding” arising out of Marx (1999, 103–
109).  
11 Vogel is not the only Marxist feminist to focus on social reproduction. See for example: the wages for 
housework movement (e.g. Dalla Costa 1972; Malos 1978); the domestic labor debate (e.g. Fee 1976; 
Mackintosh 1979); or Petchesky 1990, introduction;. I focus on Vogel for her effort to provide a book-
length account of Marx and Marxist feminism from the standpoint of social reproduction and to 
synthesize many of these debates within the movement.  
12 Labor power must be available to set the labor process in motion (144), and the energies of productive 
laborers must continually be restored (Vogel 2000, 157). 
13 Furthermore, “The ruling class, in order to stabilise the reproduction of labour-power as well as to keep 
the amount of necessary labour at acceptable levels, encourages male supremacy within the exploited 
class” (153).  
14 In doing so, she rejects the idea that we should construct sexuality as either more bodily than social, or 
as more social than bodily. Instead, she asserts that “humans are basically both social beings and bodies, 
and our sexuality is a bodily yet social energy to unite with others” (73). To a lesser extent, Ferguson 
argues that Irigaray and Lacan have social-energy-like theories of sexuality. She also situates Rubin as 
working within a Foucaultian energy paradigm. Ferguson contrasts all these social energy positions with 
theories that in her account posit sexuality as an essentialist instinct, ascribed to Mary Daly and Kathleen 
Barry, or a drive, such as in Freud, Wilhelm Reich, and Herbert Marcuse (chap. 3).  
15 In her account these are “supplemented by racist sex/affective productions systems which further divide” 
people (90).  
16 This general framework of Ferguson and sad affects could be historicized through connections with 
Lauren Berlant’s The Female Complaint, which argues that “starting in the 1830s an intimate public 
sphere of femininity constituted the first subcultural, mass-mediated, market population of relatively 
politically disenfranchised people in the United States,” one in which “strategies for new improvisations 
and adaptations around women’s suffering, emotional expertise, and practical agency became the main 
register for the sentimental publicity associated with this nondominant population” (2008, xii). 
Importantly, “embedded in” this “intimate public of femininity” is a “white universalist paternalism, 
sometimes dressed as maternalism,” part of a history in which “as long as they have had a public sphere, 
bourgeois white women writers have mobilized fantasies of what black and working-class interiority 
based on suffering must feel like in order to find a language for their own more privileged suffering at the 
hands of other women, men, and callous institutions” (6). One effect of the enmeshment in networks of 
sad affects might thus be the “kind of soft supremacy rooted in compassion and coercive identification” 
that “wants to dissolve all that structure through the work of good intentionality, while busily exoticizing 
and diminishing the inconvenient and the noncompliant” (6) that Berlant analyzes. Thanks to Stefanie A. 
Jones for pointing me to this potential connection with Berlant.  
17 In Ferguson’s terms, “historically created sexual symbolic codes can enter materially into the creation 
of sex/affective energy” (82); my claim is that we can take the materiality of this process further than 
Ferguson herself does.  
18 For example, she reads heterosexuality and heteronormativity as a particular regulation of this need by 
capitalist forces (cf. 100-106).  
19 In the concluding chapter, she summarizes this broader argument thusly: “I have suggested throughout 




                                                                                                                                                       
but is itself the mark of certain affiliations between a new bourgeois ruling bloc and the emergence of 
new forms of consciousness for late capitalism” (209).  
20 They recapitulate this sort of formulation near the end of the long third chapter, after tracing and then 
retracing the various quasi-historical modes of social-production: “So we come back to the question: in 
each case what is the relationship between social production and desiring-production, once it is said that 
they have identical natures and differing regimes? … In short, the general theory of society is a 
generalized theory of flows; it is in terms of the latter that one must consider the relationship of social 
production to desiring-production, the variations of this relationship in each case, and the limits of this 
relationship in the capitalist system” (262).  
21 Further work could explore the particularly affective forms of interaction between the capitalist 
organization and capture of affective capacity in the form of living labor capacity and of the capacity to 
enter into sex- and pleasure-centered relations and compositions, building on Hennessy and my own work 
here. Deleuze and Guattari are likely useful here, interested as they are in the capitalist organization of 
desire as such and in capitalism as the reterritorialization of decoded flows (1983, 245–46).  
22 Although, as Berg astutely argues, feminists ought to be wary of sentimentalizing, and thus becoming 
uncritical of, reproductive labor (2014, 163); her argument shares with Weeks (2007b; 2011) a critique of 
ideologies and practices of productivism that bolster the “work society.”  
23 Ferguson continues: “This would occur by minimizing the repressive aspect of social hierarchies – 
husband/wife, parent/child, teacher/student, boss/worker – which reduce the quantity and quality of 
sex/affective energy by one-way channeling and control” (230). The suggestive resemblances between 
this formulation, or of an affective reading of Eisenstein, with the argument about communist affect in the 
previous chapter are striking. Ultimately, these Marxist feminist visions are vital extensions – able to 
articulated in the register of affect –  of the affectivity of Marx’s “revolutionary ontology,” to use 
Eisenstein’s words. These notions also extend my above reading of Hennessy, and would implicate affect 
in Mies’s vision in which the “aim of all work and human endeavour is not a never-ending expansion of 
wealth and commodities, but human happiness (as the early socialists had seen it), or the production of 
life” (1986, 211–12). 
24 This is one way that Marx constructs a “system that will remove difference after taking it into account” 
(79). Also see Dipesh Chakrabarty’s analysis of universality and history in Marx vis-à-vis time and 
abstract labor (2007, chap. 2).  
25 In more detail, da Silva’s project is to interrogate the European scientific and social-scientific 
production of “the notion of the racial, which institutes the global as an ontoepistemological context— a 
productive and violent gesture necessary to sustain the post-Enlightenment version of the Subject as the 
sole self-determined thing. While this statement refigures, as it reconstitutes, the whole field of modern 
representation, its most immediate effect is to demonstrate how the knowledge arsenal, which now 
governs the global (juridical, economic, and moral) configuration, institutes racial subjection as it 
presupposes and postulates that the elimination of its ‘others’ is necessary for the realization of the 
subject’s exclusive ethical attribute, namely, self-determination” (xii-xiii).  
26 A number of white Marxist feminists have incorporated thinking about class, race and colonialism into 
their work for decades (e.g. Spelman 1988; Petchesky 1990; Eisenstein 1994; Eisenstein 1996). Ongoing 
theorizing by and critique of white feminism from anti-racist, women of color, third world, intersectional, 
and postcolonial feminists has had a profound impact on all kinds of feminist theory and the teaching of 
women’s and gender studies, especially following the publication of the This Bridge Called My Back 
(Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983) and work by Black feminists such as bell hooks (1981; 1984), Audre Lorde 
(1984), Angela Davis (1983), and many others.  
27 For one potential emancipatory line of flight that carries with black feminist attention to the material 
body, see Alexander Weheliye’s imaging of “habeas viscus” that “translate[s] the hieroglyphics of the 
flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of the future anterior 
freedoms and new genres of humanity” (2014, 137). Building upon the work of Hortense Spillers and 




                                                                                                                                                       
in different genres of the human and how might we accomplish this task through the critical project of 
black studies?” (2-3).  
28 Feminist new materialisms, of course, theorize a related, but different, sort of feminist-oriented 
materialism. On feminist new materialism, cf. van der Tuin 2009; Coole and Frost 2010; Grosz 2010; 
Frost 2011; Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, as well as a recent special issue of Women: A Cultural 
Review on “Feminist Matters: The Politics of New Materialism,” edited by Hinton and van der Tuin 
(2014). On new materialism in relation to political theory, see Washick et al. 2015.   
 
Chapter 4 
1 Sartre argues in favor of bringing together existentialism and Marxism, against both this general position 
and against Lukács, in his Search for a Method (1968).  
2 As the above review of the “Beauvoir renaissance” indicates, there is much to explore about 
embodiment in Beauvoir – and I contend that Ahmed’s work is uniquely situated to expand this project.  
3 In the conclusion, Beauvoir offers a glimpse at the emotional composition of the dialectic, in its 
gendered form: “The same drama of flesh and spirit, and of finitude and transcendence, plays itself out in 
both sexes; both are eaten away by time, stalked by death, they have the same essential need of the other” 
(SS, 763; my emphasis). 
4 The same might be said of Beauvoir’s literary works, with the characters as these kinds of subjects. A 
generative extension of the current project would be reading for the emotions at work in her novels (e.g. 
Beauvoir 1991; Beauvoir 1999) and short stories (e.g. Beauvoir 1984). 
5 To remain consistent with Beauvoir’s usage, I use “man/men” and “woman/women” in a very general 
and binary way, aware of the various differences that such usage occludes. I suggest in the conclusion to 
this chapter the need for further work to attend to the emotions and orientations of difference that are 
obscured in Beauvoir’s texts, as well as the generative possibilities they may enable. 
6 There are, of course, affinities between Ahmed’s discussion of disgust and Kristeva’s notion of the 
abject (1982). Ahmed discusses this relation (CPOE, 86-87), noting that while both are concerned with 
the border of the inside and outside of the “I,” she is more interested in the idea of “contact,” especially as 
it pertains to objects, than Kristeva (87).   
7 Thanks to Jordan Cass for initially raising this possibility to me.  
8 Future work could examine this point in the context of Iris Marion Young’s work on feminine bodily 
comportment and spatiality. It could explore for instance whether the concept of “emotional orientation” 
is salient and generative in Young’s theorizing or whether Ahmed and Young could be productively read 
together.   
9 This is particularly the case in relation to other feminist emotions and attachments, such as anger and 
hope (CPOE, chap. 8). 
10 Perhaps in the way Ahmed discusses the role of anger in feminism (CPOE, 172-78). 
11 As Kruks puts it, feminism struggles not only against “institutional dimensions of subordination” but 
also against “complicity in subordinating and subjectifying practices” (2001, 70). 
12 Perhaps, for example, reading Beauvoir in relationship to a recent issue of TSQ: Transgender Studies 
Quarterly on Trans/Feminisms (Bettcher and Stryker 2016).  




1 Tampio (2015) points out the Deleuze’s interpreters have too often underappreciated the extent to which 
following lines of flight goes together with seeing how those lines close back up on themselves (like an 
egg, in the image Deleuze gives us).  
2 Thanks are due to conversations with Susan Buck-Morss for formulating this as a positive injunction for 




                                                                                                                                                       
3 This is starkly evident as I write these sentences in the spring of 2016, observing the hate, anger, fear, 
and affective charge of Donald Trump, his rallies, and his supporters.  
4 These are not the only possible ethical theories that could be important. For instance, I think a 
productive exchange could be had between my work here and feminist care ethics, both in general (e.g. 
Held 2005) and as it has been inflected into political theory (e.g. Tronto 2013). For example, it might 
explore the affective and emotional valences of Tronto’s claim that “what it means to be a citizen in a 
democracy is to care for citizens and to care for democracy itself,” such that “to engage in such 
democratic caring requires citizens to think closely about their responsibilities and to others” (2013, x). 
Extending my current project could involve such an affective engagement with care ethics.  
5 Such a reading of Arendt would add an affective dimension to the way that feminist philosophers have 
drawn out and developed a concept of “power-with” in relation to Arendt’s work (e.g. Allen 2002; Young 
2003; Gould 2014, chap. 10). To think about how power-with works in political practice, paying attention 
to its specifically embodied and material valences is important – something my approach is able to do. 
Moreover, it could connect with her work in The Human Condition on the public realm, reading it as an 
affective coming together of bodies in speech and action. There are a number of issues and concepts that 
could be generatively pursued in an affective reading of Arendt, including but not limited to her theory of 
judgment, her account of thinking, her understanding of totalitarianism and the individual, the concept of 
the vita activa or of the web or relations, the status of the body in her work, and her relationship to 
feminist theory. Feeling as a method could also situate Arendt’s claim that “absence of emotions neither 
causes nor promotes rationality” – that “in order to respond reasonably one must first of all be ‘moved,’ 
and the opposite of emotional is not ‘rational’” (1972, 161) – in relation to work in affect theory 
challenging the reason-emotion binary that helps structure Western thought. While questions of “the body 
are purged … from Arendtian plurality” because of a “quest for purity in the domain of politics” in her 
thought (Connolly 1999, 181; 184), an affective reading can recover and reconstruct embodied 
dimensions of her thought.  
6 Braidotti rejects claims by many Kantians and/or Habermasians denying the possibility that 
poststructuralism can contribute to legitimate ethical thinking (2006, 144); here, she overlaps with work 
by Bennett (2001) and Connolly (1999), among others. She also critiques the disavowal of 
poststructuralism that accuses its ethical bent of resulting in apolitical or anti-political tendencies or 
effects (2006, 143-44).  Braidotti contends that: “The positivity of this desire to express one’s innermost 
and constitutive freedom (conatus, potentia, or becoming) is conducive to ethical behaviour, however, 
only if the subject is capable of making it last and endure, thus allowing it to sustain its own impetus. 
Unethical behaviour achieves the opposite: it denies, hinders and diminishes that impetus and hence 
makes the subject unable to sustain it” (2006, 134-35). The realm of political will shape the likelihood of 
and conditions under which the subject will or will not ethically endure; this is not, as Braidotti notes 
under the sole control of the individual/body/conjunction of flows. Unethical behaviors that work against 
the affectivity of the subject can be induced or discouraged by political processes. 
7 Thanks to Alyson Cole for initially pointing me to Gilson’s work.  
8 There are similarities here between Gilson and Judith Butler’s discussion of the differential allocation of 
precarity given a fundamental ontological condition of precariousness (2009). Gilson discusses Butler’s 
work at length in 2014, chap. 2, agreeing with much of Butler’s account, especially in its ties to 
normativity, but claims Butler makes the link between vulnerability and violence too strong at the 
expense of a more affirmative account of vulnerability. My account of the political organization of ethical 
encounters vis-à-vis Braidotti and Gilson would extend to Butler as well. I also find the way that Gilson 
discusses vulnerability in terms of an openness to affecting and being affected especially relevant to my 
own concerns with affect and emotion.   
9 Thanks to Emily Crandall for pushing me to clarify this point.  
10 She critiques contemporary theorists of vulnerability – naming Simon Critchley, Jessica Benjamin, 
Judith Butler, and Jean-François Lyotard – who draw on Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida in order to (a) 




                                                                                                                                                       
mourning” (145) and/or (b) “locate the constitution of subjectivity in the interrelation to others, which is a 
form of exposure, availability, and vulnerability” in a way that “entails the necessity of containing the 
other” (146-47). 
11 See, for example, the way that Braidotti emphasizes that her nomadic ethics “enacts the desire for in-
depth transformations,” presenting it as an “ethics of changes and transformations” with an “ethico-
political project” that “focuses on becomings,” ways to “experiment with different modes of constituting 
subjectivity and different ways of inhabiting our corporeality” (2006, 133–34). 
12 As such, generative work could occur inquiring into how biopolitics – as a form of making live and 
letting die – and necropolitics – as a form of making some die so that others can be made to live – are 
implicated in the political-ethical connections I pursue in this chapter. Several of the essays in the Beyond 
Biopolitics collection (Clough and Willse 2011) would likely prove important to such an endeavor. In a 
similar vein, future work could also engage the turn to thinking about “affirmative biopolitics” (e.g., 
Hardt and Negri 2004; Esposito 2008; Hardt and Negri 2009; Vatter 2014) from the perspective I am 
developing, as well as taking up affect in the context of Alexander Weheliye’s critique from a black 
feminist perspective of Agamben’s and Foucault’s work on biopolitics (2014). 
13 Thanks to Nicholas Tampio for pointing this issue out to me.  
14 Rancière is certainly not the only place to go for such debate on ethics and political theory; see for 
instance Vázquez-Arroyo 2004; Myers 2008; Weeks 2011, 227–28; Honig 2013, chap. 1; Mouffe 2013, 
15–18; Cole 2016. Rancière himself names at various turns Levinas, Hardt and Negri, Badiou, Agamben, 
Arendt, Žižek, Derrida, and Lyotard in his critique of what he sees as the “ethical turn” in political 
philosophy and political theory (Rancière 2010a; 2010b), although I would argue that his critique would 
extend to the kinds of arguments I am making here.  
15 These two issues concern him given his theory of ‘the political’. He argues that “there is politics 
inasmuch as ‘the people’ refer to subjects inscribed as a supplement to the count of the parts of society, a 
specific figure of the ‘part of those who have no-part;’” “whether this part exists is the political issue” 
(Rancière 2001, para. 19). Politics thus becomes “not a conflict between well defined interest groups” but 
“an opposition of logics that count the parties and parts of the community in a different way” (2001, para. 
19). There is for Rancière a fundamental “wrong” that cannot be settled or addressed through consensus 
or negotiation, because it “belongs to the original structure of all politics,” “institut[ing] a singular 
universal” (1999, 39).  
16 Also see Sara Ahmed’s work on Fanon (2004, chap. 3; 2006, chap. 3). 
17 Also see Fanon’s discussion of the “affectivity” of “the colonized” (2004, 19–20), as well as his 
account of the “epidermalization” of blackness in Black Skin, White Masks (2008). A more thorough 
reading of Fanon would work to explore the full range of colonial power’s affectivity and emotionality. It 
could also extend affect theory’s engagement with Fanon, and would have the potential to connect 
political theory and affect theory to current work in Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism, in which some 
of the debate between these intellectual formations centers on how precisely one reads Fanon (Sexton 
2011). Moreover, pairing Arendt and Fanon through attention to affect and emotion would also be 
generative, since Arendt spends some of “On Violence” critiquing Fanon on the question of violence. An 
affective reading might offer new perspectives for thinking through this debate – including my above 
affective reading of Arendt’s power/violence distinction – when race and colonialism are placed at the 
center.  
18 Such attention to the body and affect provides a helpful corrective to the questionable status of 
embodiment in Rancière. He claims that “the life of political subjectivization is made out of the difference 
between the voice and the body” (1992, 62). Such a move to potentially occlude the body makes it harder 
to think through the kinds of bodies presumed by and at work in Rancière’s thinking, or to engage the 
ways that politics is about bodies. It does mean, however, that we find an opening to bring the body in to 
Rancière’s theory and thus reimagine aspects of his work. 
19 In doing so, it could engage some of the generative work currently taking up the problematic of “flesh” 




                                                                                                                                                       
phenomenology to ask questions about politics, ontology, and agency. For her, “flesh” enables us to 
realize “that the way we think about matter and the images we use to do so have far-reaching implications 
for the way we think” about embodiment, nature, agency, and political sociality (2010, 112). If, as she 
writes, flesh demonstrates the “immanent generativity of existence” by disclosing how a body 
“‘animate[s] other bodies’” (106; internal quotes refer to Merleau-Ponty 1968, 140), then affective 
political theory can examine the way that political processes, norms, institutions, and powers organize and 
structure this generativity and animating force. In another example, for Roberto Esposito’s affirmative 
biopolitics, “flesh” opens up “possibilities unknown till now” for political thinking (2008, 166). This 
notion of the “flesh as such” is “both singular and communal, generic and specific, and undifferentiated 
and different” (167). I would argue that affect as such shares some of the same qualities as Esposito’s 
“flesh as such”, and thus this project is well suited to explore the political theoretical implications and 
intricacies of flesh. My readings – as well as other potential future readings of different theorists – 
examine how this flesh is acted upon and how fleshly materialities interact with one another in a political 
sense. A third important line of inquiry into flesh examines it as paradigmatic to racialization. Hortense 
Spillers makes a central distinction “between captive and liberated subject-positions” in the sense that 
“before the ‘body’ there is the ‘flesh’, that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape 
concealment … [i]f we think of the ‘flesh’ as primary narrative, then we mean its seared, divided, ripped-
apartness, riveted to the ship’s hold, fallen, or ‘escaped’ overboard” (2003b, 206). For Alexander 
Weheliye – building on Spillers in his critique of biopolitics and exploration of Black feminist theories of 
the human – flesh can “signal” both “how violent political domination activates a fleshly surplus that 
simultaneously sustains and disfigures said brutality” and a way “to reclaim the atrocity of flesh as a 
pivotal arena for the politics emanating from different traditions of the oppressed” (2014, 2). These works 
fundamentally challenge any attempt to unproblematically foreground flesh as a central category of 
politics or ethics, while at the same time emphasizing flesh as that which brings forth “a potentiality in 
any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of the future anterior freedoms and new genres of 
humanity” as well as “lines of flight, freedom dreams, practices of liberation, and possibilities of other 
worlds” (Weheliye 2014, 137; 2). Spillers and Weheliye push future affective political theory to more 
closely work through the way that racial and colonial domination is in some ways constitutive of what we 
know today as Western political theory. For instance, extending the work of Charles W. Mills (1997) on 
the racial contract or Uday S. Mehta (1999) on liberalism and empire by examining the role that affect 
plays in the structuring exclusions of Western thought could be important for any further research along 
the course suggested by my project. Here, the fleshly political theory I have worked to articulate must be 
careful to not reproduce the violences and exclusions that precede it.  
20 I use subterranean in the sense that Bennett does to describe her reading of Kant on moral sentiments: 
“I gather together the odd bits in Kant that form a subterranean theory of moral motivation, a Kantian 
picture of the affects of ethics. My aim is to trace the affective topography of his morality and to 
thematizes more overtly than he does its somatic or energetic dimensions” (2001, 134). My own project 
gathers together odd bits – or at least an odd mode of reading and theorizing – in order to more overtly 
thematizes emotion, affect, and embodiment in my thinkers.  
21 Insofar as we could call it a subject, given the way that different strands of affect theory challenge the 
coherence of and privileging of the subject. I also want to mark here that this dissertation, with the 
exception of my section on nature in Marx, has indeed anthropocentrically focused on the human as the 
central unit of political analysis. Future work advancing this project should examine the potential of 
affective political theory as I have developed it here to productively interact with work in vital 










Ahmed, Sara. 2004. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. New York: Routledge. 
———. 2006. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press. 
———. 2010. The Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Allen, Amy. 2002. “Power, Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault.” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2): 131–49. 
Althusser, Louis, and Etienne Balibar. 1979. Reading Capital. Translated by Ben Brewster. 
London: Verso. 
Andrew, Barbara S. 2003. “Beauvoir’s Place in Philosophical Thought.” In The Cambridge 
Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, edited by Claudia Card, 24–44. Cambridge, U.K. and 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Arendt, Hannah. 1972. “On Violence.” In Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics; Civil 
Disobedience; On Violence; Thoughts on Politics and Revolution, 103–98. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 
Arp, Kristana. 1995. “Beauvoir’s Concept of Bodily Alienation.” In Feminist Interpretations of 
Simone de Beauvoir, edited by Margaret A. Simons, 161–77. University Park, Pa.: 
Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Baca Zinn, Maxine, Lynn Weber Cannon, Elizabeth Higginbotham, and Bonnie Thornton Dill. 
1986. “The Costs of Exclusionary Practices in Women’s Studies.” Signs 11 (2): 290–303. 
Bauer, Nancy. 2001. Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
BBC. 2016. “Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts.” BBC News. 
Accessed March 11. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911. 
Beale, Frances. 1970. “Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female.” In Black Woman: An 
Anthology, 109–22. New York: Washington Square Press. 
Beasley, Chris, and Carol Bacchi. 2007. “Envisaging a New Politics for an Ethical Future: 
Beyond Trust, Care and Generosity — towards an Ethic of `social Flesh’.” Feminist 
Theory 8 (3): 279–98. doi:10.1177/1464700107082366. 
———. 2012. “Making Politics Fleshly: The Ethic of Social Flesh.” In Engaging with Carol 
Bacchi: Strategic Interventions and Exchanges, edited by Angelique Bletsas and Chris 
Beasley, 99–120. Adelaide, Australia: University of Adelaide Press. 
Beauvoir, Simone de. 1984. When Things of the Spirit Come First. Translated by Patrick O’Brien. 
New York: Random House. 
———. 1991. The Mandarins. Translated by Leonard M. Friedman. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company. 
———. 1999. She Came to Stay. Translated by Yvonne Moyse and Roger Senhouse. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company. 
———. 2011. The Second Sex. Translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier. 
New York: Vintage. 
Benjamin, Walter. 2002. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: 
Second Version.” In Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, edited by Howard Eiland and 
Michael W. Jennings, translated by Edmund Jephcott and Howard Eiland, Volume 3, 
1935-1938:401–11. Cambride, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press. 
255 
 
Bennett, Jane. 2001. The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics. 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
———. 2010. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Berg, Heather. 2014. “An Honest Day’s Wage for a Dishonest Day’s Work: (Re)Productivism 
and Refusal.” WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly 42 (1-2): 161–77. 
Bergoffen, Debra B. 1997. The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered Phenomenologies, 
Erotic Generosities. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Berlant, Lauren. 2008. The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in 
American Culture. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Bettcher, Talia M., and Susan Stryker, eds. 2016. “Trans/Feminisms.” TSQ: Transgender Studies 
Quarterly 3 (1-2). 
Blits, Jan H. 1989. “Hobbesian Fear.” Political Theory 17 (3): 417–31. 
Boros, Gábor, Herman De Dijn, Moira Gatens, Syliane Malinowski-Charles, Warren Montag, 
Teodor Münz, and Steven B. Smith. 2009. “Spinoza and Philosophers Today.” Eurozine - 
Kritika & Kontext. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-11-30-spinoza-en.html. 
Bowring, Bill. 2014. “What If Ilyenkov Had Known Marx’s Transcriptions of Spinoza?” Al-
Farabi 1 (45): 13–31. 
Braidotti, Rosi. 2006. “The Ethics of Becoming-Imperceptible.” In Deleuze and Philosophy, 
edited by Constantin V. Boundas, 133–59. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
———. 2009. “Affirmation versus Vulnerability: On Contemporary Ethical Debates.” In Gilles 
Deleuze: The Intensive Reduction, edited by Constantin V. Boundas, 143–60. London 
and New York: Continuum Books. 
———. 2013. The Posthuman. Malden, MA and Oxford: Polity Press. 
Brennan, Teresa. 2004. The Transmission of Affect. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Brittan, Arthur, and Mary Maynard. 1984. Sexism, Racism, and Oppression. Oxford and New 
York: Basil Blackwell. 
Brown, Rachel H. 2016. “Re-Examining the Transnational Nanny.” International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 18 (2): 210–29. 
Brown, Wendy. 1987. “Where Is the Sex in Political Theory?” Women & Politics 7 (1): 3–23. 
———. 1988. Manhood and Politics: A Feminist Reading in Political Theory. Totowa, N.J.: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Brunner, Jim. 2015. “Black Lives Matter Protesters Shut down Bernie Sanders; Later Rally 
Draws 15,000.” The Seattle Times, August 8. http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/politics/black-lives-matter-protesters-shut-down-bernie-sanders-rally/. 
Bryant, Levi R. 2011. The Democracy of Objects. Open Humanities Press. 
Buck-Morss, Susan. 1992. “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay 
Reconsidered.” October 62: 3–41. 
Butler, Judith. 2009. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? London; New York: Verso. 
———. 2015. Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. 
Caraway, Nancie. 1991. Segregated Sisterhood: Racism and the Politics of American Feminism. 
Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press. 
Carby, Hazel V. 1982. “White Woman Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of 
Sisterhood.” In The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain, by Centre for 
Contemporary Studies. London: Hutchinson. 
256 
 
Casarino, Cesare, and Antonio Negri. 2004. “It’s a Powerful Life: A Conversation on 
Contemporary Philosophy.” Cultural Critique 57 (1): 151–83. doi:10.1353/cul.2004.0003. 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2007. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference. 2nd Edition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Cheah, Pheng. 2003. Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial 
Literatures of LIberation. New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 2010. “Non-Dialectical Materialism.” In New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, Politics, 
edited by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, 70–91. Durham and London: Duke 
University Press. 
Chen, Adrien. 2014. “The Laborers Who Keep Dick Pics and Beheadings Out of Your Facebook 
Feed.” Wired. October 23. http://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/. 
Clough, Patricia Ticineto. 2007. “Introduction.” In The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, 
edited by Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean O’Malley Halley, 1–33. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
———. 2010. “The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia, and Bodies.” In The Affect 
Theory Reader, edited by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, 206–25. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press. 
Clough, Patricia Ticineto, Greg Goldberg, Rachel Schiff, Aaron Weeks, and Craig Willse. 2007. 
“Notes Towards a Theory of Affect-Itself.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in 
Organization 7 (1): 60–77. 
Clough, Patricia Ticineto, and Craig Willse, eds. 2011. Beyond Biopolitics: Essays on the 
Governance of Life and Death. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Cole, Alyson. 2016. “All of Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vulnerable Than Others: 
The Political Ambiguity of Vulnerability Studies, An Ambivalent Critique.” Critical 
Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory 17 (2). 
Collins, Patricia Hill. 2009. Black Feminist Thought. 2nd ed. New York and London: Routledge. 
Connolly, William E. 1995. The Ethos of Pluralization. Minneapolis and London: University Of 
Minnesota Press. 
———. 1999. Why I Am Not a Secularist. Minneapolis, MN: University Of Minnesota Press. 
———. 2001. “Spinoza and Us.” Political Theory 29 (4): 583–94. 
———. 2002. Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed. Minneapolis, MN: University Of 
Minnesota Press. 
Coole, Diana. 2010. “The Intertia of Matter and the Generativity of Flesh.” In New Materialisms: 
Ontology, Agency, Politics, edited by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, 92–115. Durham 
and London: Duke University Press. 
Coole, Diana H, and Samantha Frost, eds. 2010. New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and 
Politics. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Cox, Nicole, and Silvia Federici. 1975. Counter-Planning from the Kitchen: Wages for 
Housework A Perspective on Capital and the Left. Brooklyn, New York and London: 
Falling Wall Press, Ltd. 
Curley, Edwin. 1991. “The State of Nature and Its Law in Hobbes and Spinoza.” Philosophical 
Topics 19 (1): 97–117. 
Cvetkovich, Ann. 1992. Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian Sensationalism. 
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 
———. 2003. An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
257 
 
———. 2012. Depression: A Public Feeling. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Daigle, Christine. 2014. “The Second Sex as Appeal: The Ethical Dimension of Ambiguity.” 
philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 4 (2): 197–220. 
Dalla Costa, Mariarosa. 1972. “Women and the Subversion of the Community.” Radical 
America 6 (1): 67–102. 
da Silva, Denise Ferreira. 2007. Toward a Global Idea of Race. Minneapolis: University Of 
Minnesota Press. 
Davis, Angela Y. 1983. Women, Race & Class. New York: Vintage. 
Deleuze, Gilles. 1988. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Translated by Robert Hurley. San 
Francisco: City Lights Books. 
———. 1990. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Translated by Martin Joughin. New York: 
Zone Books. 
———. 1995. “Letter to a Harsh Critic.” In Negotiations, translated by Martin Joughin, 3–12. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1983. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University 
Of Minnesota Press. 
———. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian 
Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
———. 1994. What Is Philosophy? Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Delphy, Christine. 1997. “For a Materialist Feminism.” In Materialist Feminism: A Reader in 
Class, Difference, and Women’s Lives, edited by Rosemary Hennessy and Chrys 
Ingraham, 59–64. New York and London: Routledge. 
Dolphijn, Rick, and Iris van der Tuin. 2012. New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies. 
Open Humanities Press. 
Duncan, Stewart. 2005. “Hobbes’s Materialism in the Early 1640s.” British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 13: 437–48. 
Dungey, Nicholas. 2008. “Thomas Hobbes’s Materialism, Language, and the Possibility of 
Politics.” The Review of Politics 70 (02): 190–220. 
Easton, David. 1965. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Edwards, Jason. 2010. “The Materialism of Historical Materialism.” In New Materialisms: 
Ontology, Agency, Politics, edited by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, 281–98. Durham 
and London: Duke University Press. 
Eisenstein, Zillah R. 1979. “Developing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist 
Feminism.” In Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism, edited by 
Zillah R. Eisenstein, 5–40. New York and London: Monthly Review Press. 
———. 1994. The Color of Gender: Reimaging Democracy. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
———. 1996. Hatreds: Racialized and Sexualized Conflicts in the 21st Century. New York: 
Routledge. 
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1993. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political 
Thought. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Engels, Friedrich. 2010. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Edited by 
Tristram Hunt. London and New York: Penguin. 
258 
 
Esposito, Roberto. 2008. Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy. Translated by Timothy Campbell. 
Minneapolis and London: University Of Minnesota Press. 
Fanon, Frantz. 2004. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: 
Grove Press. 
———. 2008. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press. 
Fee, Terry. 1976. “Domestic Labor: An Analysis of Housework and Its Relation to the 
Production Process.” Review of Radical Political Economics 8 (1): 1–8. 
Ferguson, Ann. 1989. Blood at the Root: Motherhood, Sexuality and Male Dominance. London: 
Pandora Press. 
Ferguson, Kathy E., and Lori J. Marso, eds. 2012. “Symposium on Simone de Beauvoir.” Theory 
& Event 15 (2). 
Frank, Jason. 2010. Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Frost, Samantha. 2008. Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics and 
Politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
———. 2011. “The Implications of the New Materialisms for Feminist Epistemology.” In 
Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge, edited by Heidi 
E. Grasswick, 2011th ed., 69–83. London and New York: Springer. 
Gaskin, J.C.A. 2008. “Introduction.” In Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, by Thomas 
Hobbes, edited by J.C.A. Gaskin, 183–228. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gibson-Graham, JK. 2006. The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of 
Political Economy. Revised Edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Gilson, Erinn C. 2011. “Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression.” Hypatia 26 (2). 
———. 2014. The Ethics of Vulnerability: A Feminist Analysis of Social Life and Practice. New 
York and London: Routledge. 
Gould, Carol C. 1980. Marx’s Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx’s Theory 
of Social Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
———. 2014. Interactive Democracy: The Social Roots of Global Justice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gould, Deborah B. 2009. Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP’s Fight against AIDS. Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press. 
Grattan, Sean. 2011. “The Indignant Multitude: Spinozist Marxism after Empire".” Mediations 
25 (2): 5–21. 
Gregg, Melissa, and Gregory J. Seigworth. 2010. “An Inventory of Shimmers.” In The Affect 
Theory Reader, edited by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, 1–25. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press. 
Grosz, Elizabeth. 1990. “Inscriptions and Body-Maps: Representations and the Corporeal.” In 
Feminine/Masculine and Representation, edited by Terry Threadgold, 62–74. Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin. 
———. 2004. The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
———. 2010. “Feminism, Materialism, and Freedom.” In New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, 
and Politics, edited by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, 139–57. Durham and London: 
Duke University Press. 
259 
 
Hampton, Jean. 1986. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hardt, Michael. 1999. “Affective Labor.” Boundary 2 26 (2): 89–100. 
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. Empire. Cambridge  Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
———. 2004a. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: The Penguin 
Press. 
———. 2004b. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: Penguin Press. 
———. 2009. Commonwealth. Cambride, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Hartmann, Heidi I. 1979. “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More 
Progressive Union.” Capital & Class 3: 1–33. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1892. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by T.S. 
Haldane. Vol. 1. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 
http://archive.org/details/lecturesonthehis01hegeuoft. 
———. 1896. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by T.S. Haldane. Vol. 3. 
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 
http://archive.org/details/lectureshistoryp03hegeuoft. 
Heinämaa, Sara. 2003. Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, 
Beauvoir. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Held, Virginia. 2005. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Heller, Agnes. 1976. The Theory of Need in Marx. London: Allison & Busby. 
Hemmings, Clare. 2011. Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press Books. 
Hengehold, Laura. 2006. “Beauvoir’s Parrhesiastic Contracts: Frank-Speaking and the 
Philosophical-Political Couple.” In The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Critical 
Essays, edited by Margaret A. Simons, 178–200. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press. 
Hennessy, Rosemary. 2000. Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism. New York 
and London: Routledge. 
Hinton, Peta, and Iris van der Tuin, eds. 2014. Women: A Cultural Review 25 (1). 
Hobbes, Thomas. 1839. “Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning Body.” In The 
English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, edited by Sir William Molesworth. 
Vol. I. London: John Bohn. 
———. 1996. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. 2008. “Elements of Law Natural and Politic.” In Human Nature and De Corpore 
Politico, edited by J.C.A. Gaskin, 183–228. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2000. “Global Care Chains and Emotional Surplus Value.” In On the 
Edge: Living with Global Capitalism, edited by Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens, 130–
46. London: Jonathan Cape. 
———. 2012. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. Revised. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 




Honig, Bonnie. 2013. Antigone, Interrupted. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
hooks, bell. 1981. Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism. Boston: South End Press. 
———. 1984. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. Boston: South End Press. 
James, Susan. 1997. Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Joseph, Gloria. 1981. “The Incompatible Menage A Trois: Marxism, Feminism, and Racism.” In 
Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and 
Feminism, edited by Lydia Sargent, 91–107. Boston: South End Press. 
Kargon, Robert H. 1966. Atomism in England From Hariot to Newton. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Koivunen, Anu. 2010. “An Affective Turn? Reimagining the Subject of Feminist Theory.” In 
Working with Affect in Feminist Readings: Disturbing Differences, edited by Marianne 
Liljeström and Susanna Passonen, 8–28. London and New York: Routledge. 
Kojève, Alexandre. 1996. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Edited by Allan Bloom. 
Translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Kristeva, Julia. 1982. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Kruks, Sonia. 2001. Retrieving Experience : Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
———. 2005. “Beauvoir’s Time/Our Time: The Renaissance in Simone De Beauvoir Studies.” 
Feminist Studies 31 (2): 286–309. 
———. 2010. “Simone de Beauvoir: Engaging Discrepant Materialisms.” In New Materialisms: 
Ontology, Agency, and Politics, edited by Diana H Coole and Samantha Frost, 258–80. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
———. 2012. Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Ambiguity. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Lasswell, Harold D. 1936. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Lazzarato, Maurizio. 1996. “Immaterial Labor.” In Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, 
edited by Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, 133–47. Minneapolis; London: University Of 
Minnesota Press. 
Leopold, David, and Marc Stears. 2008. “Introduction.” In Political Theory: Methods and 
Approaches, edited by David Leopold and Marc Stears, 1–10. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lloyd, Genevieve. 1993. The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy. 
Second Edition. London: Routledge. 
Lorde, Audre. 1984. Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. Berkeley: The Crossing Press. 
Lordon, Frédéric. 2001. “Conatus et Institutions: Pur Un Structuralism énérgetique.” L’Année de 
La Regulation 6: 1–36. 
———. 2014. Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire. Translated by Gabriel 
Ash. London and New York: Verso. 
Lukács, György. 1973. “Existentialism.” In Marxism and Human Liberation: Essays on History, 
Culture, and Revolution by Georg Lukacs, edited by E. San Juan, translated by Henry F. 
Mins. New York: Dell Publishing Comapny. 
261 
 
Lundgren-Gothlin, Eva. 1996. Sex and Existence: Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. 
Translated by Linda Schenck. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. 1993. Libidinal Economy. Translated by Ian Hamilton Grant. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Mackintosh, Maureen. 1979. “Domestic Labour and the Household.” In Fit Work for Women, 
edited by Sandra Burman, 153–72. London: Croom Helm. 
Malos, Ellen. 1978. “Housework and the Politics of Women’s Liberation.” Socialist Review 37: 
41–71. 
Marso, Lori J. 2012. “Thinking Politically with Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex.” Theory 
& Event 15 (2). 
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v015/15.2.marso.ht
ml. 
———. 2014. “Solidarity sans Identity: Richard Wright and Simone de Beauvoir Theorize 
Political Subjectivity.” Contemporary Political Theory 13 (3): 242–62. 
Martel, James. 2007. Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas Hobbes as a Radical Democrat. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Marx, Karl. 1973. Grundrisse. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. London and New York: Penguin 
Books. 
———. 1977. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One. Translated by Ben 
Fowkes. New York: Vintage Books. 
———. 1978. “The Civil War in France.” In The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. 
Tucker, Second, 618–52. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
———. 1988. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Translated by Martin 
Milligan. New York: Prometheus Books. 
———. 1991. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three. Translated by David 
Fernbach. London: Penguin Books and New Left Review. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1948. Manifesto of the Communist Party. New York: 
International Publishers. 
———. 1956. The Holy Family: Or Critique of Critical Criticism Agaisnt Bruno Bauer and 
Company. Translated by Richard Dixon. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 
———. 1988. The German Ideology. New York: Prometheus Books. 
Massumi, Brian. 2002. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press. 
———. 2014. The Power at the End of the Economy. Durham and London: Duke University 
Press. 
McClure, Christopher Scott. 2011. “Hell and Anxiety in Hobbes’s Leviathan.” The Review of 
Politics 73 (1): 1–27. 
Mehta, Uday Singh. 1999. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British 
Liberal Thought. 1 edition. University Of Chicago Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. The Visible and the Invisible. Translated by Alfonso Lingis. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Mies, Maria. 1986. Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International 
Division of Labour. London: Zed Books. 
Milligan, Martin. 1988. “Translator’s Note on Terminology.” In Economic and Philosophic 




Mills, Charles W. 1997. The Racial Contract. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Mitchell, Juliet. 1966. “Women: The Longest Revolution.” New Left Review 40: 11–37. 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1997. “Women Workers and Capitalist Scripts: Ideologies of 
Domination, Common Interests, and the Politics of Solidarity.” In Feminist Genealogies, 
Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures, edited by M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty, 3–29. New York and London: Routledge. 
Moi, Toril. 1999. “What Is a Woman? Sex, Gender, and the Body in Feminist Theory.” In What 
Is a Woman?: And Other Essays, 3–119. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2008. Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman. 2nd ed. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Montag, Warren. 2008. “Preface.” In Spinoza and Politics, by Etienne Balibar, vii – xx. London 
and New York: Verso. 
Moraga, Cherríe, and Gloria Anzaldúa, eds. 1983. This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by 
Radical Women of Color. 2nd ed. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press. 
Mouffe, Chantal. 2013. Agonistics: Thinking The World Politically. London and New York: 
Verso. 
Murphy, Ann V. 2011. “‘Violence Is Not an Evil’: Ambiguity and Violence in Simone de 
Beauvoir’s Early Philosophical Writings.” philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental 
Feminism 1 (1): 29–44. 
Mussett, Shannon M. 2006. “Conditions of Servitude: The Peculiar Role of the Master-Slave 
Dialectic in Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex.” In The Philosophy of Simone de 
Beauvoir: Critical Essays, edited by Margaret A. Simons, 276–93. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press. 
Myers, Ella. 2008. “Resisting Foucauldian Ethics: Associative Politics and the Limits of the Care 
of the Self.” Contemporary Political Theory 7 (2): 125–46. 
Negri, Antonio. 1991a. Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse. Edited by Jim Fleming. 
Translated by Harry Cleaver, Michael Ryan, and Maurizio Viano. Brooklyn, New York: 
Autonomedia. 
———. 1991b. The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics. 
Translated by Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press. 
———. 1999. “Value and Affect.” Translated by Michael Hardt. Boundary 2 26 (2): 77–88. 
Ngai, Sianne. 2005. Ugly Feelings. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press. 
Nyquist, Mary. 2013. Arbitrary Rule: Slavery, Tyranny, and the Power of Life and Death. 
Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
Okin, Susan Moller. 1979. Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Ong, Aihwa. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. 
Durham, N.C: Duke University Press. 
Overhoff, Jurgen. 2000. Hobbes’s Theory of Will: Ideological Reasons and Historical 
Circumstances. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Parreñas, Rhacel Salazar. 2015. Servants of Globalization: Migration and Domestic Work. 2nd 
ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Pateman, Carole. 1988. The Sexual Contract. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Pedwell, Carolyn. 2014. Affective Relations: The Transnational Politics of Empathy. London and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
263 
 
Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack. 1979. “Dissolving the Hyphen: A Report on Marxist-Feminist 
Groups 1-5.” In Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism, edited by 
Zillah R. Eisenstein, 373–89. New York and London: Monthly Review Press. 
———. 1987. “Man of Flesh, Woman of Reason: A Re-Reading of Seventeenth Century Body 
Politics.” Unpublished Manuscript. 
———. 1990. Abortion and Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom. 
Revised ed. Boston: Northeastern University Press. 
Peters, Richard. 1967. Hobbes. 2nd ed. New York: Penguin. 
Protevi, John. 2009. Political Affect: Connecting the Somatic and the Social. Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press. 
Puar, Jasbir K. forthcoming. States of Debility and Capacity. Durham and London: Duke 
University Press. 
Rancière, Jacques. 1992. “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization.” October 61: 58–64. 
———. 1999. Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy. Translated by Julie Rose. Minneapolis; 
London: University of Minnesota Press. 
———. 2001. “Ten Theses on Politics.” Theory and Event 5 (3). 
———. 2010a. “The Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics.” In Dissensus: On Politics and 
Aesthetics, translated by Steven Corcoran, 184–202. London; New York: Continuum 
Books. 
———. 2010b. “The Use of Distinctions.” In Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, translated 
by Steven Corcoran, 205–18. London; New York: Continuum Books. 
Read, Jason. 2015. “The Order and Connection of Ideology Is the Same as the Order and 
Connection of Exploitation; Or, Towards a Bestiary of the Capitalist Imagination.” 
Philosophy Today. doi:10.5840/philtoday201522059. 
Roberts, Sarah T. 2016. “Commercial Content Moderation: Digital Laborers’ Dirty Work.” 
Media Studies Publications, no. Paper 12. http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/commpub/12. 
Robin, Corey. 2004. Fear: The History of a Political Idea. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ross, Andrew A. G. 2013. Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict. 
Chicago and London: University Of Chicago Press. 
Rubin, Gayle. 1975. “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex.” In 
Toward an Anthropology of Women, edited by Rayna R. Reiter, 157–210. New York and 
London: Monthly Review Press. 
Ruddick, Susan. 2010. “The Politics of Affect: Spinoza in the Work of Negri and Deleuze.” 
Theory, Culture & Society 27 (4): 21–45. 
Sacksteder, William. 1980. “How Much of Hobbes Might Spinoza Have Read?:” Southwestern 
Journal of Philosophy 11 (2): 25–39. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1968. Search for a Method. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: 
Vintage. 
Scarth, Fredrika. 2004. The Other Within: Ethics, Politics, and the Body in Simone de Beauvoir. 
Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Schmidt, Alfred. 2014. The Concept of Nature in Marx. London and New York: Verso. 
Schwarzenbach, Sibyl A. 2009. On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. 2003a. “Introduction.” In Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, 
Performativity, 1–25. Durham: Duke University Press. 
264 
 
———. 2003b. “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, Or, You’re so Paranoid, You 
Probably Think This Essay Is About You.” In Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, 
Performativity, 123–51. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, and Adam Frank. 2003. “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading 
Silvan Tomkins.” In Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press. 
Sexton, Jared. 2011. “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism.” 
InTensions 5. 
Shapin, Steven, and Simon Schaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the 
Experimental Life. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Shaviro, Steven. 2012. Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
Simons, Margaret A. 2001. Beauvoir and The Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of 
Existentialism. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. 
———. 2003. “Bergson’s Influence on Beauvoir’s Philosophical Methodology.” In The 
Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, edited by Claudia Card, 107–28. 
Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Simplican, Stacy Clifford. 2015. The Capacity Contract: Intellectual Disability and the Question 
of Citizenship. Minneapolis and London: University Of Minnesota Press. 
Sokoloff, William W. 2001. “Politics and Anxiety in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan.” Theory & 
Event 5 (1). 
Sorell, Tom. 1986. Hobbes. New York: Routledge Kegan Paul. 
Spelman, Elizabeth V. 1988. Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
Spillers, Hortense J. 2003a. “Interstices: A Small Drama of Words.” In Black, White, and in 
Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture, 152–75. Chicago and London: 
University Of Chicago Press. 
———. 2003b. “Mama’s Maybe, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book.” In Black, 
White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture, 203–29. Chicago and 
London: University Of Chicago Press. 
———. 2003c. “The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual: A Post-Date.” In Black, White, and in 
Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture, 428–70. Chicago and London: 
University Of Chicago Press. 
Spinoza, Benedict de. 2005. Ethics. Translated by Edwin Curley. London; New York: Penguin 
Classics. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1999. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the 
Vanishing Present. Cambride, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press. 
Steinberg, Justin. 2013. “Spinoza’s Political Philosophy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2013. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/spinoza-political/. 
Stewart, Kathleen. 2007. Ordinary Affects. Durham: Duke University Press. 
StoryCorps. 2016. “Not Sorry: The Woman Who Interrupted Bernie Sanders In Seattle.” 
KUOW.org. February 29. http://kuow.org/post/not-sorry-woman-who-interrupted-bernie-
sanders-seattle. 
Tambornino, John. 2002. The Corporeal Turn: Passion, Necessity, Politics. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
265 
 
Tampio, Nicholas. 2015. Deleuze’s Political Vision. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Terada, Rei. 2001. Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the “Death of the Subject.” Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Tronto, Joan C. 2013. Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice. New York: NYU 
Press. 
Tuck, Richard. 1993. Philosophy and Government 1572-1651. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
UNHCR. 2016. “UNHCR Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response - Mediterranean.” Accessed 
March 11. http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php. 
van der Tuin, Iris. 2009. “‘Jumping Generations’: On Second- and Third-Wave Feminist 
Epistemology.” Australian Feminist Studies 24 (59): 17–31. 
Vardoulakis, Dimitris, ed. 2011. Spinoza Now. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press. 
Vatter, Miguel. 2014. The Republic of the Living: Biopolitics and the Critique of Civil Society. 
New York: Fordham University Press. 
Vázquez-Arroyo, Antonio. 2004. “Agonized Liberalism: The Liberal Theory of William E. 
Connolly.” Radical Philosophy 127: 8–19. 
Vintges, Karen. 1996. Philosophy as Passion: The Thinking of Simone De Beauvoir. Translated 
by Anne Lavelle. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
———. 2006. “Simone de Beauvoir: A Feminist Thinker for the Twenty-First Century.” In The 
Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Critical Essays, edited by Margaret A. Simons, 214–
27. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Vogel, Lise. 2000. “Domestic Labor Revisited.” Science & Society 64 (2): 151–70. 
———. 2013. Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory. 2013 ed. 
Chicago: Haymarket Books. 
von Mossner, Alexa Weik, ed. 2014. Moving Environments: Affect, Emotion, Ecology, and Film. 
Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 
Ward, Julie K. 1995. “Beauvoir’s Two Senses of ‘Body’ in The Second Sex.” In Feminist 
Interpretations of Simone de Beauvoir, edited by Margaret A. Simons, 223–42. 
University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Washick, Bonnie, Elizabeth Wingrove, Kathy E. Ferguson, and Jane Bennett. 2015. “Politics 
That Matter: Thinking about Power and Justice with the New Materialists.” 
Contemporary Political Theory 14 (1): 63–89. 
Watkins, John W. N. 1965. Hobbes’s System of Ideas: A Study in the Political Significance of 
Philosophical Theories. London: Hutchinson. 
Weeks, Kathi. 2007a. “Life Within and Against Work: Affective Labor, Feminist Critique, and 
Post-Fordist Politics.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization 7 (1): 233–49. 
———. 2007b. “Life within and against Work: Affective Labor, Feminist Critique, and Post-
Fordist Politics.” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization 7 (1): 233–49. 
———. 2011. The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork 
Imaginaries. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Weheliye, Alexander G. 2014. Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black 
Feminist Theories of the Human. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Wilcox, Lauren B. 2015. Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International 
Relations. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 




Wolin, Sheldon S. 2004. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political 
Thought. Expanded Ed. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Young, Iris Marion. 2003. “Violence against Power.” In Ethics and Foreign Intervention, edited 
by Deen Chatterjee and Don Scheid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Yovel, Yirmiyahu. 1989. Spinoza and Other Heretics, Volume 2: The Adventures of Immanence. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
 
